world that embodied Blake’s “transformed understanding of Liberty” (170). I felt a true
siren’s call near the end, when Freeman cites Wendell Berry, an author whose work has
been formative to me, as one who

is not simply imitating Blake’s prophetic example and imagery. He has heard and
answered the call to be a prophet in the building up of Jerusalem—or, to be more precise,
in the building up of Jerusalem in Henry County, Kentucky. He has followed a calling to
cultivate the disciplines of the domestic arts, from farm and forest to open table shared
with friends and strangers. And, in so doing, he has become not just a prophet against
empire but a prophet for a community of gladness. (188)

Now that is a sort of dissenting, a sort of confronting and subverting for the purpose of
nurturing and rebuilding, which I understand and embrace. And if that is the spirit of
undomesticated dissent, after centuries of prophetic labors and suffering, finally gaining
a bit of fruition, then I think Freeman’s narrative is both meaningful and compelling. I
find myself still a bit mystified by symbolism and perplexed by analogical readings, but
ready to join the strand of those who “see themselves as pilgrims in this secular age,
answerable to the law of another city toward which they journey by faith on the wings
of the love of God and neighbor” (222). Freeman’s narrative gives us both models and
motive to join that goodly company, no matter the cost.

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Constitutionalism, Democracy and Religious Freedom:
To Be Fully Human
Hans-Martien ten Napel
London: Routledge, 2017 (170 pages)

Professor Hans-Martien ten Napel from Leiden University in the Netherlands has endeav-
ored yet another analysis of freedom of religion and belief within the state. In the atmos-
phere of militant secularization (or in fact laïcité) in many areas of our contemporary
sociopolitical life, it is a very relevant and current issue. It seems that there are two
models of how religion exists in the state: distinction between the church and the state
(as in the thought of Lord John Acton) and separation (the French model). Unfortunately,
it is the latter that has become dominant. In any case when religion clashes with the state
we are reminded that “we have separation of church and state!” as if separation were a
revealed word.

This book consists of four chapters in which the author considers, in turn, communal
religious freedom under pressure, social pluralist constitutionalism, pluriform democracy,
and a generous conception of religious freedom. There is yet one additional “chapter”
which is in fact not titled as a chapter, but bears a very intriguing name, “A Horizon of
Beauty.” In his book, Professor ten Napel focuses “on these associational and institu-
tional dimensions of the right to freedom of religion or belief, and their significance for
the proper functioning of our Western liberal societies” (2). This point is central in the
book, for indeed one may ask how a communal form of religion can exist in the heart of
an individualist and liberal-type political structure. Ten Napel considers himself “a critic
of the right to freedom of religion or belief” and argues that “the liberal individualist
paradigm that one can sometimes see at work in the case law of, for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court, can easily place pressure on communal religious freedom” (4).

In the four chapters of the book ten Napel does not wish to provide a final answer to the
issues his book addresses, but wants to initiate a discussion. As the author formulates it,
the book is supposed to be “a conversation opener rather than … a conversation stopper”
(141). It seems that the main question is how to retain the communal form of religion in a
pluralist setting. Indeed, in the context of a privatized religion one may ask whether there
is room for a communal religion with institutional forms, such as Roman Catholicism.
The author rightly observes that “institutional religious autonomy is, in turn, foundational
for the notion of limited government and as such for liberal democracy as a whole” (9).
The book elaborates on the presence of religion in the context of such concepts as “plu-
ralism, religious freedom, liberal pluralism, social pluralist constitutionalism, pluriform
democracy and political legitimacy” (140). The question is whether the communal form
of religious freedom needs extra protection or whether it suffices to simply guarantee the
popular liberal rights, namely, freedom of speech and freedom of expression.

Professor ten Napel postulates a vision of society in which (liberal) pluralism, religious
freedom, social pluralist constitutionalism, pluriform democracy, political legitimacy, and
democratic ethos are not only theoretically proposed, but also practically implemented.
Pluralism, for that matter, safeguards the representation of a wide variety of worldviews
in society, including a religious view. He proposes a peaceful coexistence when he writes
that “most people are trying to make sense of their lives; many of us do so in a transcen-
dental manner, others look for meaning in what is immanent” (143). As I understand it,
the author is trying to come to grips with our modern and premodern heritage. I am not
quite sure whether the term “transcendental” was a good choice, unless ten Napel had
Kant in mind here. It would be more appropriate to use “transcendent,” for what is sug-
gested here is a contrast between naturalist and nonnaturalist points of view. In a pluralist
society, the author seems to suggest, those who look to their natural reason and those who
find inspiration in religious texts may live together undisturbed.

It is interesting to note that, according to the author, pluralism as a social value of
Western societies is also true about their religious character, that is, these societies embrace
a wide scope of religions. Let us note that ten Napel’s mysteriously titled general conclu-
sion indeed opens up before us a “horizon of beauty” if we realize, as the author seems
to have realized, that humanity’s spiritual nature must be taken into account. Professor
ten Napel claims that the pluralist character of society entails also the spiritual nature of
humanity as one of its dimensions. The title of the book has this vital addition: “to be
fully human.” Therefore, if the true aim of society is to provide conditions for genuine
human development, the religious sphere must also be cared for.
Professor ten Napel advocates the right to freedom of religion or belief not from the point of view of a religion and its claims to absolute truth, but from the point of view of a political theory that protects the plurality of worldviews. Among these worldviews religion has its place. What worries me, though, is the author’s assumed relativism when he says that religions are not static but dynamic and that the right to freedom of religion or belief “possesses the flexibility to adapt to changing needs” (145). I wish he could explain precisely what he means by this “flexibility,” and what scope this flexibility has. I wonder whether Roman Catholicism fits the picture of his presumed flexibility. What we are witnessing today is quite a broad spectrum of Protestant religions, many of which hold views that are at loggerheads with the teaching of the Bible, such as, for example, its teaching on homosexuality. If, as stated in the book, there are some “transcendental” claims in religions, not all the demands of society can be met. The true religion is not obliged to meet any such demands, but to present the ultimate calling of the human being. Obviously, some religious forms can always be adjusted to what is changing, but there are truths that can never be changed (e.g., the teaching on the respect for human life from conception to natural death).

Additionally, Professor ten Napel rightly distinguishes two types of liberalism in the West: progressive and conservative. The progressive type seeks the implementation of such Enlightenment ideals as liberty, equality, and fraternity. Taken from a different point of view it proposes negative liberty as the principal value in modern society. The conservative type supports constitutionalism, provides room for mediating structures within the state, and bears great respect for the freedom of conscience. I agree with the author that it is conservative liberalism that better safeguards social plurality.

The author does well to stress the importance of such nonstate actors as families and schools in the efforts to check the power of the state. Political and legal constitutionalism collaborate, as we know, in the separation between the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. This kind of separation, however, does not in and of itself suffice for a mature civil society to be formed. I think that this point should be especially emphasized. With regard to constitutionalism and the right to freedom of religion or belief, more is needed than separation of political and legal powers. As Professor ten Napel writes, one should also “acknowledge that a communal dimension to this right exists” (148).

To sum up, the book Constitutionalism, Democracy and Religious Freedom: To Be Fully Human is a well-written text on such important issues for contemporary societies as freedom of religion or belief in its communal form, freedom of conscience, and civic activity. It attempts to show an integral approach to the human being. This integral approach should strive to create such an ethos in which a full development of the human being is possible. By a full development is meant such a condition in which this being can manifest his or her beliefs not only within the privacy of his or her home but also in public without any fear of oppression or discrimination. If citizens are forced to hide their religious views, they are doomed to be inauthentic selves, and will always feel a kind of schizophrenia.

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