Augustinian Motifs in Mandeville’s Theory of Society

In the eighteenth century, the Dutch-born satirist Bernard Mandeville was generally associated with deism and atheism. Nowadays scholarly opinions about his theological outlook are strongly divided. Instead of reassessing what Mandeville really believed, this article focuses on three theological motifs that recur in Mandeville’s *Fable of the Bees*. These typically Augustinian ideas concerning the fall of man, the two faces of evil, and the distinction between worldly and real happiness deserve more attention than they have hitherto received. Even if E. G. Hundert is right that Mandeville “abandoned the Augustinian premises” of the Calvinists and the Jansenists, he clearly did not forsake all of them. I argue that the three motifs are part of a framework within which Mandeville develops his theory of man and society. Interestingly, Mandeville’s well-known thesis “private vices, public benefits” also seems to build on these Augustinian ideas.

**Introduction**

The physician and philosopher Bernard Mandeville (1660–1733) was undoubtedly one of the most controversial writers of the eighteenth century. His is one of only a few names that were mentioned in one and the same breath with Machiavelli, Spinoza, and Hobbes; in the early modern period, this certainly was no compliment. In the eyes of his contemporaries, Mandeville, like these other radical writers, had dared to undermine sacred religion, true virtue, and good order. The Anglo-Dutch writer proposed a plan for the establishment of public houses of prostitution, authored a book with liberal thoughts on religion and theology, and produced erotic dialogues and poems. Above all, Mandeville owed his scandalous
reputation to *The Fable of the Bees* (six editions between 1714 and 1732), a work intended to “run down religion and virtue as prejudicial to society, and detrimental to the state; and to recommend luxury, avarice, pride, and all kind of vices, as being necessary to welfare” (2:385). This, at least, was how the Grand Jury of Middlesex evaluated it when presenting the book to the Court of the King’s Bench as a public nuisance. Throughout the century, the *Fable* was hotly contested for a variety of reasons. Among other accusations, it was blamed for relating national prosperity to vice, for casting doubt on the good intentions of the charity school movement, for presenting morality and religion as human inventions, and for portraying man as a thoroughly selfish animal.

This article deals with what may be called Mandeville’s theology. Whereas in the eighteenth century Mandeville’s impiety was beyond doubt, nowadays scholarly opinions about his theological beliefs are strongly divided. It is true that many commentators continue to depict him as, at least, an atheist in disguise or, at most, an indifferent deist who found pleasure in shocking his Christian readers. There is indeed plenty to be found in his work to support the atheist view; for example, that which concerned the origin of religion and the immortality of the soul. If Mandeville was interested in theology and religion at all, then it was not for its own sake but only as a psychological phenomenon. Yet there are others who believe to have discovered the true Mandeville and cannot help seeing him as a pious theist, albeit a somewhat curious one. This position is less implausible than it seems because in his *oeuvre* it is mainly atheism and deism that are attacked, not theism. Whenever the “Christian satirist” pokes fun at religion, his arrows are not aimed at the phenomenon as such, save for its superstitious excesses, but at the corruption and perversion of religion at the hands of the clergy. What is more, especially in his later works, the author himself seems to offer a theological key to the true intentions of the *Fable*. Mandeville makes Horatio, one of the interlocutors in *The Fable of Bees: Part 2*, conclude that the author “seems to have nothing less at heart than religion” (2:102), a suggestion that is subsequently confirmed by Mandeville’s spokesman Cleomenes.

The problem in reconstructing Mandeville’s real intentions is that he is such an ambivalent figure. This is true not only of his theological views but also of almost every aspect of his work—psychological, political, and moral-philosophical. Mandeville’s works—the product of a controversialist and satirist who wrote for the reader’s diversion and entertainment and regarded his *magnum opus* as a “rhapsody void of order or method” (1:8, 404–5)—lack the argumentative style and consistency of a philosophical discourse. Even if his views emanated from a systematic concept of man and society, their deeper message is concealed in a remarkable piece of rhetoric, humor, and irony. As a consequence to modern
commentators, the sincerity of the author on a variety of issues is and probably always will be cloaked in uncertainty.

In this article, I will therefore not primarily attempt to reassess whether Mandeville is a genuine atheist, sincere theist, or a sort of deist in between. What I do discuss are three theological motifs that recur in Mandeville’s *The Fable of the Bees* and the *Fable of the Bees: Part 2*. These typically Augustinian ideas concerning the fall of man, the two faces of evil, and the distinction between worldly and real happiness deserve more attention than they have hitherto received. If it is true that our author “abandoned the Augustinian premises” of the Calvinists and the Jansenists, he certainly did not forsake all of them. Whereas most scholars limit their discussions of Augustinian influence in Mandeville to his concept of virtue and vice and the role of self-love, here the focus is on the fall, evil, and happiness. As I will argue, these three motifs are part of a framework within which Mandeville develops his theory of man and society and therefore cannot be ignored as merely ornamental. For example, even though the well-known thesis “private vices, public benefits” strictly speaking is not dependent on theology, it can be shown to build on these three Augustinian ideas. For the sake of argument, while recognizing his rhetorical gifts, in this article I assume that Mandeville’s claims about God and divine providence can be taken seriously, including those voiced through the mouth of Cleomenes in part 2 of the *Fable*. Even then, as will be clear, there are enough theological puzzles left that show that Mandeville cannot simply be regarded as a writer of the orthodox Protestant type. That he was, however, not a pronounced atheist whose theological motifs should be discounted will be shown in the next section.

**Mandeville’s Theological Outlook**

As was the fate of many writers with unorthodox ideas, in the eighteenth century, Mandeville was generally associated with atheism. William Law, one of his first critics, identified several blasphemous notions in the *Fable*. The “missioner from the kingdom of darkness” had denied such serious matters as the dignity of man as image of God, the divine origin of virtue, and the immortality of the soul. That was not all. In the many responses that followed, more evidence of Mandeville’s ungodliness was collected. One commentator claimed that the writer of the *Fable* suffered from a “delirious infidelity,” another argued that his opinions had “their rise with atheism itself,” and a final critic of Mandeville observed a tendency to promote atheism. In a poem from *The Character of the Times Delineated* (1732), containing a description of the “most notorious impieties,”
Mandeville figures as “man-devil” who in contrast to “God-man” Christ did not come to earth to abolish vice but to commend it. On a more formal level, the atheistic tendencies of his books were confirmed when in 1732 the French translation of *Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and National Happiness*, Mandeville’s liberal book on religion and theology, and in 1745 that of the *Fable* parts 1 and 2 were banned by the Catholic Church by placing them on the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*.

That his contemporaries considered Mandeville an atheist is not to say that he was, in fact, irreligious. A closer look at Mandeville’s background and writings point in a different direction. First, there are some relevant biographical details (cf. 1:xvii–xx). Mandeville was born into an Arminian or Remonstrant family. Michael de Mandeville, Bernard’s father, came from the predominantly Remonstrant city of Nijmegen and was friends with Godefridus Paludanus and Joannes Narcius, two prominent Remonstrant ministers. The Remonstrants formed a liberal current within the Dutch Reformed Church that was rooted (by way of Jacob Arminius, Simon Episcopius, and Hugo Grotius) in the Christian humanism of Erasmus and Coornhert. In England, Remonstrantism found its exponents among the Cambridge Platonists; the Latitudinarians; and later in the eighteenth century, the Dissenters. What the Dutch and English Arminians had in common was an aversion to dogmatic Calvinism that overstressed such doctrines as divine election and original sin. Dogma in their version of Protestant theology was reduced to a few essentials of faith that could all be found directly in the Bible, and particularly the New Testament, which featured the moral philosophy of Christ more specifically. The Arminian emphasis on free will and man’s own responsibility in achieving salvation translated into pleas for freedom of biblical interpretation, religious toleration, and peace. It was in this liberal, anti-Calvinistic, religious climate that Mandeville was raised.

In 1670, Mandeville was baptized in the Reformed Church of Rotterdam by Rev. Paulus Leupenius, Mandeville’s brother-in-law. Having attended the Latin or Erasmian School in Rotterdam, Mandeville studied medicine in Leiden under the supervision of Burchardus de Volder, a faithful follower of Descartes. In his dissertation on the question of animal automatism, Mandeville rejected several views because of their ungodliness. Finally, to avoid theological contradictions, he resorted for explanation to the omnipotence of God. In 1699, several years after he moved to England, Mandeville was married in St. Giles-in-the-Fields. The same year, his first child was baptized in St. Martin-in-the-Fields, another Anglican church in London. In 1708, Mandeville published an English translation of a sermon preached at Colchester to the Dutch Congregation by Cornelius Pieter Schrevelius, a minister with Remonstrant sympathies. “The
general applause this sermon so deservedly met with,” we read in Mandeville’s short introduction on the title page, “was the chief motive, that put me on this undertaking” of translating.18

Other clues as to Mandeville’s theological orientation can be learned from his 1720 book, *Free Thoughts*, an argumentative work of over four hundred pages that, unlike other works by Mandeville, abstains from the dialogue form. Frequently echoing the learned and celebrated Pierre Bayle, a writer to whom Mandeville openly acknowledges his enormous debt, the book is full of dubious theological views.19 Nevertheless, the author in the introduction seems to be honest in claiming that he nowhere denies what is taught about the mysteries of Christianity by the Church of England—to which he consistently referred as “our church.” Throughout *Free Thoughts*, the Christian religion as a whole is presented as largely mysterious and in many cases transcending the powers of human reason. Adopting the nondogmatic Christianity of Grotius and Anglican Arminians such as Jeremy Taylor and John Tillotson,20 to whom he refers with approval, Mandeville on several occasions calls for tolerance and individual responsibility in theological matters. Although he argues for the vital importance of some central Christian truths, he minimizes the significance of theological differences such as dogmas, creeds, and rituals. According to Mandeville, what really matters to Christians is not what divines and theologians make us believe but what is revealed about Christ in the Gospels. These views are typically Remonstrant or, as Mandeville thinks the clergy would consider him, “latitudinarian, if not worse.”21

Judging by Mandeville’s personal background and the content of *Free Thoughts*—the second and revised editions of which appeared only four years before his death—it is tempting to characterize him as an exponent of Dutch Remonstrantism or English Latitudinarianism.22 Mandeville clearly is critical of superstition and religious excess but never comes even close to denying the existence of God as such. In fact, in his writings, atheism and related worldviews like libertinism, Epicureanism, and Spinozism are rejected outright. In the author’s own words, libertines or practical atheists are “detestable creatures” guilty of vice and profaneness, the doctrine of Epicurus is “monstrous and extravagant beyond all other follies” (2:310), and Spinozism is a manifestation of atheism or superstition—two phenomena arising from the “same defect in the mind of man” (2:312). True, echoing Bayle, speculative atheists—that is, studious, peaceable, and potentially virtuous men—are called harmless to society. But they, too, are unhappy people and fortunately small in number.23

Mandeville’s attitude toward deism is more ambiguous. On the one hand, he characterizes the growth of modern deism in England as a dangerous development.
In taking oaths, a deism that denies the existence of Divine Providence and a future life is no better guarantee for sincerity than real atheism. About Lord Shaftesbury he remarks that in order to reconcile some contradictory and all-too favorable notions about human nature “he favour’d deism, and, under pretence of lashing priestcraft and superstition, attack’d the Bible it self” (2:357). Nevertheless, Mandeville often sounded like an eighteen-century deist himself. In *The Fable of the Bees: Part 2*, Mandeville’s friend and spokesman Cleomenes, who “believ’d the Bible to be the Word of God, without reserve, and was entirely convinced of the mysterious as well as historical truths that are contain’d in it” (2:17), denies that anywhere in part 1 is religion made fun of. In truth, we are told that Mandeville believes there is no other solid principle in life than the Christian religion, and he accordingly designed the book for “modern deists and all the beau monde” (2:102), that is, members of Christendom who have little true religion and believe that faith and virtue are natural and do not require a sacrifice of the heart. Yet the language of Cleomenes in the remainder of the book can hardly be called theistic. Even though most of his wild theological speculations are not in conflict with the testimony of Scripture, he clearly portrays God as a deistic machine maker. The universe or “beautiful all” is called the “workmanship of one great Architect of power and wisdom stupendious,” and “Providence, or the all-governing wisdom of God” is defined as the “harmonious disposition of the universe; the fountain of that incomprehensible chain of causes, on which all events have their undoubted dependence” (2:44, 237, 239). Believing that the Almighty created the universe and its laws in the best possible way, Cleomenes rejects the idea of miraculous interventions as profane and repeatedly stresses that God prefers to act through secondary means.

Actually, Mandeville’s more-sympathetic commentators reckoned him among the deists. In *Honour, a Poem*, the author of a “monstrous heap of contradiction and absurdity” is mentioned together with Thomas Gordon, Tindal, Morgan, Woolston, Toland, and Hobbes—all “detested names! yet sentenc’d never to die.” Occasionally believed to be a French writer, Mandeville also turns up in eighteenth-century handbooks on deism and church history. In one of the dialogues in Philip Skelton’s *Deism Revealed* between two deists, an orthodox clergyman and a wavering layman, Mandeville is characterized as an enemy of Christianity and a follower of Hobbes’s view of human nature. Despite Mandeville’s attack on Shaftesbury, the Doctor’s idea that “private malefirs are public benefits” was in agreement with his Lordship’s idea that “particular evil is general good.” In *Institutiones historiae christianae recentioris*, the author of *The Fable* is counted among the “most decent” deists who try to associate Christianity with natural religion; in *Versuch einer vollständigen Kirchengeschichte* among the
deists or “naturalists” who are enemies of Revelation and Christian religion; and in Geschiedenis van de kristelijke kerk among the “coarse” Hobbesian deists.

If there is one thing that the above discussion makes clear, it is that Mandeville’s real theological outlook is notoriously hard to pinpoint. Maybe it is safest to say that our author, who intentionally called the observations in his book on theology and religion free thoughts, is a genuine freethinker. Mandeville eclectically combines elements from Dutch Arminianism, British deism, and French skepticism and, where convenient, switches from one perspective to the other. Be that as it may, his thinking clearly is a product of the long Christian tradition. As the two parts of the Fable show, Mandeville’s work is deeply influenced by Augustinian theology, a characteristic that he shares with many of his contemporaries.

Much of this influence will have been indirect, either through Bayle who had a background in Augustinian Calvinism or through neo-Augustinian “Jansenists” such as Pierre Nicole. For example, the illustrations in the Free Thoughts of the church fathers’ experiences with the sins of the flesh and the imprecise references therein to the Confessions are based on Bayle’s Dictionnaire article “St. Augustin.” Also his estimation later on in the book that Augustine had an “incomparable wit, and an imagination happy and abounding,” approvingly quoted from a letter by the French Protestant divine Jean Claude, is taken verbatim from remark “H” in Bayle’s article. Wherever they came from, the fact remains that several Augustinian motifs appear throughout the Fable. Three of them that most color Mandeville’s theory of man and society will be discussed in the next sections.

Mandeville’s Three Augustinian Motifs

First, Mandeville reasons from the fall of man, an idea central to Augustine’s work. According to Augustine, the sin of Adam and Eve was a decisive moment in history that introduced evil, wickedness, and disorder to the human condition. Mandeville in the Fable correspondingly claims that his reflections only apply to mankind in its corrupted state. “And here,” (we read at the end) “I must desire the reader once for all to take notice, that when I say men, I mean neither Jews nor Christians; but meer man, in the state of nature and ignorance of the true Deity” (1:40). The proviso (which, incidentally, was hardly taken seriously by his eighteenth-century readers) may be inspired by La Rochefoucauld who made a very similar remark in the introduction to his Réflexions ou sentences et maximes morales (1665). It appears that Mandeville attaches some importance to the qualification because it is repeated a few times, also in his other works. Not insignificantly, it is even mentioned on the title page of a reprint of the
first edition of *The Fable*. The discourses are said to “demonstrate, that human frailties, during the degeneracy of mankind, may be turn’d to the advantage of civil society, and made to supply the place of moral virtues” (2:392, italics in the original). Rather than a sign of secularization, this focus on fallen man is a realistic acknowledgment of the impact of original sin in thinking about the foundation of society. The gulf he sees between “men in nature,” his true object of study, and the pious who are “regenerated, and prenaturally assisted by the divine grace” (1:166) connects Mandeville to the French Augustinian tradition of Nicole, Blaise Pascal, and others. Inspired by the church father, these Jansenists stressed the depravity of man and the necessity of free grace for salvation.

In Mandeville’s view, a typical characteristic of fallen man is that his reason is a slave, as Hume was to call it later, of the passions. Incessantly longing for gratification, the passions in a corrupted world tend to dominate human behavior. Hence, “it is impossible that man, mere fallen man, should act with any other view but to please himself while he has the use of his organs” (1:348). Our passions are thoroughly selfish and seldom corrected by altruistic feelings. Even though everyone agrees that charity is a good thing and that the common good of society ought to be preferred to our private interests, we still love ourselves the most. Every person, Mandeville writes in *Free Thoughts*, is a “vast compound, a lesser world, with a sovereignty and court of judicature within, having a private welfare and preservation of his own mind, altogether abstract from the good of the publick.” All the commerce we have with other people must therefore be understood in terms of self-interest. Man is only concerned with himself and all virtuous-looking behavior is but selfishness in disguise. This, in short, is the pessimistic view of human nature that Mandeville adopted from the French moralists and theologians.

The second motif has to do with Mandeville’s view of evil. F. B. Kaye, the editor of the critical edition of *The Fable of the Bees*, in a footnote to a puzzling passage on the role of evil claims that Mandeville cannot be reckoned among such philosophical and theological optimists as Leibniz, Shaftesbury, and Milton (here also William King, Alexander Pope, and Soame Jenyns could have been mentioned). Whereas the optimists conceived of evil as teleologically working toward the good as part of a higher divine plan, Mandeville claims to be interested in the problem of evil “merely as a matter of worldly fact” (1:57). Whatever may be the precise meaning of the latter phrase, it is true that Mandeville did not design a real theodicy. However, this does not alter the fact that at times his language closely resembles that of the optimists. Like King and Leibniz, he consistently distinguishes between moral evil (the negative consequences of man’s free will) and natural evil (pain and suffering caused by purely natural
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phenomena). Mandeville moreover adopts the traditional idea, revived around the same time by Shaftesbury, that evil is only a relative concept: “things are only good and evil in reference to something else, and according to the light and position they are placed in” (1:367). This implies that perfect good and perfect evil do not exist. Particularly in a corrupted world, good and evil are always mixed. “There is nothing created,” Mandeville somewhere concludes, “that is always a blessing” (2:135).

What further links Mandeville to the optimists of his time is his insistence on the different faces of evil. As he writes in A Letter to Dion, his final publication, it is a “paradox, that natural as well as moral evil, and the very calamities we pray against” do contribute to the welfare of society. This remark arguably refers to a section of the Fable in which several examples of that are discussed. The fire of London certainly was an evil but simultaneously gave boost to crafts and trades connected to the city’s reconstruction. Shipping disasters cause great personal and material losses but no less ensure that the demand for labor and goods, whether or not related to the maritime sector, remains stable. “In recruiting what is lost and destroy’d by fire, storms, sea-fights, sieges, battles,” as Mandeville summarizes these two examples, “a considerable part of trade consists” (1:359). Finally, there are the changing natural conditions that make human life difficult. Often the four elements have destructive and unpredictable consequences that endanger our survival. However, these difficulties also require the utmost of our inventiveness and thus appear to contain the “seeds of all arts, industry and labour” (1:366). When experiencing the hardships of nature, human knowledge on how to deal with them and even to exploit them to our own advantage automatically increases.

The phenomenon of good coming from evil in the end is part of the divine plan. Mandeville writes a little further in the same Letter to Dion,

I have said indeed that we often saw an evident good spring from a palpable evil, and given instances to prove, that, by the wonderful direction of unsearchable Providence, robbers, murderers, and the worst malefactors were sometimes made instrumental to great deliverances in distress, and remarkable blessings which God wrought and conferr’d on the innocent and industrious.”

The passage alludes to remark “G” of the Fable (1:86–93) on the paradoxical line of verse: “The worst of all the multitude / Did something for the common good.” It explains how thieves, burglars, pickpockets, and drunkards, in spite of their pernicious behavior, unintendedly contribute to the consumption, money, circulation, and revenues of the nation. What Mandeville calls a wonderful direction of Divine Providence cannot but refer to two detailed examples about money
flowing from the vicious to the needy: a highwayman who spent a considerable
booty on a poor common lady of the night, allowing her to buy new clothes; a
robber whose fine imposed by the court ultimately benefited three poor country-
men, thus helping them in an “admirable” way and making them the “happiest
people in the world.” In order to see the good emanate from the evil, the author
concludes that it is crucial to look further than one link in the “chain of causes.”

Whether or not Mandeville is aware of its origin, this second motif was
Augustinian too. Although Augustine was not the first Western thinker to dis-
cuss the problem of evil, he is rightly seen as the first who sought to develop
a conclusive theodicy, as it was later called. Its central concept that evil is a
privation of good rather than an independent substance or entity was adopted by
Leibniz in his *Essais de theodicée* (1710). In his summary of the controversy,
added as an appendix to the book, the German philosopher explained that he
borrowed another idea from Augustine, namely that God can transform evil into
good. It is possible, he argues, that evil is accompanied by a greater good or that
an imperfection in the part is required for a greater perfection of the whole. “I
have followed therein the opinion of St. Augustine, who said a hundred times
that God permitted evil in order to derive from it a good, that is to say, a greater
good.”

The belief that the supreme power can use evil for a noble end, as the
Neo-Platonist Plotinus, a major influence on Augustine, had it, can be found in
many of the church father’s writings. In his *Enchiridion*, Augustine went as far
as to claim that the existence of evil is good. For God “judged it better to bring
good out of evil, than not to allow evil to exist.” This infamous felix culpa argu-
ment, which suggests that the guilt of man fortunately enabled greater goods, is
at the basis of Mandeville’s bonum-through-malum idea: The good exists not
only despite evil but also thanks to it.

The third motif is the distinction that Mandeville makes between worldly
happiness derived from temporal goods and real happiness (in God), which is
only fully attainable in the afterlife. Often when speaking about happiness or
felicity, he qualifies the term by using adjectives such as “temporal” and “earthly”
versus “real” and “true.” This typically Christian distinction played an impor-
tant role in Augustine’s work too, from his early work *De beata vita* onward. As is well known, Augustine eventually portrayed the history of mankind as a
dramatic struggle between two kingdoms or cities: an earthly city consisting of
people guided by pride and self-love and a heavenly city characterized by true
virtue and love of God and the neighbor. The latter “city of God” already exists
here on earth, be it inextricably mixed with the earthly city, and will achieve
its perfect state only in the next life. Whereas residents of the *civitas terrena*
seek their happiness in bodily pleasures and transitory goods, the true believers
who inhabit the *civitas caelestis* enjoy the highest good in God. Virtue without divine grace, Augustine reasons in his mature works, is insufficient to attain real happiness here on earth.

Mandeville associates worldly happiness with the Epicurean gratification of the passions and the comforts of life offered by a well-regulated society. Real happiness, on the other hand, refers to the bliss promised to Christians in the life to come. As Cleomenes concludes at the end of his dialogues with Horatio, one of the aims of part 1 of the *Fable* was to “point indirectly at the necessity, not only of Revelation and believing, but likewise of the practice of Christianity, manifestly to be seen in men’s lives” by exposing “on the one hand, the vanity of the world, and the most polite enjoyments of it; and, on the other, insufficiency of human reason and heathen virtue to procure real felicity” (2:356). What Mandeville suggests here is that real happiness is the reward for true faith and virtue. It turns out that the requirements of the first, as articulated by Mandeville in *Free Thoughts*, are very similar to that of the second. True faith and true virtue are alien to fallen man and therefore require self-denial. However rare, true virtue that is directed at the interests of others can be attained by repressing one’s selfish passions and desires with the help of reason. Equally uncommon, true faith arising from the love of God and neighbor demands a victory over the sinful passions and desires with the aid of divine grace. Both are rewarded with happiness of a different order than the short-term pleasure from selfishness.

**Theology in Mandeville’s Theory of Society**

We now turn to Mandeville’s account of the emergence and development of human society as set out in the *Fable* parts 1 and 2 and in the *Letter to Dion*. As I will show in this account, the three theological motifs just discussed play a significant role. It is clear that to Mandeville the emergence of human society was necessitated by the fall (the first motif). As he explains in the essay on the nature of society (1:344–6), in the “state of innocence” or “golden age” there was no need yet for men to group together and to seek community with others. People were still content with the necessities of life, freely furnished to them by the earth, and had everything they desired. In the absence of obstacles to his daily needs, man was “wholly rapt up in sublime meditations on the infinity of his Creator.” Since the fall of his first parents, however, he began to meet continuous opposition in the gratification of his desires. Moral evil was born. After man lost paradise, natural evil appeared on the scene: The elements became his enemies; natural disasters made their appearance; the earth brought forth noxious plants;
and dangerous and troublesome animals threatened him. Thus, being hindered in his labor and self-preservation, man began to work together with others. What made him cooperative was pure self-love, not a concern for the fate of his fellows. Primitive societies, Mandeville reasons, did not spring from man’s love of others but “must have had their origin from his wants, his imperfections, and the variety of his appetites.” Apparently, natural and moral evils have beneficial side-effects (the second motif of evil).

That human society did not exist from the beginning is not to say that self-love, one of its springs, was unnatural too. Especially in part 2 of the *Fable*, Mandeville stresses that self-love and self-liking (the instinct by which individuals value themselves above their real worth) were “given” to and “bestowed” on human beings by nature for their self-preservation. As in Bayle, these self-regarding passions are deemed highly necessary for human life. Rather than being sinful, hunger, thirst, and other manifestations of self-love contribute to the health and survival of the individual and the species alike. “We owe our being, and every thing else,” Mandeville writes later on in connection with the instincts of animals, “to the great Author of the universe” (2:186). Somewhat confusingly, in the index the passage in which the themes of self-love and self-liking are first introduced is referred to as “Man. In the state of nature.” It is likely, though, that this entry particularly refers to the sinful degeneration of both passions (the first motif of the fall), for shortly after they have been introduced, the author explains that self-love and self-liking are not only beneficial but also the “cause of many evils.” They, for example, lead to pride, hatred, and other forms of unsocial behavior. According to Mandeville, precisely the fact that passions once given for self-preservation produce these mixed blessings “lays open to us the precariousness of *sublunary* happiness, and the wretched condition of mortals” (2:135; italics mine).

Paradoxically, man’s perverted self-love is also what made (and continues to make) him long for society. Against the system of Lord Shaftesbury, Mandeville maintains that human sociability is only a second-order desire. Fondness for society is unnatural to human beings. It is true that people seek the company of others but only in the hope of deriving advantage from it, not as a result of a deep-rooted and innate love of their species. In whatever guises it may come, man’s sociability in the end is based on a desire for ease, security, and amelioration of his condition. Hence, Mandeville’s observation at the end of his essay on the nature of society that “neither the friendly qualities and kind affections that are natural to man, nor the real virtues he is capable of acquiring by reason and self-denial, are the foundation of society; but that what we call evil in this world, moral as well as natural, is the grand principle that makes us sociable.
creatures” (1:369; the second motif). Man as a “necessitous and helpless” creature truly stands in need of society; without it he would be unable to overcome the hostility of his fellow men and other obstacles present in nature. Seen in this light, human societies that protect people against each other and the outer world were a clever invention.

Nonetheless, the emergence of human societies in their primitive form was not entirely contingent. Surprisingly as ever, Mandeville also believes that man was “designed for society” by none other than Nature or Providence (2:184; 1:57). Rejecting the “unworthy” opinion of Hobbes that we are born unfit for society, he argues that in spite of their selfishness human beings are better adapted to coexist than any other creature. Man’s superior capacity to think and reflect, his unparalleled linguistic skills, and the usefulness of his hands and fingers all point to a fitness to live together. What makes us sociable above all is the capability and willingness to be governed. When Mandeville says that “man is a sociable creature … the word implies no more, than that in our nature we have a certain fitness, by which great multitudes of us co-operating may be united and form’d into one body” (2:183). The two keywords here are fear and understanding.

Government, to Mandeville the basis of all societies, requires the first to render people submissive and obedient and the second to make them recognize the private advantages of cooperation. In Cleomenes’s words, these features of human nature show—in agreement with God’s revelation—that man was made for society.

When after this exposition Mandeville’s spokesman is asked whether human sociability is the work of nature, or of its Creator, rather than of earthly rulers, his unexpected answer is: “without doubt” (2:185). Man, Cleomenes argues, is made as fit for society as vines are fit to make wine. Although vines owe their peculiar aptitude for producing wine to Divine Providence, it is human sagacity that discovered and brought to perfection the art of wine making. Human society likewise is an invention for which the Author of Nature merely gave us the potential. As such, government and state-building as “works of art” are distinguished from the “works of nature.” In Mandeville’s view, what nature designs, she executes. For example, the society of bees is natural (i.e., nonartificial) because it is a direct effect of instincts given for that purpose to these animals. Human society, in contrast, requires the mediation of human management and contrivance. As a result, if the principle of sociability is “the work of Providence,” as the index of the book has it, then it is only because man’s capacities that can be utilized to this end are “evidently derived from God, who made him” (2:186).

In the remainder of the book, Mandeville’s spokesman Cleomenes goes on to show that the role of God was not played out after the first creation of man. In the early history of mankind, God’s hand became visible at various points
in time. For instance, in the distant past it was Providence who saved our helpless species from being devoured and destroyed by wild beasts. A God-given, natural economy of eating and being eaten kept species in existence. Even the malice and violence among people was part of the providential plan because it prevented the overpopulation of the world. Well-aware of the infamous theodicy problem arising from these and other views, Cleomenes sticks to the conclusion that God must one way or another have used evil to steer the course of history. After all, “unless you imagine the world not to be govern’d by Providence, you must believe, that wars, and all the calamities we can suffer from man or beast, as well as plagues and all other diseases, are under a wise direction that is unfathomable” (2:262). To the question of what in the end caused the emergence of opulent societies and powerful nations, the short answer is: “Providence” (2:320). Here again secondary causes appear to have done the main work. From a mortal perspective it was the art of government, built on an incremental knowledge of human nature, according to Mandeville, that aggrrandized them.

This brings us to what may be seen as one of the central messages of the Fable, namely that flourishing societies are the result of “skilful” or “cunning management” by politicians. In addition to the regular tasks of government, their greatest challenge is to curb the passions of the individual members of society. Selfish and unsocial as they are, people need to be knit together into a single political body. Instead of repressing them, their passions should be “made subservient to the grandeur and worldly happiness of the whole” (1:7; the third motif of happiness). Such temporal blessings as national industry, wealth, and power are simply unthinkable without the vices of individuals. It is impossible, in other words, for a nation to enjoy all the comforts of life without the help of so-called vicious behavior. The fact that vices are inseparable from flourishing societies is not to say that they should be unreservedly encouraged. It is up to the wisdom of politicians to reward useful actions and prevent destructive ones. This means that only beneficial vices ought to be tolerated. Harmful vices, in contrast, must be reproved, and vices that have grown into crimes must be punished. According to Mandeville, this is the true meaning of the Fable’s subtitle Private Vices, Publick Benefits “that private vices by the dexterous management of a skilful politician may be turned into publick benefits” (1:369).

Strikingly, and little noticed, the key task for politicians laid down by Mandeville closely resembles the work of God. Just as Divine Providence makes particular evils work for the good of the whole, successful earthly rulers manage to turn moral evil to public advantages (the second motif of evil). That to Mandeville vices ultimately are a form of evil is clear. In the preface of the Fable, the indispensability of vice for wealthy and powerful nations is compared to the
dirty streets of a big city like London, a “necessary evil inseparable from the felicity” (1:12). At several other places, he stresses that moral evil caused by fallen man’s self-love and self-liking is what enables societies to flourish. The concept of necessary moral evil therefore is “implicit” in Mandeville’s idea of private vices as a source of public benefits. Rather than being “simply the converse of the doctrine of human depravity,” it is one of the providential solutions to it. What Mandeville among many other things seems to be presenting in his *Fable* is a genuine theodicy. The reason why God is not to be blamed for the existence of moral evil is that it is a product of the fall of man and, more importantly, that it can be transformed to even greater benefits. This *bonum-through-malum* idea is perfectly summarized in his slogan “private vices, public benefits.” It is a “reductio ad absurdum of the Augustinian theodicy” employed by Nicole and Jean Domat, which explained how God uses the evil passion of self-love as a remedy for society.

An important difference between politicians and God, to come back to this resemblance, is that the former exclusively focus on happiness in this life but not in the life to come (the third motif). The worst possible interpretation of the subtitle of his book, Mandeville writes in his *Letter to Dion*, is “that luxury and the vices of man … are subservient to, and even inseparable from the earthly felicity of the civil society; I mean what is commonly call’d temporal happiness, and esteem’d to be such.” The benefits he is referring to are worldly and temporal and must be distinguished from man’s eternal happiness following on his salvation. Yet the two kinds of happiness are not altogether unrelated. At the very end of “Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue,” Mandeville states that nothing can render the unsearchable depth of the Divine Wisdom more conspicuous, than that man, whom Providence had designed for society, should not only by his own frailties and imperfections, be led into the road to temporal happiness, but likewise receive, from a seeming necessity of natural causes, a tincture of that knowledge, in which he was afterwards to be made perfect by the true religion, to his eternal welfare. (1:57)

The first transformation of human frailty to inner world happiness, reminiscent of Pope’s “happy frailties” that lead to “the joy, the peace, the glory of mankind,” likely refers to the work of skillful politicians, used as means by God. The same Providence apparently provided man with some basic knowledge about the divine and a greater happiness still to come. This would mean temporal and eternal happiness are two sides of the same divine coin. But as ever, the message of this obscure passage, referred to by one of his critics as “sort of meditation,” is questionable.
Concluding Remarks

Mandeville does not shrink back from theological speculation but rather often speculates in a surprising manner. Apart from the three theological motifs discussed above, there are many references in his work to the providence of God. As we have seen, in order to account for the unintended consequences of human behavior and apparent regularities in human affairs, Mandeville frequently employs the language of Providence and not that of mechanistic determinism. Since Kaye, there has been a tendency to question the importance of these passages. The impression that Mandeville inserted some thoughts about the role of the Author of Nature in his later works to answer clerical opponents such as William Law may be right but does not explain why similar remarks can be found in part 1 of the *Fable* that appeared before he had any critics. Perhaps Mandeville does attach importance to the idea of Providence but only interprets the doctrine in a deistic fashion. Cleomenes’s refusal to equate divine foresight and care with miraculous interventions is not to be interpreted as disbelief in the doctrine of Providence as such. The idea that God prefers to work through secondary causes and innate abilities was very much in line with the theological spirit of the times. The same is true of Mandeville’s association of Divine Providence and evil, which is as old as Augustine.

Sincerely intended or not, Mandeville’s contemporaries could scarcely appreciate his theological exercises. *The Fable* was considered offensive to the Christian religion, and the presumed theological window-dressing of its author was not taken seriously. One of the reasons for the Grand Jury of Middlesex to prosecute the book was indeed that Mandeville and two other “zealots for infidelity … in their diabolical attempts against religion” (1:384) had blasphemed God. All this while the Almighty in his great mercy had decided to preserve England from the plague that had visited France between 1720 and 1722. In *The Fable of the Bees: Part 2*, the author himself forcefully denied that he anywhere ridiculed religion. His true aim was to expose the various manifestations of human selfishness as well as to unmask the hypocrisy of Christians and moralists who mostly do not live in accordance with their lofty principles. At the same time, it should be noted that Mandeville does not call for religious reform and appears to be feigning orthodoxy. Whenever his views give rise to theological difficulties; for example, regarding the compatibility of the existence of evil and the goodness of God, he is quick to hide behind the mysterious and unfathomable dispositions of Divine Providence.

Mandeville’s theological ambiguity does not alter the fact that his theory of man and society builds on Augustinian motifs. To Mandeville, human society is...
a typical product of a corrupted world (the first motif). Human societies are not institutions that are naturally there but are artificial constructs necessitated by original sin. The selfish qualities inherent in fallen man were the “first causes that made man sociable beyond other animals the moment after he lost Paradise” (1:344). In addition to these moral causes, human coexistence and cooperation were enforced by natural threats. Although harmful in themselves, within the providential order of things both evils have beneficial consequences (the second motif). According to Mandeville, moral and natural evil are the origin and support of all trades, arts, and sciences and thus the true foundation of society. One of his aims in “A Search into the Nature of Society,” first included in the second edition of The Fable, is to convince the reader that it would be “utterly impossible, either to raise any multitudes into a populous, rich and flourishing nation, or when so rais’d, to keep and maintain them in that condition, without the assistance of what we call evil both natural and moral” (1:325), or as the index of the book summarizes this “absurdity,” as one of his critics termed it, “Evil both moral and natural the solid basis of society.”

In Mandeville’s view, human society is the place par excellence where temporal happiness can be regained (the third motif). Thanks to, and in imitation of Divine Providence, dexterous politicians are able to turn private vices into public benefits, thus serving the interest of the nation and the individual alike.

Still, Mandeville would not be Mandeville if we do not end up with a paradox. Relating Divine Providence to the unintended benefits of evil is one thing; relating it to worldly happiness is another. If the emergence and development of human society were fostered by the Almighty then the temporal comforts and conveniences obtained by skillful management are part of the divine plan as well. This clearly is inconsistent with Mandeville’s view that a thriving beehive in the worldly sense cannot be a community of true Christians. Rather than embracing them, regenerated followers of Christ should abstain from worldly delights. “The worldly interest of the whole society,” as the Free Thoughts has it, “often interferes with the eternal welfare of every particular member of it.” Such vices as envy, covetousness, and pride may be important promoters of trade and industry, but, nevertheless, they run counter to the gospel and “contain the seeds of almost all the iniquities, and disorders that are committed.” The author of the The Fable of the Bees or its vindicator Cleomenes would probably respond by saying that this problem is beyond our comprehension and renders God’s providence even more inscrutable. For us, it is another proof that Mandeville’s theology is notoriously difficult to fathom.
Notes

1. I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers and Jordan J. Ballor, executive editor of this journal, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.


6. Seeing that Cleomenes is at pains to defend part 1 of *The Fable* and expresses views that are typically Mandeville’s, few commentators doubt that he is the author’s spokesman. “As it is supposed, that Cleomenes is my friend, and speaks my sentiments,” Mandeville writes in the introduction, “so it is but justice, that every thing which he advances should be look’d upon and consider’d as my own” (1:21). Somewhat unconvincingly, Kaye in a footnote to this passage remarks that sometimes in the dialogues, especially when it comes to theological matters, the author’s standpoint is rather voiced by Horatio in order to “evade responsibility for unorthodox sentiments.” This, however, renders any interpretation of the *The Fable of the Bees: Part 2* uncertain and highly subjective. See on the names “Cleomenes” and “Horatio” the introduction to Bernard Mandeville, *De oorsprong van de eer en het nut van christelijkheid bij oorlog* (Rotterdam: Lemniscaat, 2010), 15–18.


13. [George Blewitt?], *An Enquiry Whether a General Practice of Virtue Tends to the Wealth or Poverty, Benefit or Disadvantage of a People* (London: R. Wilkin, 1725), 86.


15. I owe this interpretation of Mandeville as an Arminian or, in the English context, a Latitudinarian to Arne C. Jansen, the editor and translator of the collected works in Dutch (*Verzameld werk*, 5 vols., 2006–2011). Most of the information on Mandeville’s theological background presented here is based on Jansen’s website, www.bernard-mandeville.nl.


18. Cornelis Schrevelius, *A Sermon Preach’d at Colchester, to the Dutch Congregation. On February 1 1708* ([London]: s.n., 1708). This sermon, translated by “B[ernard] M[andeville] M[edicinæ] D[octor],” deals with the following passage from the Epistle to the Romans: “For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ: for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; to the Jew first, and also to the Greek” (Rom. 1:16 KJV).


23. Mandeville, *Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and National Happiness*, 4–5.
26. Note that Mandeville’s name is absent in the better-known *A View of the Principal Deistical Writers* (London, B. Dod, 1754–1756) by John Leland.
32. Mandeville, *Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and National Happiness*, 247.
33. Most importantly, see *De civitate Dei*, 13–14; *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), s.vv. “fall,” “original sin.”
38. [Bernard Mandeville], *A Letter to Dion; Occasion’d by his Book call’d Alciphron or, the Minute Philosopher* (London: J. Roberts, 1732), 21.

39. Mandeville, *A Letter to Dion*, 32–33. Cf. what Mandeville writes in “A vindication of the book”: “The short-sighted vulgar, in the chain of causes, seldom can see farther than one link; but those who can enlarge their view, and will give themselves leisure of gazing on the prospects of concatenated events, may in a hundred places see good spring up and pullulate from evil, as naturally as chickens do from eggs. The words are to be found on page 89, in the remark [“G”] made on the seeming paradox; that in the grumbling hive *The worst of all the multitude / Did something for the common good*: Where in many instances may be amply discovered, how unsearchable Providence daily orders the comforts of the laborious, and even the deliverances of the oppressed, secretly to come forth not only from the vices of the luxurious, but likewise the crimes of the flagitious and most abandoned” (I:403–4).


42. For example, see *De civitate Dei*, XI 17, XVIII 51, XXII 1–2; *Confessiones*, VII 5; *Enchiridion*, XI, XXVII, XCVff; *Contra epistulam Manichaei*, XLI; and *De continenta*, XVI.


47. As far as I could ascertain, the only one who made this observation, in a footnote, is M. M. Goldsmith, “Mandeville’s Pernicious System,” in Mandeville and Augustan Ideas: New Essays, ed. Charles W. A. Prior (Victoria: University of Victoria Press, 2000), 83n22.

48. James, “Faith, Sincerity and Morality,” 60.


51. Mandeville, A Letter to Dion, 37.


53. Blewitt, An Enquiry Whether a General Practice of Virtue Tends to the Wealth or Poverty, Benefit or Disadvantage of a People, 136.


56. Blewitt, An Enquiry Whether a General Practice of Virtue Tends to the Wealth or Poverty, Benefit or Disadvantage of a People, 10–12.

57. Mandeville, Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and National Happiness, 12–13.