One of the key terms in the enormous *Politica Methodice Digesta, Atque Exemplis Sacris et Profanis Illustrata* of Johannes Althusius (1557–1638) is *consociatio*. This word has been translated into English a number of different ways by Althusius interpreters. This article contends that these renderings have proven confusing and unhelpful and that a better approach to this key concept is needed. It offers a brief appraisal of the received translations of *consociatio* in Althusius scholarship before providing a fresh interpretation which, it is hoped, will go some way to alleviating the extant confusion about Althusius’s political ideas.

Introduction

In 1968, the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart published an article entitled “Typologies of Democratic Systems.” In it, he described the main typologies of democratic politics, before demonstrating that those typologies deal unsatisfactorily with democracies that have a fractured political culture and yet, somehow, display political stability. According to Lijphart, these are democracies “with subcultural cleavages and with tendencies towards immobilism and instability which are deliberately turned into more stable systems by the leaders of the major subcultures.” A key example used by Lijphart and others of this phenomenon is the Netherlands in the twentieth century, with its worldview “pillars” and the advent of *verzuiling* (pillarization). Lijphart went on, in his 1968 article, to call these democracies “consociational democracies.” The concept is an interesting one and has served as a normative and descriptive concept in political science ever since as a “missing link between a plural society and political stability.”
However, buried in one of Lijphart’s endnotes is Johannes Althusius (1557–1638), whose “use of the term *consociatio*” is apparently related to Lijphart’s use of consociation. Indeed, Lijphart eventually made the connection between Althusius’s concept of *consociatio* and his own concept of consociation even stronger in later work.

This article argues that Althusius’s concept of *consociatio* is liable to be misunderstood because of the way it is deployed by some scholars. Lijphart serves as a good example. This article also maintains that our understanding of Althusius’s *consociatio*—and, therefore, his political thought—is further muddied by the way this Latin term is typically translated. The principal contention here is that, given the confusing and unhelpful way that Althusius is utilized and translated, a clarification of Althusius’s concept of *consociatio* is necessary to properly understand both Althusius’s writings and his aim in writing. The question we need to answer here is: What did Althusius actually mean by *consociatio*?

In order to address this problem of interpretation, the article is divided into two sections. The first section will give a brief outline of Althusius’s political thought and his use of the term *consociatio*, and then provide an overview of some possible influences in his use of *consociatio*. The second section will consider the problem of interpretation and utilization of Althusius and his use of *consociatio*, before proposing a solution to this interpretative quagmire. The overall aim is to offer a clearer understanding of what Althusius meant by *consociatio* when he used the term in his writings, which will in the process clarify some elements of early modern political thought in general.

**Consociatio and Althusius’s Political Thought**

The *Politica Methodice Digesta, Atque Exemplis Sacris et Profanis Illustrata* of Johannes Althusius was first published in 1603, with subsequent editions in 1610 and 1614. While the influence of this work was muted, in part by the historical events that overtook Europe throughout the decades that followed its publication, Althusius has grown in influence as a thinker. He was a jurist and political theorist who initially operated within the Reformed Protestant academic scene, before dedicating his time to working as a syndic in the city of Emden. Scholarly interest in Althusius was almost nonexistent until Otto von Gierke effectively resurrected Althusius in *Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorie* (1880), volume 7 of his magisterial examination of political and legal theory, *Untersuchungen zur Deutschen Saats- und Rechtsgeschichte*. Since that time, Althusius has received attention as a political
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Theorist, a social theorist, a jurist, and a key figure in the broader development of continental Reformed Protestantism.¹²

The first ever effort to translate a significant portion of the *Politica* into a vernacular tongue was Frederick S. Carney’s 1964 English-language volume, republished with Liberty Fund in 1995.¹³ Carney, a theologian and ethicist, undertook an enormous task in translating even a portion of Althusius voluminous 1614 tome. His rendering of *consociatio* is “association.” Jeffrey J. Veenstra made the same decision regarding *consociatio* in his recent translation of selections of Althusius’s 1617 *Dicaeologicae libri tres, totum & universum ius, quo utimur; methodice complactentes*.¹⁴ A third translation is found in the work of Thomas O. Hueglin, a political scientist who has an interest in Althusius as a theorist of federalism.¹⁵ In his monograph on the thought of Althusius, Hueglin himself notes the vexation associated with the term *consociatio*. In the end, he distances himself from Carney’s translation and uses the word “consociation.”¹⁶ These two renderings, “association” and “consociation,” have their benefits. Association is an accepted translation of the Latin. Consociation has the virtue of being very similar to the Latin word itself. However, do these renderings accurately communicate Althusius’s concept for contemporary readers? What I argue below would suggest they do not. Indeed, the confusion over Althusius’s use of *consociatio* seems to be fomented by political scientists such as Lijphart, who, for whatever reason, have a tendency to neglect the context for historical ideas while racing to the contemporary “application” of such ideas. Even scholars as careful as Carney may unwittingly be a party to a distortion of Althusius’s concept. What follows is an attempt to clear away the distortion and confusion by examining Althusius’s use of the term, and then proposing a better understanding of his concept of *consociatio*.

In the opening sentence of *Politica*, Althusius signals his intention to place the concept of *consociatio* at the center of his political thought. He writes: “*Politica est ars homines ad vitam socialem inter se constitueandam, colendam & conservanda consociandi.*”¹⁷ Carney renders these opening words as “Politics is the art of associating (*consociandi*) men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life among them.”¹⁸ Althusius goes on to say that “*Proposita igitur Politicae est consociatio.*”¹⁹ That is, “Politics is conceived of as *consociatio*.” Or, as Carney puts it, “The subject matter of politics is, therefore, association (*consociatio*).”²⁰ It should be clear from these seminal and paradigmatic words in his *Politica* that *consociatio* is of central importance to Althusius’s political thought. *Consociatio* is, in essence, politics itself. The way Althusius describes political life is revealing: it is “symbiotic,” and the end of symbiotic *consociatio* is a “holy, just, comfortable and happy” life for people.²¹
Consociatio is also described by Althusius as a pactum (a pact or covenant) between people, “one to another for mutual communication of that which is useful and necessary to exercise social life in association with others.” Althusius says that the symbiotes are συμβόηθοι (sumboethoi or coworkers). They share the responsibility to communicate (communicant) with each other the things necessary for commodious life. This line of thought about the nature of society resembles the social ideas of John Calvin. Calvin held that the design of God for human social life is that people are to be dedicated to neighbor-love and to serving one another. God gave the first human a companion, therefore establishing the principle of what Nico Vorster calls “the neighbourly nature of society,” which Calvin says “God has ordained for our well-being.” Calvin holds that marriage is, in part, intended to show humans that they are obliged to serve and be in fellowship with their neighbors. Therefore, marriage is the basic pact, or covenant, upon which the neighborly nature of society is established, and upon which society itself is founded.

It is notable that Althusius cites Calvin’s insight from book 4 of the Institutio Christianae Religionis (1559) that God trains humans, by way of human society, to be humble and ready to seek the help of others. It is evident, then, that Althusius follows Calvin in his conception of the necessity and naturalness of human relationships, mutual interconnectedness, and, therefore, human society itself. This view of political life is further developed by Althusius when he describes symbiotes as “participants or partners” in community life. There is, in Althusius’s thought, a distinct mutuality, a give-and-take, in social relations. While this may seem obvious on one level, it is a pivotal point. Althusius’s description of social symbiosis entails more than simply self-interest; symbiotes bear a distinct and inherent responsibility toward one another to supply the goods of life. It is not a voluntary responsibility; it is one that humans naturally bear. The imparting of the goods of life meets the needs of the people in society and “self-sufficiency and mutuality of life and human society are achieved.” Althusius’s understanding of the nature of human life in society is, fundamentally, that it is an intertwined life. His anthropology is revealed here to involve, in part, a natural duty to provide a good social life for others. Nico Vorster has helpfully called this description of people in political society a “symbiotic anthropology,” which Calvin and Althusius both share. What is being described here is the “neighbourly nature of society.”

Althusius understands human life as a life where things are shared between symbiotes. For Althusius, consociatio is the art of living this life of symbiosis. Symbiotes are described by Althusius not only as coworkers but also as “participants or partners” in community life. In Althusius’s description of social “sym-
biosis,” symbiotes bear an inherent responsibility toward one another to supply the goods of life. Althusius calls this supply of goods to other symbiotes “mutual communication” (communicatio mutua). All of this builds toward a picture of human life in society, and of consociatio, as fundamentally an intertwined life.33

Therefore, consociatio is, first, the umbrella term for what human life is in community.34 Further than this, Althusius asserts that the way that humans can share what is useful with one another is through participation in different kinds of consociationes. So consociatio is, second, a categorization of the different ways in which people live political life, and also the institutions that enable political life. As Hueglin states, consociatio is “a generic unit of political organization.”35 At a very basic level, there are two kinds of consociationes: “una simplex, privata” (simple and private) and “altera mista, publica” (mixed and public).36 The first category, simple and private, contains two kinds of consociationes: the family and the collegium (the latter include guilds, for example). The second kind consists of the city, province, and commonwealth. All of these consociationes are political, according to Althusius, including the private ones.37

What are Althusius’s influences in his use of consociatio? One possibility is Cicero, who is cited a number of times in Politica. Indeed, when he is defining political life, Althusius cites De res publica, where Cicero says, “The commonwealth is the concern of a people … an assemblage of men of some size associated (sociatus) with one another through agreement on law and community of interest.”38 Cicero uses the word consociatio in De officiis, when he says that “it turns out that the bonds (communitas) between and the sociability (consociatio) of men take precedence over any devotion or learning.”39 These parts of Cicero show some parallels with Althusius’s general sense that consociatio is related to a binding union of humans in community. Given that Althusius was a scholar of civil law, another possible influence is the Corpus Iuris Civilis.40 Emperor Leo VI’s (d. 912) “Constitution 98,” which forms a part of the Corpus, uses consociatio in relation to marriage. There we read of a “consociatio matrimonialis,” or a “matrimonial bond” or “matrimonial union.” This example is interesting in that it maps onto Althusius’s own understanding of consociatio as inclusive of private institutions and relationships, such as a household. There are also possible connections between Althusius’s ideas and medieval corporation theory.41 Originally couched in corporate theories of the church, where the members of a given local assembly or chapter were represented by an authority that was, in turn, answerable to the people for certain kinds of actions, corporation theory developed in the fourteenth century to envelop understandings of city and kingdom. The political community was a corporation, which meant that it was a body of many individual people as well as an abstract entity that existed separately.
from the individuals who made up the entity. The corporation was both made up of its members (the people) and abstracted from them. It was a theory that gave rise to the early modern understanding of the territorial state, a change that was affecting Althusius’s political and intellectual milieu. Of these three potential influences, the most compelling is Cicero, given that his work is cited by Althusius during a discussion of the first principles of political life and that he uses the word *consociatio* in a comparable way to Althusius.

**Consociatio as Political Fellowship**

Having examined Althusius’s own use of *consociatio* and examined some possible influences on his use of the term, we will briefly recapitulate extant interpretations and consider a possible solution to the problem. The question is: Does “association” or “consociation” adequately communicate what Althusius meant by *consociatio*? Consider “association”: It does not convey with precision what Althusius wanted to say to contemporary interpreters. For today’s readers, the term “association” lacks the interconnectedness described above. When people think of associations, they think of something like “voluntary associations.” These are important units in modern political and social science, but they do not adequately represent what Althusius was defining and describing. Contemporary liberal political theory assumes a voluntaristic, contractualist understanding of political life, whereas Althusius had a much more organic view of *consociationes*. For Althusius, *consociationes* exist to provide vehicles for social and economic communication for mutual benefit. In Althusius’s mind, these units exist so people can love their neighbor and not, as a liberal might argue, simply fulfill their needs or express their personality.

What about “consociation”? As noted above, Hueglin renders *consociatio* as “consociation” and spends quite a bit of energy relating *consociatio* to the contemporary political-theoretical idea of consociation. Is Althusius’s *consociatio* a theory of how pluralistic societies can maintain stability through cooperation between different, possibly antagonistic, groups? The answer is obvious: Althusius is in no sense setting out to provide his readers with an account of how a multicultural, multifaceted society functions. Althusius’s writings do not contain a prescriptive account of society, as per Lijphart, but rather are theoretical accounts of the first principles of political life that build to the universal *consociatio*. Althusius’s *consociatio* is not, in Hueglin’s parlance, “an explanation of political stability in culturally segmented societies.” Indeed, Hueglin notes that “Althusius understood consociation as a generic unit of political organization” and not “a form of elite control over the segments of society which are to be brought
to peaceful coexistence.” The trouble is that Hueglin brings on the very confusion he is trying to avoid by making *consociatio* equivalent to “consociation.”

How, then, should we understand Althusius’s *consociatio*? If politics is particularly to do with human communal relations and the communication of goods from one person to another, the term *association* is a weak one. This is particularly the case for the contemporary modern mind. “Association” has voluntarist, liberal-democratic connotations, not at all what Althusius had in mind. Likewise with “consociation”—the use of the term in modern political science parlance leaves it unusable in relation to Althusius, especially considering that the idea of a plural society finding stability through multiconfessional civil society institutions would have been basically inconceivable to the early modern mind.

Rather than association or consociation, Althusius’s use of *consociatio* is better expressed by the phrase “political fellowship.” It captures two important elements of Althusius’s concept. First, it reflects and describes the intertwined nature of symbiotic life in human community, as Althusius understands it. Political life is a life of communicating goods to one another. Indeed, for Althusius, participation in political life is a living out of the biblical command, “Love your neighbor.” A better term for capturing this sense of political life is “fellowship” rather than association. Fellowship properly reflects the neighborly nature of Althusius’s view of political life and illustrates that symbiotes are coworkers in human community. Fellowship also reflects Althusius’s understanding of the pact or covenant between symbiotes and between different *consociationes*. Second, “political fellowship” captures Althusius’s important claim (be it true or not) that each part of society is political. Even the family is a political *consociatio*. Indeed, there is no nonpolitical *consociatio* in Althusius’s schema. Therefore, the term “political fellowship” is quite appropriate and serves to emphasize this part of his thought about the different types of “fellowships.”

**Conclusion**

One conclusion to draw from this brief study is that, without substantial commentary and historical background on Althusius’s own categories and terms, “association” and “consociation” only serve to confuse contemporary readers. I have argued that “political fellowship” does a better job of capturing the spirit of the concept in Althusius’s writings. A second conclusion is that further scholarship is necessary to better understand Althusius’s intellectual context, and also to better frame his use of *consociatio*. Until now, his use of the term has not been scrutinized from a historical perspective in any great detail. Further work on the conceptual history of *consociatio*, reaching back to Cicero, and through to
other early modern thinkers, would provide valuable background to Althusius’s own writings, but also to early modern political thought more generally. This article is only a small step toward a clearer understanding, and more work will provide further clarity on what Althusius really intended. It will also crystalize the differences between Althusius and ourselves. Careful intellectual history allows for more effective self-reflection. Shedding clearer light on the ideas of the past will allow us to do the same for the problems we are addressing today. A better understanding of consociatio might be one small step in this direction.

Notes

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8. The author wishes to acknowledge the recent publication of David P. Henreckson, *The Immortal Commonwealth: Covenant, Community, and Political Resistance in Early Reformed Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). This book was published shortly after this article was submitted for publication, meaning I could not engage with it. Henreckson addresses Althusius’s use of *consociatio* in *The Immortal Commonwealth*, 134–37, and focuses on the sixteenth-century theological context of the word. Happily, his conclusions about the meaning of *consociatio* are consistent with my own.

9. Johannes Althusius, *Politica Methodice digesta et exemplis sacris et profanes illustrata* (Herborn in Nassovia: Christophorus Corvinus, 1603); Johannes Althusius, *Politica Methodice digesta atque exemplis sacris et profanes illustrata* (Arnheim: Johannes Janssonius, 1610); Johannes Althusius, *Politica Methodice digesta atque exemplis sacris et profanes illustrata* (Herborn in Nassovia: Corvinus, 1614). Citations will be to the 1614 edition, as follows: *Politica* [[chapter •••]: [section number •••]]. English translation will be from Johannes Althusius, *Politica: An Abridged Translation of Politics Methodically Set Forth and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995), unless otherwise noted. Citations will be to *Politica: An Abridged Translation* [[page •••]].


26. For more examples of Calvin’s view of society see Calvin’s commentary on Ephesians 5:21 in *Joannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia* from the *Corpus Reformatorum*, ed. Guillemus Baum, Eduardus Cunitz, and Eduardos Reuss (Brunsvigae: C. A. Schwetschke, 1863), 51:221–22; idem, commentary on Genesis 2:18 in *Calvini opera*, 23:46.


35. Hueglin, *Early Modern Concepts*, 211.


40. See, for example, Johannes Althusius, *Jurisprudentia Romani Libri duo* (Basle: Waldkirch’s, 1586).

41. Cf. the interesting connection made in Henry C. Black, “Consociatio,” in *Law Dictionary Containing Definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern and Including the Principal Terms of International, Constitutional, Ecclesiastical and Commercial Law, and Medical Jurisprudence, with a Collection of Legal Maxims, Numerous Select Titles from the Roman, Modern Civil, Scotch, French, Spanish, and Mexican Law, and Other Foreign Systems, and a Table of Abbreviations* (West: St Paul, 1910), 251.


47. Hueglin, *Early Modern Concepts*, 211.
