information: "I said to myself what I said every time those stories ran, 'You must stop. You must stop.' But I didn't."

The formidable research Leap conducted enabled him to write at length on the various types of crime being committed but was at times exhausting. A large part of the book is dedicated to description of the activities of white-collar criminals, and I felt restless at times as the data was disproportionate with the analysis.

Despite these shortcomings, the reader will benefit from Leap's book. The model he provides is complex and comprehensive; he punctures the mystique that corporate crime is somehow more benign than muggings and murders; and he leaves us longing for a society in which those with whom we do business can be trusted to act honorably.

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The Age of Abundance: How Prosperity Transformed America's Politics and Culture

Brink Lindsey

New York: Collins, 2007 (394 pages)

The culture wars have raged in America with particular intensity over the past forty years, a result of the great divide between the disciples of liberation emanating from 1960s ideologies and beliefs and the religious traditionalists in all faiths appalled by the threat to the inherited religious values of western civilization.

Brink Lindsey, vice president for research at the Cato Institute, has written a broad-ranging study tackling the origins and development of this cultural conflict. He offers a powerful argument concerning how a developing age of abundance helped diffuse the cultural tensions and promote a more libertarian culture. "The experience of recent years," he writes, "has made it increasingly clear that the center did hold. It takes the form of today's modus vivendi, a libertarian synthesis of core middle-class values and inclusive tolerance" (340).

Lindsey argues that the achievement of mass affluence resulted in major changes in values concerning race, sexuality, gender differences, and multiculturalism. The more open society that resulted came about because workers no longer were dependent as much on factories or giant corporations for their work; blacks were freed from the confines of Jim Crow segregation; and the dominance of political parties (and party bossism as well) was ended. These factors, along with the rise of different religious values and beliefs—everything from Aquarian new age religions to Mormonism to evangelical Christianity—contributed in the end, Lindsey believes, to greater freedom.

Lindsey explores this argument by focusing on a history of twentieth-century America. Abraham Maslow, a Brandeis University professor of psychology, is Lindsey's hero throughout the book. Maslow saw the idea of human needs emanating in the form of a pyramid. When economic scarcity was the norm in America, as it was until the post-World

War II period, basic human needs—food, shelter, and clothes—trumped other desires. However, when a more affluent society developed, people yearned for higher needs and desires. "At the summit [of Maslow's pyramid]," Lindsey writes, "is the drive to create self-actualization" (61).

The revolutionary youth of the 1960s were the vanguard of this search for self-actualization. Middle-class Americans eventually turned on to this as well. Prosperity made it all possible. Who would have time in the scarcity-based economy of the Great Depression and the industrial revolution to worry about being true to oneself? Or to search for the truth by studying Buddhism or Taoism? In an era of mass affluence, hundreds of thousands of people did have the time and the inclination to do so.

There were clashes. Lindsey reduces the political conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s to a battleground between the forces of liberation and the forces of reaction. He sees the battleground over liberalism in the 1960s as one whereby conservatism "was a response to liberalism run amok" (246). He thus negates a half-century's worth of organizing by conservative politicians and intellectuals (the majority of them classical liberals) who were not simply responding to New Deal liberalism but creating their own model of a good society.

In the end, Lindsey argues, even with the rise of a religious right, which sought to preserve traditional values, the liberationist ethic won out. There is much to commend about this development. There is much to condemn as well.

Is it true that liberationist values when applied to anything but culture are really dominant values among the middle class today? Lindsey has his eyes cast toward an awakened middle-class liberationist majority as a new centrist majority. However, it is the same middle-class Americans who wish to be left alone to exercise, play computer games, or engage in spiritual or religious quests, who also want the state to intervene on vital matters such as health care, social security, and education.

In fact, where has the middle class learned about the blessings of liberationist ideals? Their children learn about them in government schools; they have them reaffirmed by a media and by government bureaucrats who wish to diminish economic freedoms and some social freedoms as well (e.g., smoking) at every opportunity. This development does not bode well for a middle-class libertarian majority. On culture, yes; on economics, no.

However, this is a book about describing a synthesis, a trend Lindsey sees at work in the political culture of America. He is describing a new vital center, one that has rejected the extremes of liberation on the left and the calls for moral authoritarianism pronounced by some on the right. His book is about, in the end, the failure of either right- or left-wing ideologues to win the majority of support for their various causes. "Both sides," he writes, "have failed to capture the prize of the great unconverted middle" (321). What this might lead to politically is anyone's guess, but Lindsey has done a great service in trying to understand how America got to this point.

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