Symposium

Jude Chua Soo Meng/
Javier Calero Cuervo
Simon Lim Qing Wei
Stephen J. Laumakis
This short piece is intended both as an introduction and as a distinct contribution in itself. Here we track the evolution of this symposium collection on “Golf, Business, and Leadership” but also briefly theorize the scholarly context in which this discussion of golf, business, and leadership is embedded.

A spiritual writer once wrote that rest ought to be taken as recuperation, as a kind of change of occupation so that one can bounce back with new impetus to one’s daily job. It was never to be taken as mere idleness.¹

Such a way of relating rest, leisure, or recreation to work, one’s job, and occupation seemed to us a very interesting one. On the one hand, it suggests that leisure is not a disjointed break from work and one’s professional occupation during the day. Leisurely rest, which could also mean refreshing play, is not a disconnected escape from one’s daily professional enterprise. Rather it is to be more intimately related to work. Leisure, or play, is closely tied with work. It is to be different no doubt. Yet it is nonetheless to be in some sense continuous with work. It prepares for and supports work. It is not a useless appendix to work. Rather it is that which formed and reforms the work. In this sense leisure or play is itself a kind of work, a change of occupation, and not idleness.

Such an interesting idea begged for more reflection and interrogation. Is such a way of characterizing rest, leisure, or play intelligible or defensible? It was somehow fortunate that several independent sources of reflection had converged on this theme or on themes immediately relevant to this, and it seemed to us a good idea to come together to surface its potentials. On the one hand, Javier, who had been exploring the correlation between sports and leadership, had on
several occasions bumped into anecdotal and journalistic reports of how one leisurely sport, golf, was beneficial for work in one way or another. Jude, on the other hand, was intrigued by a recently published collection of essays titled, *Golf and Philosophy: Lessons from the Links*, in which eighteen philosophers had written how golf connects with philosophical ideas, several of which had to do with moral philosophy.

After several emails bouncing around ideas, we thought it would be good to get people together to meet and have a chat. In June 2017, we hosted a short seminar at the National Institute of Education (NIE), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Javier, then a short-term visiting scholar at NIE, shared with seminar participants some of his initial findings on sports in youth prefiguring the subjects’ performance as managers. That discussion gave us the opportunity to revisit how golf, which many business people are rather familiar with, might be beneficial for the professional life. A couple of participants have played golf, so there was an interest in putting some ideas on paper. Thus the plan was to have a special symposium with the *Journal of Markets & Morality*, further theorizing the relationship between golf and professional life.

The focus on how golf and professional life relates is not just a question of how sports shape our working life-world. Members of the seminar were aware of the literature on neoliberalism and had brought that up as a context for situating the relevance of the topic. Sociologists who write about neoliberalism often worry about how the marketized world had misshaped professional agency. Their idea is that the desire to pacify market demand leads to a vicious consequentialism that undermines ethical intentions and fosters a selfish, competitive outlook. This is often described as the “terrors of performativity”—the obsessive desire to perform toward performance indicators (proxies to fitness in the market) terrorizes one’s cognitive space and displaces what does not fit with that consequentialist, Machiavellian outlook. What are often displaced are ethical principles or valuable goals not captured or not capturable by quantitative proxies. The further worry is that organizations that are not necessarily in business (e.g., educational organizations) have gradually adopted a similar “business” or “marketized” outlook. Much of the scholarly work has complained about the distortion of the moral or professional agency of people at work. But there has been little discussion of a solution. In this we see a gap and an opportunity. Can leisurely play such as golf have benefits for mitigating the specter of the terrors of performativity—perhaps even of exorcising it? Could it foster the right mood or comportment for ethical ideas to better flourish, in the midst of pressures to dismiss ethics?

Furthermore, we believed it was possible that the sociological discussion on neoliberalism and the market is muddled. It is difficult to deny that the steering of
organizations under market pressures could lead to the terrors of performativity. At the same time, a closer inspection suggests a more nuanced diagnosis. The obsession with performative targets is certainly not exclusive to organizations immersed in a free market environment. One can imagine a department under pressure from a central planning office to deliver certain planned outcomes experiencing the same problem. Indeed, this and similar forms of corruption were often discussed by Friedrich Hayek when he analyzed the dynamics of systems that steered away from market signals. These socialist systems are unable to overcome bounded rationality and thus have to constantly cover up errors entailed by the consequentialist pursuit of misguided performance goals prescribed by the central planning committee. Still, they have to promote the deceptive appearance of good performance under the guise of these indicators that are yet unrelated with real and pressing needs or aspects of well-being. The problem is obviously not the market per se. It is the flourishing of consequentialist thinking under pressure, whether this is steered by the market or by central planning. These distortions, which are the result of consequentialism, were earlier painstakingly analyzed by the new natural law theorist Germain Grisez. If this is so, then the approach to mitigating these terrors is not always to attack the free economy (with its coordinating benefits!) but rather to fracture consequentialism. In this way one will not throw the baby out with the bathwater.

This approach has precedent. Stanford’s James G. March was for many years attentive to the dominance of the logic of consequence in organizations and had sought not to dismantle the market but to fracture unreflective consequentialism and to mingle a deontological logic of appropriateness with the interest in consequences. March came up with a series of “technologies of foolishness” for professional thinking. These are different approaches to thinking at work compared with conventional consequentialist wisdom. For example, March encouraged the hypocritical celebration of ethical duties by consequentialist thinkers and leaders—with the hope that such hypocrisy would be transitional. Again, March welcomed the playful consideration of new identities and decisions different from the typical roles one plays; these, he believed, might help overcome consequentialist blind spots. Yet, notice that these discussions deal with how to reform one’s thinking at work during work. What remains underinvestigated is the exploration of this neglected time we call rest or leisure. Can rest or leisurely play also be a tool for arresting the consequentialist spirit? Can golf also be a technology of foolishness? Are there indications that golfing might foster human qualities that could translate well into desirable attitudes for (business) leaders? Here is a huge segment of human life not sufficiently analyzed and exploited to reform professional and moral agency at work.
The following original essays are an attempt to begin the conversation. How does the play of golf—a form of leisure familiar to leaders of organizations and businesses—relate with one’s professional life? Does it support the cultivation of desirable ideas and qualities in leaders, relevant for their work? In various ways the following essays indicate positive connections between golf, ethical leadership, and business thinking. We hope this collection might be of interest to our readers who also play golf (or engage in other similar forms of leisure) and start them off wondering with us along the lines of philosophies of golfing relevant to leadership and professional agency. Most of all, we hope readers will enjoy what we believe is a refreshing approach to thinking about these issues.

Finally, we thank the editors Kevin Schmiesing and Dylan Pahman for their support and for taking a chance on us; we hope we have not disappointed them.

Notes


2. Most recently, see “Secret to Working at 95—Play Golf,” South China Morning Post, August 30, 2018, B2.


Meta-Physis and the Natural Law:
Golf, Gardens, and Good Business

Jude Chua Soo Meng

Golf, Good Business, and the Natural Law

I have elsewhere explored how the natural-law theorist’s approach to the concept of business would involve developing the notion of a “business” in its central case or focal meaning.¹ Much like the project to arrive at a definition of “law” in its central case in Natural Law and Natural Rights, this involves intentionally relating the activities one does or can do in business with the deliverances of the precepts of the natural law, which point to the important things in life that we ought to consider achieving.² Put more plainly, a natural-law businessman, if there were one, would draw on the professional insights he has into business and think through how these insights can be applied to realize the choice-worthy, important things. A conception of business like this would in turn be more important and sit more centrally in comparison with the peripheral instantiations of the term business; it would more fittingly be said to be “good business.”³

Of course, much depends on one’s grasp of these important things. A natural-law theorist or a natural-law businessman would point to the natural law that identifies these important things, namely, the basic goods of life: knowledge, aesthetics, friendship, marriage, religion, and sound ethical behavior, and so forth.³ A focal vision of business (whether had by the business leader or by politicians governing a locale with businesses operating) informed by these basic values would not allow the business’s activities to directly attack these goods, or would at least protect the right of businesses to not attack these goods should they so wish.⁴ For example, bakeries should not be forced to bake products that
celebrate wrongdoing, thus being complicit in promoting untruth and practical unreasonableness, and legislators should protect freedom of religion—topics that Ryan Anderson and Sherif Girgis discuss well. Instead, businesses should be attentive to opportunities to foster the basic goods. One would imagine that it would even explore ways these goods can be promoted or facilitated in its business design, organization, CSR activities, retreats, and so on, amidst the necessity of profit making and attentiveness to market prices, which in turn promote the sustainability of a business providing jobs and goods and that themselves go toward promoting these basic goods.

The talk of basic goods then prompts the question: How are these basic goods known? How do we come to understand the natural law, which prescribes these basic goods as choice-worthy? My suggestion in this article is that the grasping of the natural law can be facilitated by a sport that many business leaders play during leisure or with other business partners: golf. In this article, I explore how the beautiful greens of golf courses as well as the apparent futility of the gameplay afford us with opportunities to grasp the natural law.

Meta-Physis: Showing the Natural Law

We can begin by appreciating why a discussion such as this is important. Recall that the natural law is self-evident (per se nota). Saying that the natural law is self-evident qua underived from a metaphysics or account of human nature describes the knowing process in a negative way and tells us how the natural law is not grasped. But how then, positively, is it grasped? There is the reference to how one moves from inclination to an intelligible grasp of the relevant good, and the point made regarding how upon probing one often ends up with one of these goods as the point of one’s actions without intending to seek any further thing or state of affairs. Finnis also supplies a dialectical argument in defense of the good of knowledge, pointing out how any serious denial of that good involved a performative self-contradiction, but that was just for one of the many goods.

Still, my own reading of Aristotle, John Deely’s semiotics, and Martin Heidegger gives rise to a few exploratory ideas concerning the grasping of the natural law and the importance of “nature,” which I suspect can usefully complement what already is in the literature detailing our coming to be conscious of the natural law’s normative prescriptions. Indeed, I would suggest that in some important sense, our grasp of the natural law comes after (meta) “nature” (physis). In unpacking these ideas below, I will relate them to the game of golf and suggest how golf can make important contributions to the grasping of the natural law.
Emerging Nature: Those Awe-some Greens

Consider the *Metaphysics*, in which Aristotle speaks of a “wonder” (or “astonishment” or “awe” [*thaumazein*]) that begins the philosophical comportment, specifically the wondering at a puzzle, leading to an interest in the knowledge of its answer for its own sake, to the extent that one then focuses with absorbed interest on studying the puzzle: “[I]t is because of wonder that men both now and formerly began to philosophize…. “13 The quest to know for its own sake is different from the (previous) pursuit of knowledge for the sake of one’s needs in relation to survival. Wondering (say, at a puzzle) leads to our interest in knowledge for its own sake, over and above knowing for survival. Such wondering is not itself the quest for knowledge for its own sake, but comports one for the latter.

Aristotle sounds like he is equating wonder with an emotional fascination with whatever one is ignorant about. Here, we have a desire to know for its own sake, different from the desire to survive, but still a desire nonetheless. Inspired by this desire, the quest for knowledge for its own sake proceeds. Aquinas’s own commentary, following Aristotle closely, also focuses on the way in which philosophy began because men were motivated to escape ignorance, and this might also give the impression that Aquinas had in mind some kind of emotive desire like curiosity:

For when we see certain obvious effects whose cause we do not know, we wonder about their cause…. [S]ince wonder stems from ignorance, they are obviously moved to philosophize in order to escape from ignorance. It is accordingly evident from this that “they pursued” knowledge, or diligently sought it, only for itself and not for any utility or usefulness.14

Indeed, Beatrice Zedler suggests that for Aquinas, philosophizing could be motivated by something like fear—namely, the fear of ignorance. In which case, wonder is merely a kind of fear: “[a]ccording to Thomas, wonder is a species of fear following upon the apprehension of something exceeding our knowledge and sometimes exceeding our ability to know it.”15

Whereas, I suspect there could be something more than the substitution of psychological drives at work. Unhelpfully, neither Aristotle’s text in that section of the *Metaphysics* nor Aquinas’s commentary on it distinguish for us “the quest for knowledge for its own sake following wonder,” understood as (1) “the quest for knowledge for its own sake motivated as such by some kind of desire or emotion” as distinct from (2) “the quest for knowledge for its own sake that follows from a comportment categorically different from the motivating presence of some feeling.” While both seek knowledge as an end in itself rather than for
instrumental uses, the first (1) is powered, as it were, by a kind of desire or emotion, whereas the second (2) is the result of some mental state that is something categorically quite different from feelings.

There is no need to deny that some psychological drive to escape ignorance—whether curiosity or fear—and hence “wonder” in these senses, is at play. The question I would ask is whether the experience of wonder points to something else apart from such an emotive drive. Aristotle’s reference in chapter 1 of the *Metaphysics* to all men desiring to know and “the delight we all take in the senses … and most of all the sense which operates through the eyes,”¹⁶ would seem to signal that he is thinking only of such emotive or preferential drives at work during wonder. Wonder spurs the quest to know, and when appeased, particularly though the sense of sight, one experiences delight. Wonder, therefore, on a natural reading in the context of all the references to sensations and feelings in the Aristotelian corpus, sounds like something emotive as well, akin to a feeling of fascination.

What also interests me, however, is Aquinas’s commentary on that passage which, unlike Aristotle’s, speaks of “desire” in a way that relates not specifically to delight of any kind but refers rather to “desiring” in the broader sense of “tending toward” and in this sense, of the desire of matter for form and also of the intellect for knowledge:

> Each thing naturally desires its own perfection. Hence matter is also said to desire form as any imperfect thing desires its perfection. Therefore, since the intellect, by which man is what he is, considered in itself is all things potentially, and becomes them actually only through knowledge, because the intellect is none of the things that exist before it understands them … so each man naturally desires knowledge just as matter desires form.¹⁷

Even if we take Aristotle and Aquinas to be admitting the presence of an emotive drive to seek knowledge for its own sake, it seems to me that for Aquinas at least, there is room to accommodate the interpretation that the desirous-tending-toward knowledge for its own sake is not driven merely by our feeling-desires. For here Aquinas speaks of the human intellect itself tending toward (desiring) knowledge just as it seeks its own perfection and that view of “desiring” would not need to point merely to some emotive basis. So we can accept Aquinas’s vision of beings, including the human intellect, “desiring” qua “tending toward” its own perfection, and be a little more nuanced when unpacking what may be involved in the genesis and processes of such desiring qua tending toward. John Deely’s musings on the event of the philosophical and metaphysical consciousness of the human being is helpful here:
The human animal … goes beyond the relation of objects to the self by sometimes asking what are these objects quite apart from any biological interest which we find in them, insofar as they exhibit an independence of relations to us. It is true that such an inquiry perforce exhibits an “interest” on the part of the organism pursuing it. But the possibility of such an interest is consequent upon, rather than constitutive of, a unique objectification…. Usually when we speak of the “needs and interests” of an organism we are speaking of something that arises from the physiology of biological heritage. Here we are speaking of an “interest” which, to be sure, presupposes a psychological capacity, but which presupposes more fundamentally a unique objectification in the absence of which the “interest” has no possibility of arising.\(^\text{18}\)

Again,

The human \textit{Innenwelt} begins, as does any animal \textit{Innenwelt}, by giving rise to an objective world, an \textit{Umwelt}, dually rooted in the interaction between physical environment and biological organism. But the action proper to understanding within this \textit{Umwelt} begins by loosening this tie whereby biological heritage wholly determines the organization of the objective world or \textit{Umwelt}.\(^\text{19}\)

What Deely is referring to here (and in other related works), as I read him, is the beginning of the human ability to think and enquire after things for the sake of knowing them for their own sakes, and part of the process includes, among other things, the loosening of the vice-like grip of the animal’s (\textit{zoö}-semiotic) way of perceiving the world, where everything is related according to whether it is useful, harmful, or irrelevant for our survival. Of course, the desire for survival and fear of death would be a major driving force for relating the world to ourselves in this way. But the point Deely is making here is that when the human mind enters the picture there is a detachment from this manner of relating to things, and with that detachment or loosening comes that other uniquely human ability to relate objects to themselves, that is, to be interested in objects for their own sakes—for example, for our sheer knowledge of them without any intention to instrumentalize our interested knowledge of them for any other utility in relation to our biological needs or survival.

If that is so, I would suggest that a more complete notion of \textit{thaumazein} that begins any philosophical inquiry into knowing things for their own sake is to understand \textit{thaumazein} not merely as a type of feeling or emotion, whether desire or fear. Instead we should understand \textit{thaumazein} to be a proto-philosophical \textit{event} which, amongst other things, marks that point in our consciousness wherein we are able to achieve some measure of \textit{detachment} and disentanglement from what drives our survival and biological needs and their way of relating our experience.
of the world. And there could well be emotions attendant or even consequent, whether fear or desire. Yet it remains that *thaumazein* signals that point where there is a kind of *prior* suspension of or fracturing of the imperative of desires that drive us to survive and to steer our thinking to relate our experiences primarily as useful, harmful, or irrelevant to our biological needs and survival.

But the achievement of *thaumazein* ought not be restricted to the emergence of thinking in the speculative order, of knowing for its own sake, and ultimately the emergence of speculative science. After all, if *thaumazein* and its *detachment* from the compulsion of our sense appetites and preferences and their manner of relating the world to ourselves now allows our attention to fall on or be steered by the interest to seek knowledge for its own sake, then this is simply because that event we call *thaumazein* is, by way of the said detachment, allowing our attention to fall on or be steered by *other* interests or directives (the quest for knowledge being one of them) besides those relevant to our survival, whatever these other interests or directives may be. This suggests that where there are other intellectual principles or directives at play, these too would now be more visible to our consciousness. These other important first or basic principles in our minds would now foreground. These must include the first principles of practical reason, the natural law.²⁰

Of course, there is a tendency in the natural-law tradition to overstate the contrast between preferences and reasons, which I do not want to repeat here. It must be said that the grasp of intelligent ideas during understanding is very much dependent on what sensation and perception gives, and understanding is but a further transformation of the *Umwelt*, or the species-specific life-world, and it is by building and drawing on that the human life-world, the *Lebenswelt*, in which there is the manifestation of understanding, emerges.²¹

Still, just as the compulsion to know instrumental facts for the sake of survival is loosened and backgrounded, and the quest to know for its own sake is therefore in its place, foregrounded, so also, as we experience a greater detachment from other drives instrumental to our biological survival and related principally to our biological needs (or what Deely calls “*cathexis*”²²), we then grasp more clearly the normative direction of the natural law or the first principles of practical reason—namely, the gentler but no less important direction to pursue other goods in life for their own sakes and as intelligible ends understood as terminal *reasons* for action and not as mere emotions or feelings. In a sense, the natural law is “shown,” in the same way the stars show when the brightness of the sun is dimmed. John Finnis, we recall, identified some of these goods: knowledge, life, friendship, the experience of beauty, the skillful play in work or performance,
the need to experience a moral integration between one’s feelings and reason, and some kind of religious or overarching worldview, to name a few.

In short, *thaumazein*, I think, does not just mark the stage of detachment that clears our way to pursue knowledge for its own sake; it also allows to be brought to mind those various intelligible goods that make up human flourishing and hence are worthy of our pursuit if we are to experience fulfillment apart from mere existence.

What gives rise to this sense of wonder and its clearing? Not merely the confrontation with a puzzle or *aporia*, I think. Here I want to chart out some lines of thought that may need further critical discussion, but which nevertheless can indicate the ways in which golf plays a part in our thinking about the natural law and business. Martin Heidegger, as Richard Capobianco’s reading points out, reminds us of the way in which wonder follows from our engagement with nature or *physis*, understood as the *coming-into-presentation-and-then-passing-away-of-things.* Capobianco’s commentary on Heidegger is lucid on this point:

We must endeavour, [Heidegger] tells us … to return to the “originary meaning of nature as *physis*” that prevailed in the ancient Greeks, and accordingly, this means understanding Nature-*physis* as the “emerging-and-letting-come-to-presence of what is present”. At the core of the Greeks’ experience of *physis* “is the overabundance, the excess of what presences. Here one should recall the anecdote of Thales: he is that person so struck by the overabundance of the world of the stars that he was compelled to direct his gaze towards the heavens alone. In the Greek climate, the human is so overwhelmed by the presence of what is present, that he is compelled to the question concerning what is present as what is present. The Greeks name the relation to his thrust of presence *thaumazein* [wonder, astonishment] (Heidegger, *Four Seminars*).” Nature-*physis*-Being, is this “thrust of presence,” and we are astonished before the “overflow of presence”. Even in Plato and Aristotle, this remained the case, according to Heidegger.

It is important to grasp that the overflowing or excess of that presence-ing of things refers not so much to the magnitude or volume of that thing which emerges before us, but refers instead to its infinitude in relation to a limiting meaning or meanings. Like an act that cannot be received in limiting potency, it appears to escape the confines of our cognitive grasp. Hence Capobianco adds:

Furthermore, the *presence* of things to us is never exhausted by meaning: a friend, the sea, the tree, the flower—all that present themselves to us—are always more than how we present them. Cezanne painted Mont Sainte-Victoire more than sixty times by several accounts, but never once did he think he had
exhausted its showing, its manifestation. Similarly, we can never say enough about even one of Cezanne’s paintings of the mountains! All things show themselves to us and address us—again and again—and they are always more than their sense or meaning. Presence always exceeds, overflows, meaning and therefore is not reducible to meaning.25

Thus, as things become present—say a flower entering full bloom, or a child emerging into a toddler from a mere infant26—their presence-ing, their becoming more real and actual, yet also addressing us again and again, could inspire in us that sense of wonder. At other times, an aesthetic scenery coming into view, attractive and calling our attention, flooding our consciousness in succession and therefore yet another manner of the presence-ing of physis—say the long stretch of sand set against the blue waves of a lagoon, or else the landscape of mountains invading one’s consciousness repeatedly as we approach—does the same.

Or for that matter: the garden of a golf course—even better set against a beautiful coast line, or flanked by lush forest-hills and mountains, say those courses in the Riau Islands in Bintan or Batam in Indonesia—could certainly inspire wondrous awe. Robert Fudge and Joseph Ulatowski have a relevant discussion of the beauty of gardens and golf courses in the intriguing collection, *Golf and Philosophy: Lessons from the Links*, edited by Andy Wible. In “On the Beauty and Sublimity of Golf,” they write,

Linksland, public commons linksland, and the stateside links-style courses resemble English gardens by virtue of their more natural state. An appreciation of these courses must forfeit perfectly manicured greens, fairways, and rough. Built golf courses and designer golf courses are far more well-groomed than their linksland and links-style relatives and more closely resemble French gardens. The standards of beauty that apply to them therefore differ. But despite these differences, all golf courses create an atmosphere that serves as the foundation for the aesthetic appreciation and can transform a round of golf into something similar to a garden stroll.27

So, consider the beautiful landscape coming into view as you come to that signature hole set against the sea, or each distinct, beautiful garden-course opening up to you at every hole while you peer down from the tee box toward the greens and the pin. The suggestion that the experienced presence-ing of nature-physis can stimulate the experience of thaumazein is a suggestion that may be true in varying degrees from person to person, depending on the character of the person involved, assuming entrenched habits and so forth. Yet if Heidegger’s suggestion and the testimony of Heidegger’s Greeks regarding the co-relating connection
between nature-\textit{physis} and \textit{thaumazein} is anything to go by, then it seems to me the presence-ing of a beautiful golf course as it opens up to your consciousness holds much promise for recovering the experience of \textit{thaumazein}, and with that, the foregrounding of the prescription of the natural law \textit{et al}, as said above.

\textbf{Passing Nature: The End of the Game}

But it is not merely the presence-ing of stunning, awe-inspiring natural or manicured gardens and landscapes in golf that is relevant to the grasping of the natural law by way of the \textit{physis-thaumazein} or that “nature-wonder” connection. Thus far mention has been of the emergence of \textit{physis} in golf, that arrests us, and dislocates or fractures \textit{cathexis’s} hold on us. Yet in \textit{physis} is also the “passing away,” which is equally relevant—or at least I would think so. For the death and the dying of \textit{physis} also comports us in ways that foreground the truly important and essential—precisely by comporting us to think practically, even amidst the juxtaposition of speculative modes of thinking. This means that, whereas the “coming into presence” of \textit{physis} and wonder frees us from the shackles of \textit{cathexis} so that in that clearing speculative and practical modes of understanding and thinking can foreground, the “passing away” of \textit{physis} now steers us to reflect seriously, evaluatively, practically, and not merely speculatively. When death approaches, when things come to an end, and when we become acutely aware of our own temporality, amidst our purely theoretical pursuits, we are nudged to ask (at times accompanied by angst and anxiety)—is this all worth it, and what else is worth (the rest of) our (precious and limited) time?\textsuperscript{28} What then is the point or end of it all?

As it happens golf can be quite useful as a fruitful retreat in which one meditates about one’s temporality, backgrounds speculative thinking, and comports into practical thinking. For a start, as one walks toward the first hole and tees off, the course opens up to the golfer in its stunning beauty, but as one approaches the ninth or eighteenth hole, depending on the length of the game for the day, the golf course then begins to close, and the window of golfing opportunity approaches its own passing away, and its closure. Although the stunning gardens of themselves do not pass away, they are soon hidden from our view, as the holes pass us by, and the experience of being immersed in wondrous beauty also passes. Hence, there is sometimes the insinuation of an analogy between the way in which the wonderful game enters its closure at the last hole, and the reminder that life comes to an end for all of us—a reminder about the reality of death that Martin Heidegger invites us to take a little more seriously for ourselves, not for morbid reasons, but simply so that we would take more seriously the life we have before
it inevitably ends. Sometimes, knowing that we do not have something forever invites us to value something much more, instead of taking it for granted. Here, a bit of human psychology is at work, for better or for worse.

Still, the connection between golf and our temporality is not merely analogous but more intimate: The time between the first and the (ninth or) eighteenth hole, anywhere between one-and-a-half hours to four hours, is a window of opportunity to play golf, but it is also a window of opportunity to do something else in a counterfactual, other possible world, now being traded off when one plays golf and walks the fairways. If one were a god, perhaps it would not have mattered. Yet as mortal beings, our time is not an unlimited resource. Hence when one trades off hours of doing other things so as to play golf, one directly draws on the temporal resource one has—a resource that is, as said earlier, very finite. If so, sooner or later, one is going to realize that such time spent using one’s lifetime had better be fruitful and not futile. Such considerations in fact come rather naturally, in part, as I will detail below, because of our confrontation with the potential futility of the fun play of golf.

Ironically, we are often attracted to golf simply because it is fun, even if also occasionally frustrating. The play of hitting a ball into a hole across or around different kinds of obstacles has its own entertaining appeal alongside the aesthetics of the course. Indeed, golf is defined by the hitting of a ball into a hole. While pleasurable and entertaining for a while, the game of golf can soon appear rather pointless. Is that all there is? What, spend hours merely hitting a ball into a hole? One does not live forever, and this time could have been spent doing something else.

Yet, as I have suggested elsewhere, the apparent purposelessness and pointlessness of the game-play in golf is particularly useful and also transformative, as it affords the interrogation into the point of the game and the play. Soon when it is not that fun, one asks, what are we doing here? What is this business of putting a ball into a hole? It seems futile and pointless. Indeed its pointlessness stares at you. Its futility is glaring. Its uselessness is arresting. Yet this moment in encounter with glaring pointlessness is precisely that which invites us to think about the point of this game, if any: “What is the purpose here?” By that one means: “What is (or are) the choice-worthy goal(s) to be pursued in this activity called golf?” Here one is comported into practical thinking.

I might add that without its glaring pointlessness that comportment into practical thinking might not have worked that well. Consider, in contrast, those times one is engaged in everyday useful things. Such everyday busyness is not pointless, and so does not arrest one’s thinking, and does not stop one to think. One carries on doing. And oftentimes, as one continues in one’s busy doings,
it is speculative thinking that continues to foreground: here one continues to execute plans, to think efficient ways and better means to realize given goals, just as a mathematician thinks speculatively best and shortest ways to connect two dots on a plane. But when one’s doing comes across as glaringly futile, one might perhaps stop and think. Here, golf’s pointless futility stops us, fractures our everyday speculative thinking’s busy direction, backgrounds the latter and foregrounds practical thinking and begs for its advice, by posing the question: “Is this really worth following through?”

If one finds nothing of worth, one gives up the sport soon, except to revisit it on occasion for sheer fun in the future. One cannot waste one’s life playing golf. Yet the other approach to play is indeed to locate choice-worthy goods in it, for some goods do show up: It is great exercise for a healthy life; there is the mastery of skillful play; again, the conversations that help one learn about the other’s true character and also nurture understanding and friendship amongst players; the taming of anger and the exercise of perseverance which tempers emotions for the sake of reason’s direction; the appreciation of the surrounding beauty; a time of peace and quiet, walking between holes, to voice one’s aspirations and worries to God (if one so believes), and the building of familial bonds when husband (man), wife (woman), and child spend time together without interruption from technology and other trifles. One’s mind is adverted toward the things and states of affairs that are worth seeking—and one spots them and seeks them in that mess of phenomena we capture with the label “golf.” Only if we find these goods, and fortunately do find these goods, can playing golf continue and also continue to make sense. Only thus are those few hours spent well. Yet the insight that spending these few hours well in golfing means achieving through “golf” these various choice-worthy goods is also an expression of, and a showing of, practical thinking’s judgment that these are the things that constitute human flourishing and the truly important things worth seeking: the good of life, of play, of truth and friendship, of practical reasonableness, of aesthetic experience, of religion and of marriage. Hence, the natural law becomes visible through its direction to pursue the various basic goods.

Here one is reminded of the “experience machine” thought experiment, where one is offered a lifetime of pleasure being plugged into the experience machine. There, one confronts the futility of an existence of sheer pleasure (fun) without other attending (unsimulated) goods, and hesitates to plug in, worrying about the loss of other goods besides the experience of pleasure. Such worry—such concerned practical thinking—is at the same time an expression of, and a showing of, that concerned practical thinking’s judgment that these other goods ought to be sought in any life worth living. That grasp of important things worth seek-
ing and achieving in life is potentially further heightened by the prospect of the complete termination (because one is being plugged in “for life”), and hence, death of one’s life as one knows it, that is, not plugged into a machine and floating in a tank of water, say. With the irreversibility of the death of one’s current life, one’s mood is very serious—this is not mere empty speculation. In the context of the need for serious deliberation about what truly matters, practical thinking kicks in. Yet here also is where it sometimes fails: As a thought experiment, and unlike really playing golf and really investing one’s finite temporal resource, one knows at the back of one’s mind that all this is just the contemplation of an abstract possibility, and so one cannot take it seriously enough. In this case, one does not comport seriously in practical thinking but instead indulges in the speculative consideration of whether such plugging in is logically possible. The thought experiment loses its punch and efficacy for showing the natural law.

Leisure for Leaders, Golf for Good Business

In this short article my thoughts have been on how golf can be relevant to the showing of the natural law, which in turn is theoretically important for developing central case conceptions of what a (good) “business” might mean. In this way, my aim was to relate golf and business by alluding to golf’s contribution to our reflective conception of what a business in its focal and hence truly important and praiseworthy sense might be, distinguishable from corrupt, poor, and peripheral senses deserving of criticism. I suggested that the experience of stunning beauty in golf can inspire thaumazein, which fractures the human being’s fixation on biological motives focused on survival, so that the direction of practical reason, including the natural law, can better foreground. At the same time, the golfer’s concern to spend time well against the backdrop of his own temporality also helps him or her think more seriously about how to spend well that time on the course, thus showing the important goods to which natural law points. Such showing of the natural law could well be characterized as “meta-physi-cal” events, if I may, since these are events that occur after nature-physis, taken as the emerging-and-passing-away of things. Of course, nothing in this means golfing replaces business or leadership schools. Yet, it does seem to me that businessmen and organizational leaders could benefit from golf during leisure (or else, a golfing business retreat with suitable reflective seminars) to better recollect and grasp important values that enable them to steer their businesses in directions that promote human fulfilment, whether this is within their own organizations, or for the market which they service.
Notes


12. A brief sketch of aspects of these ideas also appears in the magazine, *NIE News* (2018), which I further develop here.

13. See Aristotle 1. 982b 11–983a 23

14. See Aristotle 1. 982b 11–983a 23


16. See Aristotle 1. 982b 11–983a 23


20. The natural law seems to me to be a kind of *syntactical* language in the sense meant in semiotics. These are the structuring grammar of the human mind, which our cultural languages (English, Mandarin, Spanish, etc.) presupposes. See John Deely and Susan Petrilli’s work, which builds on Thomas Sebeok.


26. I might mention in passing that the ongoing experience of the conception and birth of a child and experiencing him, engaging and educating him, seeing him coming into presence, just as the child qua *physis* is born, grows, acquires abilities and develops, and with his presence-ing abundantly addressing you, is another example of how *physis* leads to the wonder that breaks down the grip of *cathexis* and so shows the natural law. As a parent, one inevitably grasps the important things—and perhaps this important basic good called “marriage,” which we grasp under reason as worth seeking but distinguishable from the *cathectic*, romantic, and/or lustful feelings that encourage community, procreation, and the survival of the species. See Jude Chua Soo Meng, “Showing What ‘Marriage’ Is: Law’s Civilizing Sign,” *Semiotica* 209, Special Issue: Law’s Hidden Meanings (2016): 249–75.


30. See Jude Chua, “Being Written.”

32. See Jude Chua, “Golf.” For a discussion that seeks to disentangle the confusion between speculative thinking and practical thinking, and for the point that the natural law is principally thinking in the practical mode, see John Finnis, *Fundamentals of Ethics* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1983), 1–23.

33. Jude Chua, “Golf.”

34. See John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights*, 95–97.

35. And leisure is certainly not the wasting of time, but resting refreshment that also develops the human person.
Human Values for a Golfer and an Organizational Leader

Simon Lim Qing Wei

Introduction

The notion of values has been studied across all social disciplines as they form the foundation for attitudinal and behavioral responses of individuals and some unethical business practices. For business and organizational leaders, values generally function as the basis for making decisions and are used as a determinant for practicing a preferred leadership style in the organization. In fact, we bring and enact our embraced human values everywhere we go. As human values are perceived to guide one’s actions and serve as standards in daily living, or act as the motivational roots of behaviors, the individual’s attitudes and behaviors may travel across different contexts. Hence, it stands to reason that one’s behavior in a sporting arena—for example, golf—might insinuate the values that the individual may then embrace in the context of organizational leadership. In this paper, I discuss some of the values that golfers may exhibit on the golf course, and explore how these same values might manifest in the leader of an organization if these values do indeed travel from the golf course into the boardroom.

Values from the Golf Course to the Boardroom

A social psychologist and cross-cultural researcher Shalom Schwartz has developed a theory of basic human values that considers practical, psychological, social, and cultural dimensions. This theory includes ten human values that Schwartz has discussed at length and has been validated by hundreds of samples.
taken from eighty-two countries across different cultures. I will be exploring five of these values, namely: “self-direction,” “stimulation,” “achievement,” “security,” and “benevolence.”

**Self-Direction**

Schwartz has defined the value of self-direction as independent thought and action, enabling the individual to be able to choose, create, and explore his or her own goals.

This value can be present in a golfer. Such a golfer might have the desire to perfect or gain mastery of every single swing. This aspiration resonates with the need for control and mastery, or “an inborn drive to do and to learn how to do” from which the self-direction value was derived. This may explain why golfers would spend long hours at the driving range, perfecting their swings and postures, before venturing onto the golf course. Moreover, golfers who are self-directed often prefer freedom in choosing their own goals on the course. In a way, they are a group of curious, adventurous, and independent people, who would want to have the final say on how to change their tactics of play on different terrains and lies.

Likewise for self-directed leaders in organizations, they will usually have an inquisitive mindset and are adventurous enough to explore new grounds, especially in this world of uncertainties. Leaders with flexible and independent thinking will tend to have the heart and motivation for self-directed learning while they are in search of fresh ideas. They should desire to acquire new knowledge. In fact, there are many studies done on self-directed learning (SDL), particularly in a workplace environment. SDL has been proven to be a significant contributor for work performance which has led individuals to be more competitive in the labor market. SDL is a complex process, and this concept develops from the notion of lifelong learning that consists of formal education such as those courses offered by educational institutes, informal education that includes work-based workshops, and informal learning by reading articles and books. In order for the organizational leaders to keep up-to-date with the latest development in their respective fields, they will embrace the attitude of SDL by taking initiative to identify their learning needs, choosing and implementing learning strategies, and evaluating their learning outcomes. It is not easy for SDL to take place effectively. While SDL could influence performance through innovation and is believed to be beneficial for the individual and at organizational levels, it does require a certain degree of self-monitoring, self-management, independence, openness, reflection, confidence, readiness, and initiative.
Stimulation

Schwartz has also considered stimulation as a value described as “excitement, novelty and challenge in life.” Such “stimulation” derives from the need for variety in order to maintain an optimal level of activation and to satisfy the biological need for thrill-seeking, stimulation, and arousal, conditioned by personal social experiences.

In golf, we can observe such a value in action. Stimulation thrives on variation. Sometimes, playing on a new course is a source of stimulation. Also, when golfers come to own a different set of golf clubs, they are stimulated and excited to try their hand on the new clubs in a golf game as soon as possible. In these cases, the golfers would be motivated to play their game better. For amateurs who are teeing off, they would definitely be stimulated and excited if they had a long drive of 350 yards—something out of the ordinary—or on a rare occasion achieved a hole-in-one. These novelties in the same game would add excitement to their future play, encouraging the golfers to persist and hone their skills further.

Similarly, for organizational leaders to lead their organizations effectively, they need to embrace the value of stimulation. Leaders must keep wanting to grow, to learn, and to develop their capacities if they are to continue as an effective leader. Further, organizational leaders must also be able to inspire and motivate their staff to undertake various challenges, especially in handling new endeavors or changing the way they work. Leaders who practice the value of stimulation will usually challenge the status quo, changing the traditional ways of performing their routines at work. Leaders will put on their critical thinking hat and create a working environment that is tolerant of novel and creative ideas. They may also nurture their staff to be open-minded and question the old ways of functioning. Such intellectually stimulating leaders will encourage their staff to be innovative for solving problems in their work and trying out new approaches. With these practices of stimulation in place, they will likely improve organizational performance.

Achievement

The value of achievement in Schwartz’s theory drives the person to obtain success by demonstrating competency based on social standards and was derived from the requisites of coordinated social interaction and group survival. This value is strongly related to being ambitious and having expectations of being successful and has been discussed by many academics.

In golf, we can see the fruition for the value of achievement when golfers obtain low scores through their competence in the game. Such competency is
seen in those golfers who possess the right attitude and aptitude. How well a golfer plays on the golf course depends on his approach and belief towards the sport. If the golfer believes that the improvement of his skills is possible and is also ambitious and wants to attain higher achievement through obtaining lower scores, or, if the golfer has an ambitious intention to compete with other golfers, he or she will try to improve his or her competency through regular practices at the driving range or on the golf course.

In highlighting how expectancies for success could translate into one’s achievement, an expectancy-value model of achievement motivation was developed. In this model, expectancies and values are believed to impact directly on the individual’s achievement. Organizational leaders’ expectancies and values can be influenced by task-specific beliefs, such as their ability beliefs, which are closely related to their competencies in the tasks, the perceived difficulty level of tasks, and the leaders’ goals and memories. These social, cognitive factors are subject to the leaders’ perceptions of their previous experiences and social influences. Hence, expectancy for success is the belief in how well they will do for the given task in the future, while ability beliefs are seen as the perception of an individual’s current competence in the given activity. Although ability beliefs and expectancies for success are distinguished conceptually, they are both highly correlated. For instance, when the organizational leader believes that he or she has the ability to perform certain tasks, the success rate for that undertaking will be higher. Similarly, if the leader considers his competency level for the task is low, the likelihood for the leader to succeed in the assignment will be reduced greatly.

**Security**

The essence of security value is the need for harmony, safety, and stability in society and in relationships. This value of security can serve individual interests, as well as the interests of a wider community or group. Among many other things, a person can experience security when there is harmony in his or her relationships with others.

Do we see such harmonious security among the golfers? Golfers who embrace this value will keep to the rules of the game and help one another on the course, so as to maintain harmonious relationships and physical safety among players. Is there loud shouting or quarrels on the course, or is there laughter during the golf game? In a common battle against the terrain and the obstacles, bonds among golfers are usually formed, barriers are broken, and mutual understanding is reached. Apart from the tranquility of the greenery, the pace of the game, which
allows conversations, can enable the fostering of deep relationships among golfers, creating a sense of belonging and stability of bond. Some golfers actively welcome that. Golfers who embrace harmonious security may encourage one another with words like “nice shot!” instead of a snigger, or even go about helping fellow golfers search for lost balls, rather than simply turning their heads and walking away.

In many parts of the world such as China and other Asian countries, harmonious security in relationships, especially in businesses, is considered as a high priority and has been examined as a value, motive, or goal. Organizational leaders would be able to fuel strong and more intimate business partnerships by espousing the value of harmony, to increase the effectiveness of the organization. This value of harmonious security in relationships is particularly necessary in business exchanges, as it has been widely acknowledged. In this sense, organizational leaders will need to put in considerable efforts to uphold the relationship quality by maintaining harmony in the organization and with business partners. In business and organizational management, this value of security is considered a key indicator of long-term success. With these high-quality relationships in the organization, effectiveness of relationship-building will be greatly enhanced, favorable financial outcomes will be generated, mutual benefits beyond the sheer exchange of goods and services will be achieved, and the business performances will be improved.

Of course, for such harmonious security relationships to take place, two factors are necessary—communication and long-term orientation. First, communication among stakeholders is fundamental for fostering confidence among people. This is needful especially for building sustainable relationships and to reduce dysfunctional conflict. Therefore, how a leader communicates his or her thoughts to the staff, or even to business partners, will determine the stability of their relationships. Second, long-term orientation in building relationships is fundamental. Organizational leaders with the heart for maintaining harmonious relationships will usually have a long-term orientation toward their relationships with others. This is particularly true when leaders expect continuity in relationships with their business partners.

**Benevolence**

The value of benevolence focuses on the welfare of others in every interaction and is based on the need for positive interaction and affiliation. The key motivations behind this value are the preservation and enhancement of people’s welfare, especially those in frequent personal contact.
This benevolence value can also be seen in the context of golf. This game could be seen as either an individual sport or as a team sport that one plays with others. There are always emotional ups and downs, for example, when the golfers have good tee shots, hit their golf balls over the water hazard, or when their golf balls are stuck in the sand bunkers. During those moments, continuous support and encouragement from fellow golfers may manifest. Such supportive attitudes in turn manifest benevolence.

How do we see such value practiced in business organizations? While benevolence is an indigenous Chinese leadership practice that has its origin in the three-dimension model (the two other behaviors are authoritarianism and morality) of paternalistic leadership, the practice of benevolence has also been studied in Western contexts such as Turkey and Canada. In an organization, benevolent acts can be illustrated when one demonstrates individualized genuine care and considers the interest of others and the well-being of their families. A leader who is benevolent would also spend great effort in taking care, expressing concern, and encouraging others to solve problems. In this way, benevolent leaders will usually earn respect and trust from their staff, which will bring positive influence on the staff’s work performance.

Conclusion: Golf and the Interview

In this essay, I have examined five human values based on Schwartz’s theory of basic human values and have illustrated how a golfer and a leader will exhibit their embraced values on the golf course and in an organization, respectively. The values that have been discussed are: (1) self-direction, (2) stimulation, (3) achievement, (4) security, and (5) benevolence. Thus far, this essay has been a theoretical exploration of the five above-mentioned values that assumes the transferability of these values from the golf course to the organization. Of course, an empirical study of whether and to what extent values travel from the golf course to the boardroom could corroborate our theoretical claims with empirical evidence. Still, given the reflections above, there may be reason for a company to bring its next potential executive for an eighteen-hole “interview” on a golf course before it decides to hire him or her. Seeing how the candidate manifests his or her values on and around the greens could enable the firm to make an educated conjecture about what kind of organizational leader he or she will be.
Notes


The Virtues of Golf, (Course) Management, and the Common Good

Stephen J. Laumakis
Professor of Philosophy
University of St. Thomas, Minnesota

Introduction

Except for publications dedicated to popular audiences, there is little “professional” scholarly work that focuses on the intersection of philosophy, business, and athletics. As a result, the purpose of this essay is to consider the intersection of philosophy, and in particular, ethics, (business) management, and the common good in relation to the game of golf. More specifically, I am interested in the virtues (or excellences of character) that one needs in order to manage their own game (and their entire life), and simultaneously promote the flourishing of the other members of their foursome (and their community). In other words, I want to use the game of golf, and the set of practices required in order to play well, as well as the broader idea of course management in order to see how these contribute not only to the common good of your foursome but also how these same ideas can be transferred to the rest of your everyday life.

This essay begins by rehearsing the basic elements of an Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of virtue ethics and the natural law, and then applies these philosophical ideas to the game of golf. It then considers the basic principles of business management and applies these principles to the game of golf and golf course management. Finally, it considers the concept of the common good (and several formulations of it) and applies it to your foursome. In short, I plan to offer advice about how some basic philosophical ideas and business principles can be fruitfully and strategically applied not only to your golf game, but also, and most importantly, to your everyday life.
Virtue Ethics and the Natural Law

The basic features of Aristotelian-Thomistic virtue ethics and their conceptions of the natural law are remarkably clear and easy to understand. According to Aristotle and Aquinas, the central focus or question of ethics and morality is how to go about making or becoming good human beings. In other words, ethics is about trying to determine what kind(s) of actions help(s) human beings flourish and achieve their end, goal, or telos, and consequently be the best kind of thing that they are. In short, ethics is anchored in the metaphysics of the human person and what it takes for one to be a good human person.

Both Aristotle and Aquinas believe that human actions are goal-directed activities, and so it is useful to begin by starting with the aim, goal, or telos of human actions—the good. In Aristotelian-Thomistic virtue ethics “the good” is defined as that at which all human actions are aimed, or in other words, it is the target of our moral actions. According to Aristotle and Thomas, there are many possible ends or goals or targets to aim at, including: money, power, fame, material possessions, and happiness. Yet they both maintain that one of these ends, namely, happiness or eudaimonia—which they define as an activity of the soul in accord with virtue or excellence, or more clearly as “human flourishing”—is not only not a means to another end, but also the final end or telos at which all human actions are directed, precisely because it is chosen for itself and not for anything beyond itself. In fact, they insist that this ultimate end for human actions—human flourishing/eudaimonia—is tied to our nature as rational animals, that is, beings who are composed of the hylomorphic union of a material body and a rational soul.

So if we begin with a conception of the human person as a rational animal composed of a material body and a rational soul, with a composite nature directed at the characteristic activity of rational thought and contemplation, whose ultimate end is happiness or doing its characteristic activity (i.e., thinking or contemplating) well or in accordance with excellence/arete, or more precisely with virtue, then we can distinguish between actions and dispositions or habits that will help the human person achieve its end or hit its target, and other kinds of actions and dispositions or habits that will not help the human person realize their ultimate goal or happiness. The former character traits are known as virtues, and the latter are known as vices.

Aristotle and Aquinas’s common conception of the natural law involves practical, universal judgments about the rightness or wrongness of human actions as known by human reason alone. In other words, they think that certain kinds of human actions, as known by human reason, are objectively morally wrong. It is
useful to think of Aristotle’s conception of the natural law as the “higher moral law” that all social activists (i.e., M. L. King, Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, etc.) appeal to when they claim that particular human and civil laws are unjust and contrary to the human good.

While Thomas Aquinas accepts the basic features of Aristotle’s conception of the natural law, his own account of this law understands it as the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law—or God’s law for governing all of creation. In other words, since God has created the world in accordance with divine wisdom (eternal law), and revealed the divine law (in the Hebrew Scriptures with the Mosaic Law and in the New Testament in the teachings of Jesus) in order to help humans achieve their ultimate end and happiness with God in the next life, God also helps us determine the morality of actions not covered by these other kinds of law. In Thomas’s account, our rational understanding of the principles of human morality is referred to as the natural law. Thomas also insists that our human or positive laws (civil law) are to be judged by their conformity with the higher natural law, divine law, and ultimately with the eternal law. As a result, it should be clear that both thinkers share a conception of morality and ethics that is about trying to determine objectively what kind of actions help a human being flourish and achieve their end, goal, or telos, and consequently be the best kind of human person they can be. In short, ethics is anchored in the metaphysics of the human person and what it takes for one to be a good human person.

Virtue Ethics, Natural Law, and Golf

When we turn our attention to the game of golf and how it is played, it should be clear how the game can be helpfully understood from both the point of view of virtue ethics as well as from the vantage point of natural law theory. Let’s begin with what I will call the “Virtue Theory of Golf.”

As we have seen, the goal or target or aim of virtue theory in ethics is to produce a good and flourishing human person. So when we apply this theory to the game of golf, we can say that the aim of golf is to produce a good golfer. But what makes one a good golfer? For some, a good golfer is anyone who consistently shoots good scores and/or consistently beats their opponents. For others, a good golfer is someone who not only knows the rules of golf but also plays by them. For still others, a good golfer is a playing companion who makes playing the game enjoyable, even when they are not playing well, but especially when you are not playing your best. And I am sure the reader can probably think of some other ways their playing partner might be considered a “good golfer.”
However, both Aristotle and Aquinas would argue that there is, properly speaking, just one way to be a good and flourishing golfer, and that way involves both knowing how to and actually hitting the right shot, in the right way, at the right time, in the right circumstances in order to achieve the ultimate goal of golf, which is shooting the lowest score while playing the game in accordance with its constitutive rules. Failing to play in accordance with the rules would mean that you are not actually playing the game of golf (as constituted by its rules), and being successful by way of luck or chance or what is commonly referred to as the rub of the green, is not to be a good golfer, properly speaking, but merely accidentally—as when one hits an approach shot off of a rake that was in a bunker, and the ball miraculously not only ends up on the green but also somehow finds the bottom of the cup after ricocheting off the flag stick (or any other versions of what are commonly called “lucky shots”).

What makes one a good golfer, on this view, is an acquired set of good habits or virtues that allow one both to know what shot is called for in any given situation and to possess the ability (acquired through hours of practice!) to execute the appropriate shot in the same way as the acknowledged masters of the game. For example, it means practicing flop shots until one is able to hit them like Phil Mickelson does, or practicing bunker shot until one is able to play them the way Seve Ballesteros did or Luke Donald or Paula Creamer do. In short, one becomes a good golfer by practicing the kinds of shots that good golfers execute, and then one executes them in the course of a good round.

The vices of golf, as one can imagine, are the bad habits that prevent one from exercising good golf shots in the course of a round. These bad shots, as every bad golfer knows, include: hooks, slices, topping the ball, hitting it fat, under or over clubbing, the wrong grip, the wrong address, an improper backswing, an improper pivot, coming over the top, coming in too steeply, lifting your head, and, more generally, simply failing to hit the appropriate shot at the time it is needed. These vices also include not knowing the rules of golf, and violating them even when you know them—for example, taking a mulligan or using a foot wedge to escape from behind a tree or otherwise improve a bad lie.

A natural-law perspective on the game of golf, on the other hand, would say that the game itself is constituted by its constitutive rules and that violations of the rules mean either that you are not actually playing the game, or that the attendant penalties must be applied to your score. Of course, competitors could always agree to stipulate some changes to the rules for the purposes of a given competition, but again, any violation of the “new rules” means either that you are not actually playing the game as specified by your agreement, or that the attendant penalties must be applied to your score. Nevertheless, there is an objective set
of rules that specify what is or is not permitted in order for one to be playing the
game in the appropriate way.

So much for the “ethics” of golf; we now turn to the business and manage-
ment side of the game.

Principles of Management

Like almost every other arena of business, the field of business management has
undergone significant changes, especially in response to the application of scien-
tific and social scientific findings and principles. At its most basic level, manage-
ment is both the study of the principles of social organization and organizational
leadership, and the application of this kind of knowledge to the administration of
the organization in question. It is possible to distinguish two different historical
forms of management and three basic theories of management.

The earliest form of management study and practice presupposed a conception
of human persons, organizational members, and laborers as lazy, unmotivated
individuals who need to be watched, motivated, and held accountable for their
weaknesses and actions. A more recent view of management studies holds a
very different view of the person. According to this view, people are actually
self-motivated and want to succeed, and so managers need to understand this
and learn how to direct these motivated individuals toward the ends or goals of
their organizations.

These two historical management views of the human person have led to
three distinct theories of business management. The first theory of management,
which tends to see each individual person as a cog in a complex organizational
machine, employs a “scientific” conception of business management. On this
theory, management focuses on how jobs, work, and incentive schemes can be
designed to improve both the efficiency and productivity of the organization or
business using industrial engineering methods and practices. The second theory
of management accepts the more recent view of human persons as rational,
self-motivated, and self-interested utility maximizers who want to succeed,
and, as a result, it conceives of organizations not as machines with human and
material cogs, but rather as systems of interdependent human beings who share
a common interest in the survival and effective functioning of the organization
or business. Finally, a third theory of management extends this interdependent
view of the human beings who compose the organization or business to the
organization and the relationship that exists between the organization itself and
the environment in which it exists. On this theory, the purpose of management
is to coordinate the fit or alignment between the business or organization and
the environment within which it has come into existence and on whose features it interdependently relies. In other words, on this theory, management is about cultivating and enhancing the social, political, and economic relationships that constitute the environment in which the business and organization have not only come into being but also in which they continue to survive and flourish. This particular theory clearly shares important features with both the traditional Buddhist notion of *paticca-samuppada* or interdependent arising or dependent origination (as a theory of causation) and deep ecology (as a holistic view of the ecosystem) in environmental ethics and environmental philosophy. On this view, the organizational or business environment is viewed as a network or web of contextual forces and factors—in ongoing interactions—in both the internal and external environment of the organization or business.

In addition to these theories of management, and the historically changing views of management studies and its conceptions of human beings, there have also been evolving conceptions and changing perspectives on the basic purposes of a business. It is to these views that we now direct our consideration.

**What Is a Business For?**

Like the changing views of the human person and the competing theories of business management discussed in the previous section, there have been correspondingly evolving perspectives on the basic purpose of a business. It is customary in the literature of professional scholarly journals in business to distinguish three main views of the purpose of a business: first, the managerial view; second, the shareholder view; and third, the stakeholder view. Not surprisingly, each of these unique views of the purpose of a business depend on a specific view of the human person and their relationship to the business or company.

According to the managerial view, which is based on the view of the person as a cog in the machine of the business, and whose manager’s job is to advance the efficiency and productivity of the business using industrial engineering methods and “scientific” practices, the business is quite literally a mechanism for converting raw materials into products to sell to customers. The shareholder view, on the other hand, looks beyond the relationships of workers and the raw materials and the efficiencies involved in the business *per se*, and instead employs an economic framework where the job of the top managers is to produce the highest possible stock market valuation of the business’s assets. In other words, the purpose of the business is to make money for those who have invested in it. The third and final view of the purpose of a business is the stakeholder view. According to this most common view, a business exists as a nested set of relationships that include
various and multiple groups all with at least some kind of vested interest in the survival and ongoing existence of the business. These stakeholders include the business leaders, managers, employees, customers, suppliers, and everyone and everything else that is affected by the business and its operations. This obviously broader and more expansive view of what constitutes a business also includes a richer and more complex conception of the purpose of a business, because it includes all those with a stake in its existence.

**Principles of Golf Course Management**

I think it should be rather obvious that the principles of golf course management assume that human persons and golfers are rational, self-motivated, and self-interested utility maximizers who want to succeed even in the face of a game that is not only virtually impossible to master but also has been described by Mark Twain as “a good walk spoiled.” As a result, golf course management, like business management, depends on how you think about the game.

One possibility is to see the game as a series of discrete actions—that is, gripping the club, taking a stance, driving the ball, hitting long iron shots, hitting short iron shots, playing from the sand, recovering from a wayward shot, chipping, and putting—whose ultimate success depends on the successful completion of each individual component. A second approach sees the game itself as a whole, whose overall quality depends on one’s ability to adjust their thinking and shot-making to the current circumstances in which one finds oneself and one’s ball. This more pragmatic view recognizes that a perfect round is virtually impossible, and so one has to learn how to deal with the practically unavoidable bad shots and bad lies. A third view sees the game as just one (enjoyable?) part of one’s entire life, and tries to appreciate it and the accompanying beauty of the course and its setting as a leisurely and relaxing walk (*pace* Twain) through nature and a reenergizing break from the demands of ordinary life. This approach to course management takes the widest or broadest conception of the game and its place in a well-ordered and flourishing life. It takes a “big picture” view of both the point and purpose of life as well as the point and purpose of the game, especially if you happen not to be a professional golfer. I am sure reflective, thoughtful readers can easily think of other ways to manage their games in light of other ways they might think about the meaning and purpose of the game of golf and its place in their lives.
The Common Good

At this point it should not be surprising to hear that there is not a single agreed-upon concept of the “common good.” Historically, philosophers, theologians, economists, and political scientists have had sometimes competing and often inconsistent descriptions of what they understand the common good to encompass.

For the sake of simplification and easy classification, we can distinguish two broad categories of conceptions of the common good. On the one hand, there are substantive definitions that consider the common good to be the goods that are shared by all and that benefit all of the members of a given community, for example, clean air, clean water, and other natural resources. On the other hand, there are procedural definitions that see it as that which is achieved or produced by all as the outcome of a given community’s collective efforts and participation, for example, education, knowledge, and national defense. Nevertheless, on either conception, the common good may refer to public goods, public interests, the sum of individual goods, what benefits the whole vs. what benefits the individual, and more generally, according to Catholic social teaching, “the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment.”

On this last understanding, the “common good” refers to the social conditions that allow people to reach their individual fulfillment, and it also specifies their end as the good that is sought by all human beings precisely because of the kind of thing that human persons are—social animals whose proper end or goal or aim in life is flourishing with other human persons.

It should also be noted that this same notion of interdependent arising and interdependent flourishing that Western ideas of the common good share with non-Western views can be found in both Chinese and Buddhist conceptions of human goods and human flourishing. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the concept of the common good, like the game of golf itself, is indeed a worldwide phenomenon. How this useful idea can be fruitfully applied to your own foursome is the subject of the last section of this essay.

The Common Good of Your Foursome

Given the different and competing conceptions of the common good just noted, it should not be difficult to distinguish at least two different understandings of the common good of your foursome. On the one hand, the common good of your foursome is the rather intuitive idea that all of the members of your group are doing well and playing well, because all the members of the group are playing
The Virtues of Golf, (Course) Management, and the Common Good

well and quite literally feeding off of the successes of the other members of the foursome. In fact, professional golfers often talk about feeding off of the good vibes being generated by an opponent with whom they are playing who happens to be playing well. The same thing can also be experienced in a nonprofessional setting when members of your foursome are playing well; good play can be and often is infectious, especially when you are pulling for one another. One might reasonably think of this as the procedural or aggregate view of the common good of your foursome.

On the other hand, the substantive or collective view of the common good of your foursome is the fellowship and comradery of the group that exists independent of how either the particular members of the group are playing or how well you are playing as a group. This sense of your foursome’s common good is rooted in the fact that you genuinely like playing with one another and is rooted in the fellowship and friendships of the foursome—even prior to playing the game. In a certain sense, it is the condition for the possibility of playing as a foursome in the first place, because it is the reason why you look forward to and actually want to play with one another to begin with.

Although either conception of the common good of your foursome is a good in itself and pleasant to experience, as I am sure all those who have played golf for any significant amount of time know; nevertheless, there is something intrinsically and more profoundly fulfilling about the latter conception because it is rooted in both the friendships of the foursome and, if only occasionally, the excellence of playing the game well. And the same considerations, mutatis mutandis, can be said about and applied to business and corporate relationships, especially when they can incorporate the game of golf into their network of relationships. In fact, it is precisely for this reason that some basic philosophical ideas and business principles can be fruitfully and strategically applied not only to your golf game but also and most importantly to your everyday life.
Notes

1. See, for example: The Philosophy of Popular Culture Series from the University of Kentucky Press, which includes: *Golf and Philosophy; Basketball and Philosophy; Baseball and Philosophy; Football and Philosophy*; see also Open Court Publishing Company’s Popular Culture and Philosophy series, which includes, *The Simpsons and Philosophy; The Matrix and Philosophy*; and *Harry Potter and Philosophy*; and the Blackwell Philosophy and Pop Culture Series, which includes *Wonder Woman and Philosophy; X-Men and Philosophy; Spider-Man and Philosophy*; and *The Hunger Games and Philosophy*.

2. Virtue ethics is not about producing the greatest amount of happiness or pleasure for the greatest number (as it is in Utilitarianism or Consequentialism), nor is it about fulfilling one’s duty or obligations (as it is in the Deontological ethics of Kant).

3. At least those in the sphere of morality, properly speaking. Thus, they distinguish human actions, which involve intention, free will, and rational choice, from “acts of a man,” which involve involuntary actions, such as acts of digestion, the beating of the heart, and knee-jerk bodily reactions and passive sensory perceptions.

4. Aristotle insists that happiness or the ultimate end consists in the rational activity of philosophical contemplation. Thomas, on the other hand, distinguishes two kinds of happiness: natural happiness, which coincides with Aristotle’s account of philosophical contemplation, and, second, supernatural happiness, which consists of the beatific vision of God in the afterlife.

5. Aristotle and Thomas are committed to the view that a human being is a single substance, composed of two metaphysical principles: matter, which is a principle of individuation and potency, and form, which is a principle of determination, making the substance be the kind of thing it is—and yet neither principle is a complete thing or substance in its own right (as, for example, Plato, Descartes, and any dualist would typically maintain). Moreover, in the case of living things—that is, plants, animals, and human beings—the form of the composite or its substantial form is also known as the soul. There are, on their view, three distinct kinds of souls: vegetative souls in plants, sensitive souls in animals, and rational souls in human beings. These forms or souls are part of the nature of the being in question. In other words, they help explain why each kind of being—a plant, an animal, or a human being—does the kinds of characteristic things it does, since *agere sequitur esse*—action follows being, or more generally, a being does the kinds of characteristic things it does precisely because it is the kind of being it is. So, in the case of plants, the vegetative soul explains why it grows, takes in nourishment, and reproduces. In the case of animals, the sensitive soul explains why it not only grows, takes in nourishment, and reproduces, but also moves, and has sense experiences. Finally, in the case of human beings, the rational soul explains why humans do all of the activities of plants and animals, and also are able to engage in rational thought.
6. Happiness, flourishing, or philosophical contemplation in this life, for Aristotle, and
the contemplative life of the beatific vision in the next life, for Thomas.

2nd ed. (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2017).


10. Think, for example, of Charlie Chaplin in *Modern Times*.

11. Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et Spes* (December 7,