more responsibly” (172). This is a complex point, although certainly interesting, which would require further discussion, including philosophical grounds for business, civil society and government relationships, and comparisons between the respective approaches of American and European communities regarding CSR. Apart from this question, Vogel is probably right in his concluding paragraph in which he states that “civil and government regulations both have a legitimate role to play in improving public welfare. The former reflects the potential of the market for virtue; the latter recognizes its limits” (173).

—Domènec Melé (e-mail: mele@iese.edu)

IESE Business School, University of Navarra, Spain

Earthly Powers: Religion and Politics in Europe from the French Revolution to the Great War
Michael Burleigh
London, United Kingdom: HarperCollins, 2005 (576 pages)

The current environment of the “culture wars” is, as even metaphorical wars are, divisive and often Manichean. According to conventional wisdom, one side promotes theocracy while the other strives to eliminate all religious imagery. One side says that all power comes from the will of the people, while the other asserts that only the divinely elected few can exercise legitimate power. One side believes in the absolute rights of freedom of the individual, while the other wishes to impose rigid moral codes derived from divine revelation. Viewed with this stark opposition in mind, human history is a series of battles between religious and secular forces with little room for compromise or accommodation. The opposing camps yield no quarter and certainly have nothing to learn from each other.

This perspective is especially prevalent in certain readings of European history. At the beginning were the ancient Greek and Roman civilizations, whose power and glory resulted from atheistic philosophers’ defying the gods of the city. Thanks to Christian usurpation of these civilizations by Constantine, the “Dark Ages” of monkish superstition and ignorance followed, only to be broken by the nobly humanistic project of the Enlightenment. Since then, Europe has become ever more secular, ever more humane, and not coincidentally, ever less Christian. The crisis of European culture is simply a manifestation of this centuries-long struggle between God’s party and the people’s party.

Or so the theory goes. Reading history in such a way, it is hard to see how religion and liberty could possibly coexist, let alone benefit from each other. Actual events, however, especially in European history, are much more complicated.

It would be easy to say that the current trends of European secularization have been the direct result of the French Revolution. It would also happen to be true, for the most part, but the great virtue of Michael Burleigh’s Earthly Powers is that it takes a more
comprehensive and realistic look at the interaction between Christianity and liberalism. What emerges is a picture in which both church and state have appropriated not only the imagery and symbolism but often the moral language and themes typically associated with the other. These appropriations often confused the primary aims and objectives of church and state, leading to a loss of institutional integrity on both sides with bloody, soul-draining results.

States used quasi-religious imagery, catechisms, and hymns to form myths about the nation, and the result was the idolatry of nationalism. Churches, on the other hand, made compromises with states that reduced their activity to social work in service of the regime, with little or no spiritual content and little desire to criticize the mechanisms that financially supported them. The things of Caesar and God were thus intermingled.

Whether this exchange between Christianity and European liberalism could have been otherwise and what the future holds for a Europe with shrinking Christian and growing Muslim populations are some of the massively important questions resulting from *Earthly Powers*.

Burleigh does much to dispel myths surrounding the familiar story line of advancing secularism against a retrograde Catholic Church. The alliance of throne and altar made the Catholic Church (and especially the Jesuits) an easy target for French revolutionaries, but readers will be surprised to learn of the many attempts made by reform-minded French clergy to curry favor with republicans until oaths of loyalty were imposed. Religious orders that provided social services were tolerated to a much greater extent than were contemplative and monastic orders, but even the former eventually came under suspicion. Who ran the schools and thereby formed the minds of the next generation proved to be one of the most contested questions.

Burleigh’s book is too complex and its scope too vast to be easily summarized in a short review. Any work attempting to cover so much contentious history must necessarily be uneven, covering some details very well while skimming over and neglecting others, and this is especially the case when the subject covers Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Russia. There are, however, a few themes in his narrative that merit special attention.

The struggle between the forces of religion and secularization is the most obvious. *Earthly Powers* is full of examples of the often violent and rarely creative tension between church and state. As already mentioned, much of this violence was directed toward the Catholic Church in France as a result of its relationship to the monarchy, but it by no means stopped there. Bismark’s *Kulturkampf* and, to a lesser degree, the Italian *Risorgimento* went beyond attacking the temporal powers of the Church.

So the question is: Is there something about Christianity inherently dangerous to liberalism? Are Tocqueville’s “spirit of religion” and “spirit of freedom” necessarily at war with each other in Europe? Did Pius IX’s *Syllabus of Errors* contain some truth about liberalism? Given the sordid history of church-state affairs after the French Revolution, the answer would seem to be in the affirmative.
It is therefore surprising to read that European political movements often sought and came to power with explicit religious support. Christianity has never limited itself to purely supernatural concerns, and Christians themselves are inevitably involved in social and economic life. The forms of this involvement have varied greatly throughout history and will continue to develop according to changing circumstances. Burleigh’s chapters on political messianism and nationalism (chapter 5) and the Church and industrial society (chapter 9) are especially perceptive and highlight the political temptations of Christians even in a secular and liberal Europe.

Protestant churches were more prone to nationalist sentiments than the Catholic Church, although the role of the “resistance Church” in countries such as Ireland and Poland are exceptions: The concept of the nation was kept alive by a persecuted community of believers. During the Restoration, France saw the revival of corporatist thought in the works of Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Boland. Romantic notions of medieval guilds and other restrictions on both state power and free enterprise also flourished in the nineteenth century. The guild mentality re-appeared among Christian socialists and other utopians; the end result being a widespread distrust of market economics that is still found among Europeans, both secular and religious.

The formation of Christian democratic political parties in many European countries was usually based on a compromise, a “third way” between liberalism and socialism. The problem with the third way is that it tended to forms of state capitalism virtually indistinguishable from the socialist alternative; it also led to the current economic and demographic decline of European nations. The European social model, with its increasingly expansive welfare state, low economic growth, declining birth rates, and increasing need for immigration (to say nothing of the abysmal rates of church attendance), is the unimpressive result, for which all sides, religious and secular, left and right, are blameworthy.

The failure of European Christian democratic parties to reconcile religion and liberty is a serious problem, but the issue has also been addressed by the Catholic Church’s development of social doctrine. Most experts in the field recognize, as does Burleigh, the foundational importance of Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, coming as it did in the midst of the Industrial Revolution and following the creation of the Italian Republic. Since then, Catholic social doctrine has sought to reappraise liberalism, sometimes by looking to the United States, rather than France, as the model. Burleigh quotes Leo XIII:

I am of the opinion that all French citizens should [be] united in supporting the government France has given herself. A republic is as legitimate a form of government as any other. Look at the United States of America! There you have a Republic that grows stronger every day—and that in spite of unbridled liberty. And the Catholic Church there? It develops and flourishes. It has no quarrel with the State. What is good for the United States can be good for France too. (349)
The most remarkable recent attempts at this reappraisal have been Pope John Paul II’s *Centesimus Annus* (1991) and, to a lesser degree, Pope Benedict XVI’s *Deus Caritas Est* (2006). Both encyclicals have rooted the Church’s understanding of liberalism in Christian theology and anthropology. It is not coincidental that both have also been critical of the secularist welfare-state mentality that plagues modern Europe. One could argue that the success of the European project itself depends on Christian lay people who should find ways to implement this social doctrine effectively.

This is a task of the present and future generations. Burleigh’s *Earthly Powers* has shown us the immensely complicated background of this challenge. If anything, he has underestimated it by not taking into account the Jewish and Islamic understandings of politics and law that have also contributed to Europe. (The latter is certainly poised to make a forceful return soon.) Different understandings of theology and God’s relationship to human society are bound to have different political effects. Whether European secularists have learned anything since 1789 remains an open question.

—Kishore Jayabalan

*Istituto Acton, Rome, Italy*