evil in this world can hardly be denied. Therefore, the fact that some people willingly suffer for the good of others, coupled with the fact that some people avoid the suffering that they rightly deserve, makes it more difficult to discern accurately the causal relationships of justice. As Frederic Bastiat noted in *Economic Harmonies*:

\[ ... 
\]

… For the laws of Providence to be considered as harmonious, it is not necessary that they exclude evil. It is enough that evil have its explanation and purpose, that it be self-limiting, and that every pain be the means of preventing greater pain by eliminating whatever causes it.

Society is composed of men, and every man is a free agent. Since man is free, he can choose; since he can choose, he can err; since he can err, he can suffer…. Now, all error breeds suffering. And this suffering either falls upon the one who erred, in which case it sets in operation the law of responsibility, or else it strikes innocent parties, in which case it sets in motion the marvelous reagent that is the law of solidarity. The action of these laws, combined with the ability … of seeing the connection between cause and effect, must bring us back, by the very fact of suffering, to the path of righteousness and truth…. But if evil is to fulfill this purpose … the freedom of the individual must be respected.

Now, if man-made institutions intervene in these matters to nullify divine law, evil nonetheless follows upon error, but it falls upon the wrong person. It strikes him whom it should not strike; it no longer serves as a warning or a lesson; it is no longer self-limiting; it is no longer destroyed by its own action; it persists, it grows worse, as would happen in the biological world if the imprudent acts and excesses committed by the inhabitants of one hemisphere took their toll only upon the inhabitants of the other hemisphere.

My second reservation concerns Roth’s generality principle. I am not sure that he carries this principle to its logical conclusion. Roth’s argument lies within a Kantian framework that I find to be insufficient and incomplete. Before Kant, the American theologian and philosopher, Jonathan Edwards, developed his own moral philosophy, using a generality principle. In his essay, *The Nature of True Virtue*, Edwards argued that virtuous or moral acts are those that are motivated by a love for being, in general. On this basis, Edwards demonstrated that it would ultimately lead one to assert that genuine virtue is motivated by the love of God who is the ultimate Being. In turn, as Jesus said, love for God will motivate a person to keep His commandments. In other words, while a contractualist guide is our best means of pursuing actions that are truly moral, it is God who provides the contract, because He is the only one who rightly understands all of the causal relationships. In *The Weight of Glory*, C. S. Lewis put the matter this way:

If there lurks in most modern minds the notion that to desire our own good and earnestly to hope for the enjoyment of it is a bad thing, I submit that this notion has crept in from Kant and the Stoics and is no part of the Christian faith. Indeed, if we consider the unblushing promises of reward and the staggering nature of the rewards promised in the Gospels, it would seem that our Lord finds our desires not too strong but too weak. We are half-hearted creatures, fooling about with drink and sex and ambition when infinite joy is offered us, like an ignorant child who wants to go on making mud pies in a slum because he cannot imagine what is meant by the offer of a holiday at the sea. We are far too easily pleased.

My reservations notwithstanding, I do think that Roth’s book is useful and valuable. Using modern secular thought as his starting point, he reaches roughly the same conclusions that one would reach reasoning from the older Christian tradition. There is certainly much to like about that effort.

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**Markets, Planning, and Democracy**

David L. Prychitko

Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar, 2002 (219 pages)

This volume is a collection of twelve essays published by the author between 1988 and 1998. It also includes one short speech delivered at a conference and an enriched version of a book review. The main issue addressed is whether markets or planning better promote economic growth, freedom, and democracy. The author argues that markets are both necessary and sufficient for the success of a democratic society. Prychitko distinguishes between capitalist and socialist planning and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each. He also examines the role of government in a free-market economy and the impact of planning on the distribution of wealth and resources. Overall, Prychitko advocates for a market-oriented approach to economic policy, emphasizing the importance of individual freedom and economic efficiency. The book is aimed at economists, policymakers, and students of political economy.
(the latter ignored by the author). Indeed, the remaining chapters of the first part of the book are devoted to reviewing the shortcomings of self-management with social ownership (the Yugoslav option). It is, however, somewhat surprising that its free-market alternative is only mentioned to stress its theoretical feasibility. The crucial question—that is, why workers have seldom considered it an interesting option in the real world—is not analyzed in depth.

The second part of the book deals with the Austrian approach to the welfare state and a number of inconsistencies that have characterized some eminent Austrian economists in the Misesian tradition. In particular, Prychitko calls the reader’s attention to some rather dogmatic claims that have been made, by Murray Rothbard and Roy Cordato, for example, which seem to contradict the very fundamentals of Austrian economics. Prychitko also calls attention to some Austrian cases where reality has been misunderstood. For instance, if the “old” Austrians were right and central planning was indeed impracticable, how can one explain that Communist economics survived for so many decades in the Eastern Bloc?

As a consequence, the author encourages young Austrians to be more critical of their illustrious predecessors and to pay more attention to the insights of a number of Third-Way scholars. In a nutshell, Prychitko would like us to look at the role of state intervention through Hayek (as opposed to Mises and Rothbard).

Overall, this is an interesting book. It surely deserves credit for emphasizing that Austrian scholars need to take a greater interest in policy matters and to avoid some extreme views that might be perceived as sheer dogmatic arrogance. Nevertheless, it is not an easy book. Non-economists may find some passages difficult to understand, especially if they are not familiar with the Austrian tradition and debate. Furthermore, some readers will probably notice the lack of a thesis, of a leading argument with respect to which the various contributions can be compared and linked to each other. There are also some repetitions and imbalances. For example, almost half of a book is probably too much to devote to explaining why a given category of self-managed enterprises is consistent with Austrian economics. On the other hand, although the Austrian analyses of the welfare state and of the role of government intervention deserve to be reassessed, one has the impression that too many pages are devoted to asking questions and perhaps not enough to offering answers.

Regarding this last point, advocating “libertarianism with solidarity” and without anarchic excesses is certainly worth further discussion, if not another book—but raising the issue in the concluding page of the volume is a puzzling choice, if not unfair to the curious reader. Indeed, if that is the essence of what Prychitko calls “Hayekian socialism,” that very reader may wonder whether it might be wiser to forget about most of Hayek’s work and concentrate instead on de Jouvenel or Leoni, or perhaps consider the challenges raised by De Jasay and Hoppe.

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