In a second case study, Joseph Bosco Bangura writes on the role of Pentecostalism in economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. While it is frequently argued that religiosity can impede “progress” of various types, this author makes a positive case for the impact of Pentecostalism on Africa’s economic future. He asserts that it can promote entrepreneurship, hard work, and have a positive impact on family structure issues. He also states that Pentecostalism stresses hope, and that hope can spur a movement out of poverty.

There are three other papers in the case-study section. Jack Barentsen examines the role of hope in leadership, positing that leaders can be “harbingers of hope” (153). A particular focus of this paper is how the vision of hope that a leader expresses may include or exclude groups or categories of people—which is particularly relevant given the current fractured political situation in the United States. A second paper explores the role of hope in social entrepreneurship, particularly in regard to social exclusion; author Pavel Chalupnicek suggests that scholars who examine social entrepreneurship have given short shrift to the idea of hope, perhaps because they tend to emphasize the related idea of empowerment. Finally, H. H. Drake Williams III tackles the rather unexpected topic of torture, contrasting a Stoic posture with one that emphasizes hope in Christ, as expressed in the letters of the early church father Ignatius.

I will admit that when I first picked up *Driven by Hope*, I was somewhat skeptical of what it might include. However, although it ranges quite widely, I found this volume to be quite thought-provoking. In a world that often seems short on hope, and that focuses on the negative, it is genuinely refreshing to read about hope and its relation to economics. As a professor of economics at a place called Hope College, I especially appreciate the book’s focus on hope as an important factor in our economic activity. We can remember the words of 1 Timothy 6:17 (NASB): “Instruct those who are rich in this present world not to be conceited or to fix their hope on the uncertainty of riches, but on God, who richly supplies us with all things to enjoy.”

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**Uneasy Street: The Anxieties of Affluence**  
**Rachel Sherman**  

“We know very little about what it is like to be wealthy in the current historical moment,” writes sociologist Rachel Sherman. “Contemporary scholarly accounts of elite experience are in short supply, due largely to the difficulty of gaining access to wealthy people” (11). To address this gap, Sherman interviewed fifty wealthy individuals in her hometown of New York City and published her findings in the recent monograph *Uneasy Street: The Anxieties of Affluence*.

The book is part sociology, part psychology, and part discourse analysis. Sherman’s general goal is to understand the mechanisms of legitimating economic inequalities. What
are the narratives that the wealthy tell themselves as they needlessly spend hundreds of thousands of dollars renovating an upscale apartment? What is it like to generally live with *too much* money? As Sherman reveals, answers to questions like these contradict popular images of carelessness and ease. The book “challenges two common ideas about the wealthy: one, that they are always engaged in a competitive struggle for status or distinction, and two, that they are complacent about their privilege. I also highlight their desire to be moral actors” (24–25).

Her general conclusions about this “cultural logic of legitimate entitlement” means “first, working hard, consuming prudently, and giving back; second, being both aware of and modest about privilege; and third, not feeling as if one deserves more than others. This logic draws fundamentally on the symbolism of the morally worthy middle class” (232). In other words, it is habitual for affluent people to pretend to be middle class as much as possible in order to appease their consciences.

I cannot imagine any reader of *Uneasy Street* thinking anything positive about either “the 1 percent” or the lives they live. Sherman’s analysis is not only staunchly critical of the wealthy in general (more on this later), but it also suggests that the anxieties of affluence are downright overwhelming. Since the book’s content is comprised of snippets from private interviews amid a running commentary, readers obtain an intimate experience of the constant fear hanging over those who, in theory, should have nothing to worry about. This includes fear of losing one’s job (even if the job is not needed) (68–69), fear of someone discovering how much was spent on new furniture (even if people already know the owner is wealthy) (106), fear of being judged as a snob (even amid philanthropy) (130), fear of spending too much on oneself (or in general), fear of envying others (111), fear of not giving enough, fear of being irrelevant and not contributing to society (130–48, 163–93), fear that the kids will be snobs (chap. 6), and fear of losing it all. With so much in the bank, there is so much more to lose. Capital accumulations in *Uneasy Street* are like a newborn infant—except the baby never matures and develops independence; it just becomes more and more needy as it gets bigger.

Veblen’s theory of “conspicuous consumption” (i.e., outdoing the Joneses) is clearly not a dominating theme in the lives of the affluent.

Although we see some evidence of the more Bourdieuan idea that they seek distinction—which can be indicated by consuming less or differently—the story remains more complicated. These accounts are marked by deep ambivalence about legitimate needs. Consumption is at least sometimes driven by fears of being judged by others and a wish to fit in with peer groups. And these groups help the wealthy define what kind of lifestyle is “normal,” not only to set parameters for competition. (121)

The focus on social normality exists on a scale, but this is a double-edged sword: “judging ‘bad’ wealthy people means ‘good’ wealthy people can also exist. In the end, ironically, inhabiting privilege in an ‘unentitled,’ morally worthy way actually legitimates entitlement” (25). This introduces an overarching concern between legitimate and illegitimate
privilege. “Illegitimate privilege means excess, ostentation, and entitlement. In contrast, legitimate privilege means being ordinary, down-to-earth, hard-working, and prudent” (25).

The mechanisms and behaviors demonstrating this are numerous. For example, “They were especially aware of how much they needed to survive if a job was lost or something happened to them…. The discomfort these interviewees feel is real, though the actual risk is minimal…. [W]orrying about money is another way to avoid feeling affluent” (68–69, 39). In another example, Sherman notes an interesting strategy of an interior designer: “‘Always, for every job, I always throw in Ikea and Crate and Barrel pieces. They love that. It makes them feel better.’ I asked, ‘Because it makes them feel like they’re economizing?’ He replied, ‘Yes’” (97). The whole household plays the game of mitigating shame or guilt.

The same phenomenon occurs for children. “I came to see that the kind of entitlement parents wanted to avoid was behavioral and emotional, not material. As long as they don’t act or feel entitled, children remain legitimately entitled to resources. Their advantages remain essentially the same” (199). But “these attempts to construct meaningful community with people who have less again highlight the tension mentioned earlier in the concept of ‘normal’: between a desire that a child be more normal and a desire that the child know what normal is (and that he is advantaged relative to it)” (214). This forges a double standard of access: “there is a class assumption here that these parents’ children should have access to the lives of others even when they would not want those others to have access to their own lives” (213). The rich should experience poor life, but the poor should never experience rich life. In this way, the classes should be kept separate.

There were some distinctions, however, in Sherman’s study. Those who are more “downward-oriented people are more willing to acknowledge their conflicted feelings openly” (32). They “also lived in more diverse worlds, both literally and imaginatively” (30). Nevertheless, “Regardless of their struggles, almost all my respondents described becoming acclimated over time to making more expensive consumer choices” (114).

Uneasy Street left me with some … uneasiness. First of all, Sherman’s penetrating analysis demonstrates how plainly wealth can destroy people’s lives, sense of self, and community. Being rich is overrated. Her lucid analysis also heightens the conscience of privileged readers (like myself). It is difficult to overstate the fact that all of her basic findings are a virtual exposition of that famous text, “The love of money is the root of all kinds of evil” (1 Tim. 6:10 CEB).

But I also felt uneasy about Sherman’s Marxist egalitarian framework. The conclusion contains these remarks:

What would it mean, for example, to say that we should be critical of the fact that J. K. Rowling is a billionaire—regardless of how she came by her fortune, how she spends it, or whether she gives it away—just on the basis of the idea that such wealth is inseparable from extreme inequality, which is both pernicious to society and itself immoral?… The distribution of assets is the problem, not the individual behavior, disposition, or feelings—or any other characteristic—of the person holding the assets…. A more egalitarian distribution of resources across communities (national or otherwise) can be defended as a morally better form of social organization because it benefits more people and, ultimately, society as a whole. (236)
It is difficult interpreting statements such as these—especially as terms like “inequality” and “distribution” remain terribly vague. What determines what qualifies as “extreme inequality,” and who is in a privileged position to make that determination? Does this include, for example, the gap between Sherman’s (and my) position as white American professors and those below us? If not, why not, and if so, who are we to judge (since we are both extremely wealthy in global standards)? It is also troubling that Sherman so easily trivializes human responsibility (and virtues, like work ethic, prudence, and generosity). Can we really say that it makes no moral difference whether a billionaire donates all of her cash to charities and nonprofits or spends it on houses? Can one really suggest that the state of anyone’s heart is irrelevant to the shaping of society?

Finally, we must not forget that many forms of “egalitarian distribution of resources” cannot be “defended as morally better” as long as the twentieth century is remembered. At the very least, this includes the inherent grotesqueries of statist socialism and command economies—witnessed everywhere as unforgivingly oppressive to our species. Readers are not given pointers to how any type of egalitarian society might be feasibly organized—though, to Sherman’s credit, we should remain open to such possibilities in the tradition of William Thompson, Thomas Hodgskin, and others. Concentrations of power are a problem whether they are public or private.

Sherman’s disdainful tenor toward the wealthy (again, meaning wealthy classes above her own, not the wealthy in general) unfortunately taints an otherwise erudite and thoughtful analysis. Nevertheless, Uneasy Street is an excellent analysis for those wanting to know what it is like to struggle as an affluent person living in contemporary New York.

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