

Session III
Religious Liberty
and Pluralism

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There is no necessary logical connection between religious pluralism and religious freedom. In theory, there could be a nation in which some one religious tradition is dominant and officially established, while members of minority religious groups are perfectly free to worship and witness according to their own convictions. In practice, however, religious freedom has usually arisen out of religious pluralism and conflict. When Professor John Figgis aphoristically remarked that “political liberty is the residuary legatee of ecclesiastical animosities,” he expressed one half of the truth.¹ The other half is that the churches have sometimes embraced religious freedom out of friendship and as a matter of principle, as something flowing from the Gospel. In 1960, the Faith and Order Commission of the World Council of Churches composed a landmark statement on “Christian Witness, Proselytism, and Religious Liberty.” Several years later, the Second Vatican Council issued its own Declaration on Religious Freedom. The task of composing this document was significantly assigned to the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity, which was also charged with fostering better relations with Judaism. Progress in ecumenism and interfaith relations was seen to depend on religious tolerance and freedom.

The Origins of Religious Tolerance

To go back to premodern times, we may note that in the Middle Ages it was recognized that the decision of faith should not and indeed could not be

coerced. On this ground, Jews and Muslims in Christian territories were generally allowed to worship according to their own rites, although Christian heretics, who were considered to have culpably rejected the truth, were frequently subjected to coercion. Religious freedom was more seriously violated in early modern times, when State absolutism prevailed in many parts of Europe. The prince simply imposed his religion on the principality, according to the principle, *cuius regio, eius religio*. The citizens were required to worship in the Church to which the ruler belonged and were forbidden to be baptized, married, and buried in any other. In many countries, the monarch was required to profess the faith of the nation, which identified itself as Catholic, Anglican, Orthodox, Lutheran, or whatever.

The liberalism of the Enlightenment turned the idea of religious establishment on its head by virtually establishing irreligion. The laicism that stemmed from the Jacobin party in France spread to Italy and to much of Latin America. Anticlerical regimes expropriated ecclesiastical property, closed religious schools, monasteries, and convents, secularized the institution of marriage, and insisted on the right of the civil government to name bishops and pastors. Religion as an independent voice was effectively banished from public life.

Faced by the challenge of this sectarian liberalism, the Holy See tended to favor the confessional State. Leo XIII, toward the end of the nineteenth century, fully recognized the importance of freedom as an inherent right pertaining to human nature, but he believed that the dignity and freedom of the human person could not be effectively maintained unless the State was committed to the true faith. The civil ruler, Leo believed, was sovereign over temporal matters but was subject to the spiritual authority in religious matters. For Leo XIII, this subordination was a matter of divine law, since Christ had conferred the fullness of spiritual authority on the Church stemming from the apostles. In the Catholic State, as Leo conceived of it, non-Catholic religious bodies could be tolerated for the sake of the common good, including civil peace. But these bodies were not seen as having any right to exist or be tolerated, since their beliefs were, in his view, erroneous.

In the United States a new system came into being. Because the citizens of the colonies belonged to a variety of Christian churches, the federal government refrained from endorsing any, one, confessional position. It declared itself incompetent in matters of religion, whether to authorize or to hinder it. In the Bill of Rights adopted in 1791, Congress was prohibited from making any law that would either establish a given religion or impede the free exercise of religion.

To judge from the results, nonestablishment was more beneficial to the churches than establishment had been. America became one of the most religiously practicing nations of the world. Protestantism flourished in multiple forms. The Catholic Church, declining in many parts of Europe, grew rapidly on American soil. Cardinal Gibbons, when he took possession of his titular church in Rome in 1887, expressed his great sense of pride and gratitude at belonging to a country “where the civil government holds over us the aegis of its protection without interfering in the legitimate exercise of our sublime mission as ministers of the gospel of Jesus Christ.”²

Wedded as they were to the model of the confessional State, the popes of the nineteenth century were not fully at ease with the American system. In 1895, Leo XIII wrote to the American bishops, expressing his satisfaction that the Church in their country was free to live and act without hindrance, but he reminded them that the American experiment should not be considered a universally desirable pattern, or even a perfect arrangement for American Catholics themselves.

The fact that Catholicity with you is in good condition, nay, is even enjoying a prosperous growth, is by all means to be attributed to the fecundity with which God has endowed his Church, in virtue of which, unless men and circumstances interfere, she spontaneously expands and propagates herself; but she would bring forth more abundant fruits if, in addition to liberty, she enjoyed the favor of laws and the patronage of public authority.³

Religious Freedom in Modern Papal Teaching

In the course of the twentieth century, Rome became more sympathetic to systems in which diverse religious bodies enjoyed equal protection from the law. As totalitarian dictatorships of various kinds arrogated absolute authority to themselves, crushing the freedom and dignity of the citizenry, the Catholic Church increasingly understood itself as called to defend not only its own rights but those of all religions and of all human beings. Pius XI repudiated the deification of party and State in the systems of Marxist Communism, Fascism, and National Socialism. Farsighted popes, such as Pius XII and John XXIII, were especially conscious of the new position of the Catholic Church on the world stage. In his radio message for Christmas 1944, Pius XII declared that the human person is not an object to be shaped passively by government but “the subject, the foundation, and the end” of social and political life.⁴ “The

purpose of social life,” he said, “remains always the same, always sacred and obligatory, namely, the development of the personal values of man as the image of God.”⁵

Pius XII’s allocution of 1953 to Italian jurists, known from its first two words as *Ci Riesce*, marks an important step forward. Speculating on the role of the Catholic Church in the universal community of nations then aborning, the pope says that since the members of that community will be both Christian and non-Christian and will include many who are indifferent or hostile to religion, the government cannot reasonably be expected to give privileged status to the Catholic faith. The citizens of each member-State should therefore be given freedom to follow their own beliefs and religious practices, subject to the requirements of public order in their respective national States. While holding that there can be no objective right to profess religious or moral error, the Catholic Church would recognize that these evils could be tolerated for the sake of promoting a greater common good. Even when the government has the power to repress error, said the pope, it may be justified in tolerating it, as does God, who does not lack the power to repress all intellectual and moral deviations but nevertheless allows error and sin to exist. The Church would not insist on any special legal recognition for itself on the part of the international organization provided that she received stable guarantees of the independence she would need to fulfill her divine mission.⁶

Commentators on this address of Pius XII were not slow to perceive its implications for what we may call the American system of nonestablishment. The pope seemed to be approving for the international order a kind of institutionalized religious pluralism similar to that which had long been practiced in the United States.

Giuseppe Roncalli, the future John XXIII, served as the official Vatican observer to UNESCO while in Paris as Nuncio. During that time he is said to have “played an important part” in drafting the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.⁷ However that may be, he surely welcomed the opportunity for Catholics to involve themselves in the work of international organizations for justice, liberty, and peace.

In his 1963 encyclical *Pacem in Terris* John XXIII called attention to the signs of the times, which clearly show, he said, that men and women have become increasingly conscious of their dignity as human persons (n. 79). Invoking the authority of Leo XIII, he declared that the dignity of the human person requires that each citizen should enjoy the right to act freely and responsibly (n. 34). Freedom, said the pope, is one of the transcendental prop-

erties of the good society, a “fourth pillar,” as it were, alongside truth, justice, and love. Human society is to be realized in freedom, in such a way that the citizens accept responsibility for their own actions. Among the fundamental rights of the person, one must acknowledge those of being able to search for the truth, to communicate one’s opinions (n. 12), and to worship God according to the upright norm of one’s own conscience (n. 14), subject only to the demands of the moral order and the common good.

Vatican II on Religious Freedom

From the preceding historical overview it should be evident that the Declaration on Religious Freedom of Vatican II was not a radically new departure. It had a prehistory in the teaching of modern popes, especially Leo XIII, Pius XI, Pius XII, and John XXIII, but the Council made further progress in that it cleared up certain ambiguities in previous Catholic teaching and unfolded implications that had not been previously stated. The Declaration asserted that religious freedom is a right of all human beings, not simply the right of the Catholic Church and its members (n. 2). The human person as such has an inalienable right as well as an obligation to search for religious truth and to profess it when found (n. 1). Because religion is a social phenomenon, religious groups and organizations have the right not to be hindered in their witness to the faith unless, in so doing, they interfere with the rights of others or violate the requirements of public order (n. 3). Freedom, moreover, involves immunity from coercion by any human authority (nn. 1, 2). In the laws and practices of civil society, freedom should be respected as far as possible and limited only insofar as necessary (n. 7). Religious freedom should be constitutionally recognized, thereby becoming not only a moral but also a civil, right (n. 15).

Vatican II is sometimes understood as having belatedly accepted principles of religious freedom that had already won recognition in most of the civilized world. The Council did, indeed, take advantage of the progress that had been achieved in secular regimes and ecumenical theology, but Vatican II did not simply appropriate the liberal model, which views freedom in negative terms, as equivalent to noncommitment and noninterference. The biblical and theological concept of freedom, taken up by Vatican II, is primarily positive. Noncoercion is no more than a necessary prerequisite for the positive exercise of freedom in responsible self-determination and voluntary adherence to the good and the true. Although freedom can be, and sometimes is, abused, this

eventuality does not negate the right itself. The positive meaning of freedom is emphasized in Vatican II's Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, which states that true freedom is not a license to do whatever one pleases but a capacity to move spontaneously toward that perfection that is the goal of life (n. 17).

Vatican II in these documents did not dramatically reverse previous Catholic teaching. The Declaration on Religious Freedom left intact the traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duties of individuals and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ (n. 1). It did not demand a separation of Church and State, nor did it condemn the Leonine model of the confessional State (n. 6). It affirmed that even if there is an established Church, the right of religious freedom must be accorded to *all* religious groups (n. 6). The civil government, according to Vatican II, has no authority to command or inhibit religious beliefs and practices except in the measure required by public order (n. 7). The Council's teaching on these points, without contradicting earlier Catholic tradition, converged in some respects with the American system of nonestablishment.

Since the Council, many concordats involving the Holy See have been revised so as to avoid referring to Roman Catholicism as the "religion of the State." Following in the footsteps of Pius XII, the Catholic Church today asks only that her right to pursue her evangelical mission be guaranteed. At the close of Vatican II, Paul VI gave classic expression to this new position. In a message to political rulers he declared:

And what is it that this Church asks of you, after nearly two thousand years of all sorts of vicissitudes in her relations with you, the powers of the earth? What does the Church ask of you today? In one of the major texts of the Council she has told you: She asks of you nothing but freedom—the freedom to believe and to preach her faith, the freedom to love God and serve him, the freedom to live and to bring to men her message of life.⁸

The Effect of Civil Religion

Although no given religion is established in the United States, our national traditions are heavily imbued with religion. Abraham Kuyper, lecturing in 1874, maintained that the people of the United States "bear a clear-cut Christian stamp more than any other nation on earth." The separation between Church and State, he said, had a very different meaning for Americans than it

did for Cavour. It stemmed “not from the desire to be liberated from the Church but from the realization that the well-being of the Church and the progress of Christianity demand it.”⁹

We have had in the United States a kind of “civil,” “political,” or “public” religion that neither affirms the particular beliefs of any denomination nor seeks to compete with any Church or synagogue.¹⁰ It does not deify the State but inculcates reverence to a God by whom all States are judged. This common patrimony has some affinities with the “natural religion” of the deists but goes beyond deism in professing various biblical beliefs: for example, that God is to be worshiped and obeyed, that he hears our prayers, rewards virtue, punishes vice, has mercy on the repentant, and governs the world with his providential care.

This “civil religion,” as I call it, is not legally imposed but is officially encouraged. It makes regular appearances at the time of Presidential inaugurations, Thanksgiving Day proclamations, and State funerals. Incumbents of public office are regularly sworn in with their hand on the Bible. They are expected to profess the articles of civil religion and are, at the same time, limited by it insofar as, in their public pronouncements, they are cautioned against asserting a more specific faith. Not all citizens are required to share the civil religion, but it has hitherto enjoyed solid public support. It provides a kind of protective umbrella under which, more specific religious faiths can flourish. Another feature of the American system, which distinguishes it from the laicism of nineteenth-century Europe, is the limited scope of the national government. The First Amendment originally applied only to the Federal government; it did not prevent individual States from having established churches. Even when the First Amendment was applied to individual States through the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, allowance was made for schools, hospitals, and welfare agencies to maintain their specific religious identities.

The government, while not professing any particular form of theism, favored a situation in which religious groups had an effective cultural presence. Religious groups could take advantage of the institutions of free speech and a free press to disseminate their convictions. Many immigrant groups coming from Europe brought their denominational identity with them and settled in religiously homogeneous neighborhoods, whether Jewish or Christian. Thus, the environment in which Americans grew up was permeated with religious influences. Practically speaking, Americans reaped the benefits without the deficits of an established religion.

Civil Religion in Tension with Pluralism

Several new factors are undercutting the traditional civil religion, with its biblical and theistic character. In the first place, the nonestablishment clause in the Bill of Rights has been interpreted in the courts in restrictive ways, imperiling, to some degree, the free exercise of religion, guaranteed by the same article. As a result, government aid is sometimes extended in a preferential and discriminatory way to organizations disavowing any religious connection or orientation. Public funding that might even incidentally redound to the benefit of religious institutions is frequently disallowed. Even religiously affiliated institutions are sometimes required by law not to take account of religious preference or practice in their processes of hiring and promotion. Religious symbols are systematically removed from public life. Public manifestations of faith, for example, in the display of crucifixes, Christmas crèches, and Jewish menorahs, are often discouraged or forbidden in the name of pluralism. In the effort to avoid whatever might resemble “establishment,” the social and public features that belong to religion by its very nature are circumscribed.

A second negative influence is an approach to religion that seeks to achieve harmony by avoiding challenges and confrontation. Questions of religious truth are systematically bracketed. In such an atmosphere it becomes easy for people to regard their religion as a matter of historical accident or arbitrary choice rather than as a gift that avails for eternal salvation. When people come together for family occasions or for business or professional activities, they tend to avoid speaking of religion, which could prove a divisive topic. In this way, religion gets forced to the margins of life and comes to be viewed almost as a hobby to which religiously disposed people might decide to devote some of their leisure time.

This weakening of the consensus is intensified, in the third place, by the proliferation of nonbiblical religions, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, traditional African and Native American religions, and the recent flowering of New Age religion. Concurrently we are experiencing a growth of secularism, which renders many Americans tone-deaf to religion of any kind. Atheistic, pantheistic, and polytheistic groups, which were previously in a position of dissent from what John Courtney Murray called “the American proposition,” are demanding equal status in civil society. As the religious pluralism becomes greater, it undermines the formerly dominant status of biblical theism. The developments just noted have brought about, in the fourth place, a new attitude toward

pluralism itself. Traditionally, religious pluralism was regarded as an evil, albeit a necessary one. In the words of John Courtney Murray:

... The truth is that American society is religiously pluralist. The truth is lamentable; it is nonetheless true. Many of the beliefs entertained within society ought not to be believed, because they are false; nonetheless, men believe them. It is not the function of government to resolve the dispute between conflicting truths, all of which claim the final validity of transcendence. As representative of a pluralist society, wherein religious faith is—as it must be—free, government undertakes to represent the principle of freedom.¹¹

Murray believed that truth about natural and revealed religion matters, that it should be championed by argument and sustained by the consensus of the people. The truths of rational religion, he held, were part of the American proposition. While religious truth could not be imposed by governmental decree, it could be debated and, when found, made to enrich the public consensus. The patrimony of rational belief, which Murray summarized in terms resembling what I have described as the principles of American civil religion, was true, he held; it could be known to be true and could serve as a building block of civil society. This is the basic thesis of *We Hold These Truths*.

Murray himself recognized the likelihood that the American consensus would dissolve. This prospect has, in our day, come close to fulfillment. The prevalent mood is one of despair of knowing anything about the deep structures of reality. The assumption seems to be that there is no way of rationally settling differences of opinion in the realm of religion. Some contend, consequently, that everyone is entitled to his or her own opinion, simply because it is an opinion. For the sake of civil peace, all parties and all views are accorded equal status. The purpose of dialogue, in this pragmatic framework, is not to achieve agreement or truth but to achieve a pragmatic *modus vivendi* among people who continue to differ about questions of substance.

The current retreat from engagement with truth exacts a heavy price. The American proposition, as Richard John Neuhaus reminds us, is no longer proposed. People do not know why they ought to be doing what the laws say that they should be doing. “The popularly accessible and vibrant belief systems and worldviews of our society are largely excluded from the public arena in which the decisions are made about how the society should be ordered.”¹²

Society, in the classical sense, presupposed a common purpose. The citizens of the State (or the vast majority of them) were expected to share a common

vision concerning the good life. As diversity deepens, this consensus breaks down. Cognitive minorities go off in their own directions and cease to be concerned about the values dear to others. In the absence of a shared vision, shared meanings, and a common vocabulary, civil discourse collapses.¹³ Many Americans no longer adhere to the consensus enshrined in their founding documents. This alienation contributes to a weakening of patriotism and to what some refer to as an “eclipse of citizenship.”¹⁴

According to Michael Sandel, in his well-known *Democracy's Discontent*, the dominant tendency in political theory today is to exclude moral and religious arguments from the public realm for the sake of political harmony. The assumption is that reasonable people will always disagree about the nature of truth and justice; there are no criteria for deciding which of two contradictory opinions is true. This pragmatic relativism is manifest, Sandel reports, in the works of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Robert Nozick, and Bruce Ackerman. The minimalist liberalism of these theorists, in Sandel's view, reduces all rights to the merely procedural rather than the substantive; it engenders what he calls “the procedural republic,” in which toleration, freedom, and fairness are the supreme values. This procedural republic, he points out, leads to a moral void in which the citizens are deprived of the moral and intellectual vision needed to sustain a sense of national purpose and even to safeguard freedom itself.¹⁵

To illustrate how minimalist liberalism fails to protect the most elemental human rights, issues such as slavery and abortion come to mind. Unless one acknowledges the inviolable value of the individual person—a postulate that defies justification on pragmatist grounds—it cannot be shown why slavery should not be legitimized by the will of the majority. The recent trend to sanction abortion when the mother chooses to do away with an unborn child violates the principle of the right to life—a principle that the Founding Fathers regarded as grounded in the eternal law of God. The sanctity of human life is further jeopardized by campaigns for infanticide, euthanasia, and assisted suicide. The American experiment started with a national consensus that offered, in the name of liberty, a common ground allowing for a good measure of religious diversity. The constitutional right to freedom, by allowing different positions to be held and propagated without external interference, protected and enhanced pluralism, but we now face the danger that extreme and unreconciled pluralism may turn against the principles that undergird religious freedom itself.

In the absence of any standard of truth by which right and wrong can be measured, decisions have no objective point of reference. Rights cease to have a firm foundation in the inviolable dignity of the person. Decisions about matters of right become, in the end, matters of self-interest or mere arbitrary whim. Nobody is secure, because everyone's rights become negotiable. As John Paul II puts it, "Freedom negates itself and destroys itself, and becomes a factor leading to the destruction of others, when it no longer recognizes and respects its essential link with truth."¹⁶

In the world of agnostic relativism, religion loses its true character as a way of relating the human family to God. God himself is treated as a mere projection of human fantasy, to be exploited insofar as the idea proves interesting and socially useful. Religion becomes a psychological exercise—perhaps a form of therapy or entertainment. In the absence of a realist epistemology, in which God can be apprehended as a power beyond and above us, religion itself becomes as insecure as freedom. Religious freedom lacks any firm grounding because religion has lost its roots in transcendent reality.

Popes of the past century have often been criticized for their expressed reservations about religious freedom. They were referring to the militant secularism of their own day, but much of their criticism is applicable to the agnostic pragmatism that prevails in American society today. It is hard to refute the logic of the following words from Leo XIII:

The nature of human liberty, however it be considered, whether in individuals or in society, whether in those who command or in those who obey, supposes the necessity of obedience to some supreme and eternal law, which is no other than the authority of God, commanding good and forbidding evil. And, so far from this most just authority of God over men diminishing, or even destroying their liberty, it protects and perfects it; for the real perfection of all creatures is found in the prosecution and attainment of their respective ends. But the supreme end to which liberty must aspire is God.¹⁷

If pluralism is taken to mean that the human mind will never be able to encompass the mystery of the divine, it is inevitable and justified. There will always be different points of view, different perspectives, limited insights, but where pluralism is cultivated for its own sake, as if all points of view were equally legitimate, the line must be drawn. We must agree with Murray that religious pluralism implies error and is "against the will of God."¹⁸ Pluralism, if it is not to become destructive, must be accompanied by fundamental agreements such as those embodied in what I have described as the American civil

religion. Unless a solid majority of the citizens accept some such basic core of agreement, the prognosis for religion in the American republic is poor.

Those of us who have come to believe in the God of the Bible and of Judeo-Christian tradition, even without fully agreeing among ourselves about other points of doctrine, have an urgent, common task. We must join forces to give common testimony to the basic truths of natural and biblical religion. We must confess together the importance of declaring that God exists, that his goodness can be known, and that we have certain specifiable duties toward him. We must also insist on our right to bear witness to the further truths that we believe on the basis of Jewish and Christian revelation, as understood within our respective traditions. If many Americans fail to believe, it is partly because believers have failed to present their faith as something credible and important. If the question of religious truth is bracketed for the sake of a consensus that excludes no one, or is short-circuited by a lazy agnosticism, our pluralism may fall into suicidal excesses. Both freedom and religion are jeopardized by the skeptical relativism that threatens to become the dominant ideology of the nation.

Abraham Kuyper called upon Catholics and Protestants to stand side by side in bearing witness to the fundamentals of the creed that they held in common.¹⁹ The same call goes forth today from wise leaders of our respective Churches. In its Decree on Ecumenism, the Second Vatican Council exhorted the faithful: "Before the whole world, let all Christians profess their faith in God, one and three, in the incarnate Son of God, our Redeemer and Lord. United in their efforts and with mutual respect, let them bear witness to our common hope, which does not play us false" (n. 12). Most recently, Charles Colson has argued persuasively that in order to make any effect on our culture, Catholics and Protestants must stand together on the great truths of Scripture and the ancient creeds.²⁰ If these proposals are faithfully implemented, the recent trend away from biblical faith may yield to a new spring-time of evangelization.

Notes

1. John Courtney Murray, *We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1960), 59.
2. Quoted in George G. Higgins, "Introduction," in James Cardinal Gibbons, *Religious Freedom: 1965 and 1975*, ed. Walter J. Burghardt (New York: Paulist, 1977), 4.

3. Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Longinqua*, n. 6, in *The Papal Encyclicals 1878–1903*, ed. Claudia Carlen (Wilmington, N.C.: McGrath, 1981), 365.
4. Pius XII, Radio Message, December 24, 1944: AAS 37 (1935): 12, quoted in John Courtney Murray, *The Problem of Religious Freedom* (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1965), 65.
5. Pius XII, Radio Message, December 24, 1942; AAS 35 (1943): 14, quoted in Murray, *Ibid.*
6. Pius XII, “Religion in the Community of Nations,” in *The Major Addresses of Pope Pius XII*, vol. 1, ed. Vincent A. Yzermans (St. Paul, Minn.: North Central Publishing), 269–77.
7. John Nurser, *The Reign of Conscience: Individual, Church, and State in Lord Acton’s History of Liberty* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1987), 174. John XXIII in *Pacem in Terris*, nn. 143–45 speaks favorably of the *Universal Declaration*.
8. This “Closing Message of the Council to Rulers” was actually read by Cardinal Achille Liénard of Lille; text in *The Documents of Vatican I*, ed. Walter M. Abbott (New York: America Press, 1966), 730. Murray ascribes the “Message” to Paul VI, *ibid.*, 693, n. 53.
9. Abraham Kuyper, “Calvinism: Source and Stronghold of Our Constitutional Liberties,” in James D. Bratt, ed., *Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998), 279–317, quotations from 289–91.
10. The term, *civil religion*, apt though it be, is subject to misunderstanding. It could be taken as the religion of the State, which Jean-Jacques Rousseau advocated as a replacement for orthodox Christianity. It could also suggest a kind of deification of the nation, a distortion from which, political rhetoric in the United States has not been exempt. But, notwithstanding these limitations, authors such as Robert Bellah have used the term in approximately the sense I give to it. Abraham Lincoln used the term *political religion*; Martin Marty prefers to speak of “the public church.” The terminology is not, in the end, decisive.
11. Murray, *We Hold These Truths*, 74–75.
12. Richard John Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1984), 176, 260; quotation 259.
13. David Hollenbach, S.J., “Is Tolerance Enough? The Catholic University and the Common Good,” *Conversations on Jesuit Higher Education* 13 (Spring 1998): 5–15.
14. Robert J. Pranger, *The Eclipse of Citizenship: Power and Participation in Contemporary Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968).

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15. Michael J. Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1996), especially chapter 1.
16. This point is frequently made in the writings of John Paul II, notably in the encyclical *Evangelium Vitae*, n. 19, here quoted.
17. Leo XIII, *Libertas Praestantissimum*, n. 8.
18. Murray, *We Hold These Truths*, 23; cf. 74.
19. Abraham Kuyper, *Christianity: A Total World and Life System* (Marlborough, N.H.: Plymouth Rock Foundation, 1996), 110; quoted by Charles Colson and Nancy Pearcey, *How Now Shall We Live?* (Wheaton, Ill.: Tyndale House, 1999), 304, 517.
20. Colson and Pearcey, *How Now Shall We Live?*, 304–5.