We must admit, to our shame, that the Roman Catholics are far ahead of us in their study of the social problem. Indeed, very far ahead. The action of the Roman Catholics should spur us to show more dynamism. The encyclical Rerum Novarum of Leo XIII states the principles that are common to all Christians, and which we share with our Roman Catholic compatriots.

—Abraham Kuyper

These words of Abraham Kuyper can be found in the first footnote of his well-known opening address on the problem of poverty of the first Christian Social Congress, the address, which is also quoted by our esteemed plenary speaker, Michael Novak in his contribution. Kuyper delivered this speech on November 9, 1891, so about six months after the great encyclical letter of Pope Leo XIII on the rights and duties of capital and labor of May 15, 1891. The quotation that I cited indicates that Kuyper was impressed by the content of Rerum Novarum. But not only that. His footnote indicates, as well, that in his opinion the Dutch Calvinists and the Roman Catholic Pope were on the same track in their analysis and treatment of the so-called social question. The only difference that he mentions is that the Roman Catholics are ahead, even “very far ahead.” But their way or track is the same, because Calvinists and Catholics share in this case the same Christian principles.
In his valuable contribution, Novak refers to what he calls four salient principles of Catholic social thought, which already can be seen in *Rerum Novarum*. The principle of personal agency and responsibility is at the cornerstone, and the other three principles that flow from this fundamental motive are, in his view (and in my shorthand): a spirited defense of private property, an emphasis on personal initiative and enterprise, and a condemnation of socialism as unjust and contrary to nature. His overview leads, I think, to an interesting question, especially in this conference about the legacy of these two pioneers. And that is the question, whether Abraham Kuyper had indeed the same principles in mind as Novak states, when he spoke about *Rerum Novarum* and its principles? Or had he a somewhat different appreciation of the social principles that are common to all Christians?

I will delve into that question as carefully as possible, for, in my opinion, this problem marks an ideal meeting point among at least three traditions of social thought: the social teaching of the Catholic Church, the Dutch Neo-Calvinistic tradition, and the neoliberal tradition that colors to some extent the approach of Novak. And, moreover, the possible answer to that question can also serve as a stepping stone for some comments on Novak’s view on recent advancements in economic theory, at least as far as the Austrian School is concerned.

The question, “What precisely attracted Abraham Kuyper in *Rerum Novarum*?” seen from the viewpoint of principles common to all Christians, is less difficult to answer than it seems, for as far as those principles are concerned, there are, indeed, strong points of similarity and even analogy between *Rerum Novarum* and Abraham Kuyper’s previous work. The principal motives in Kuyper’s approach to social and economic problems took form in the 1870s and are clearly recognizable in all of his later publications, including his great address on poverty of 1891.

I begin with a remark about the session 1874–1875 of the Dutch Parliament. In that session, Kuyper asked his own fellow Roman Catholic members of the House to pay more attention to the writings of a certain bishop of Mainz, von Ketteler—to the same bishop who influenced Leo XIII to such a high extent. And he does so because in his view von Ketteler makes the same plea as he does, only in even stronger language. But what was that plea? It was the request to the government to come as soon as possible, in view of the growing misery in society, to develop separate legislation on labor. Kuyper saw the development of that law as a matter of public justice, because it could restore the distorted balance between labor and capital. I will quote here some words from Abraham Kuyper’s parliamentary speech and ask you later on to compare them with what Leo XIII wrote in *Rerum Novarum*. Let us begin with Abraham Kuyper:

In earlier days a law on labor should not have been possible, because … every relationship (of labor) with other social groupings did not exist in a way which is relevant for public justice…. But since then the situation in Europe has changed to such a high extent, that one may ask with very good reason (alleszins met recht): Why deny any longer to labor its own rights and legal forms of life, which are demanded by the very character of its nature!? … At this moment the laborer is still placed in the condition, that by the force of simple contract he must compete with other groups in society who already are in the possession of the privilege of their own legislation. So he is obliged to compete with his own life and body at stake with the beneficial position of capital. Are these chances really equal?

Among the many and grave duties of rulers who would do their best for the people, the first and chief is to act with strict justice, with that justice which is called distributive, toward each and every class alike (n. 33) … [Now], the richer class have many ways of shielding themselves and stand less in the need of help of the State; whereas the mass of the poor have no resources of their own to fall back upon. And it is for this reason that wage earners, since they mostly belong in the mass of the needy, should be especially cared for and protected by the Government (n. 37) … the first thing of all to secure is to save unfortunate working people from the cruelty of men of greed, who use human beings as mere instruments of money-making (n. 42). The condition of the working classes is the pressing question of the hour, and nothing can be of higher interest to all classes of the State than that it should be rightly and reasonably settled (n. 60).

Not only is the resemblance in content striking. There is, indeed, also a deep resemblance in their orienting principle, which they both call the principle of justice: respectively, public and distributive justice. This justice has to be implemented primarily by the State, and in their shared opinion this principle is not only related to the rights of separate persons or individuals but also to the rights of social groupings and of classes. (Kuyper even speaks here of spheres, according to the Calvinistic principle of sovereignty, for him labor is a sphere of its own). Both Leo XIII and Kuyper invite the government to take action to restore the distorted balance of power between these spheres. Now this is, in my view, not a typical classical liberal perception of justice, for that pertains primarily to the State-citizen or State-individual dichotomy. So one

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And now Leo XIII in *Rerum Novarum*:8

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could even ask if Leo XIII and Kuyper in their concept of justice were not influenced here to some extent by the Marxist method of class-analysis.

Personally I do not think so, but my argument for that brings me quite naturally to a second form of deep congeniality between Leo XIII and Abraham Kuyper. They both interpret the social question of their day predominantly as a lack of appreciation for the natural and organic body (or bond) of society itself. This lack of recognition goes, in their common opinion, even back to revolutionary roots, which already led to awful forms of disharmony between social groups. The awareness of that revolutionary source colors, for instance, the famous first words of Leo XIII’s encyclical: “…the spirit of revolutionary change, which has long been disturbing the nations of the world, (has now) passed the sphere of politics, and made its influence felt in the sphere of practical economics.” In the letter itself, Leo XIII states clearly:

The ancient working men’s guilds were abolished in the last century, and no other protective organization took their place. Public institutions and the laws set aside the ancient religion (n. 3). The great mistake made now is the notion, that class is naturally hostile to class, and that the wealthy and the working men are intended by nature to live in mutual conflict. [But] just as the symmetry of the human frame is the result of the suitable arrangement of the different parts of the body, [so] in a State it is ordained that these two classes should live in harmony and agreement (n. 19).

Abraham Kuyper thought similarly. See, for instance, the following quotation of Abraham Kuyper that Novak also cites: “The French Revolution threw out the majesty of the Lord in order to construct an artificial authority based on individual free will.” And at the end of the same quotation you find the remark, that in sharp contrast with that view, the Christian religion (so not only the Calvinist variety of it) stresses personal human dignity in the social relationships of an organically integrated society.

What do I want to say with these remarks? My suggestion is not, and I want to be clear, that Novak was wrong in his rendering of the four salient principles of Catholic social thought. But I want to add something to his exposition: A correct interpretation of those principles is only possible, if they are seen and understood in direct coherence with the common views that I just mentioned, namely, the view of the organic unity of human society on the one side and the principle of distributive justice on the other side (as the orienting principle for all actions of the State).

But, saying this, I am not sure if Novak is willing to support this view, for in his list of salient principles, distributive justice and the institution of the State are not mentioned at all. And, as far as the organic unity of society is concerned, it struck me that in relation to that concept, at least in two of Novak’s books the word nostalgia is used, the nostalgia for a simpler more agrarian world as it existed in medieval times. But is that the main point here? No, I do not think so. The main point is that both pioneers obviously disliked and distrusted, at least to some extent, the mechanistic Enlightenment concepts of the new free-market society—not because they were new but because they implied a substitution of the existing organic and communal forms of markets and guilds for a far more mechanical and individualistic form of human economic interaction; and that, without any provision for what that substitution could mean in terms of justice for the vulnerable conditions of poor people. They could not support, to say it otherwise, that kind of liberalism that transferred the Enlightenment idea of revolution from the realm of politics to that of economy and industry.

Now, in his lecture and in his many publications, Novak made it quite clear that he also does not want to ally with any type of doctrinaire or revolutionary liberalism. His plea is for a humane liberalism that fights for the upholding of liberal institutions, such as private property and a non-State controlled market. Now, I am inclined to say, that in relation to these issues all of us here are already at his side, for I suppose that none of us here, either Catholic or Calvinist, will defend the opposite position, which, however, turns this type of liberalism almost into a truism. But that is not very satisfying. For we all feel as well, that this does not really honor what Michael Novak stands for; there is really more substance, more content to his position than is present in such a truism. Therefore, it may be good to look closer at his thought, not only to understand better his particular way of reading, papal encyclicals and other historical material, but also to receive better insight into his positive appreciation of recent trends in the developments of modern economics.

I can choose no better guide here than Michael Novak himself. In his work on the spirit of democratic capitalism, a very interesting part is where he explains the spiritual drive behind the new societal order of democratic capitalism. This new “religion,” so he says, was [and is] “susceptible of a quite secular form, but [it] gives human history and the cosmos a meaning, and also a commanding power.” This dynamic spirit of capitalism even set forth tables of virtues and vices with a thoroughgoing casuistry for interpreting every detail of concrete behavior in their light. Different elements of its ethos are therefore mentioned by him, such as the evolution of pluralism, new concepts of the individual, the community, the family, concept of sin, and respect for unintended consequences of human actions. And then, in my view as a sum-
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mary of everything said before, Novak states: “The spirit of democratic capitalism is the spirit of development, risk, experiment, and adventure. It surrenders present security for future betterment.”¹³ Later on, where the importance of ideals is discussed, the text states: “To know the ideals of democratic capitalism is to be restless under the status quo and to wish to do better in the future.”¹⁴

Now I am fully aware that Novak describes here a concrete societal system, which he does not want to identify with the coming kingdom of God.¹⁵ But he is not shy in stating at the same time that he sees these elements also as real merits from his own neoliberal position. I quote:

I hold that the liberal society, among known and workable present and future societies, best serves Catholic social thought, best uplifts the poor, institutionalizes the dignity of the human person, makes possible the growth and manifold activities of human associations of every sort, and conspires to establish a more voluntary and open and communitarian form of life than any society of the past, present, or foreseeable future.¹⁶

Seen from the vantage point of the merits of the spirit of democratic capitalism as described by Novak, his way of interpreting the papal encyclicals and the work of Abraham Kuyper become now indeed far more clear and understandable. For are “development, risk, and adventure” not the best vehicles to create what Novak calls “productive” justice, the justice of producing wealth and creating economic development for all?¹⁷ Is this restless development not especially present in a system, which is blessed by the presence of self-correcting impersonal¹⁸ economic mechanisms?¹⁹ Are voluntary associations between mature individuals not the best forms of building community? Is the Lord of history not primarily a purposive God,²⁰ striving for the coming of his kingdom? Is one of the best ways to defeat sin not to transfer its energy to creative use with unintended good consequences,²¹ and are outward Christian soldiers not called to daily combat with the self, inspired to noble competition by the example of the saints?²²

It is, in my opinion, this underlying philosophy (or ideology) of progress, growth, risk, restlessness, competition, and the derived value of impersonal mechanisms that indeed explains Novak’s specific way of reading of the papal encyclicals. It also elucidates why Novak is not fully appreciative of their whole content. Both Leo XIII and Abraham Kuyper miss, for instance, that strong orientation on the necessity of human progress that Novak has in mind, when he speaks about the approximation by that progress of the kingdom of God.²³ Furthermore, the concepts of human subjectivity, community, property, and even profit have, in my opinion, a somewhat different color in the encyclicals than they get in Novak’s exposition.

In relation to the issue of personal agency, it is, for instance, striking that the encyclical Centesimus Annus speaks next to individual subjectivity of a “subjectivity” of society that also has to be honored (n. 13). So the subjectivity of the individual is obviously only half of the correct view of the human person. Regarding private property, something similar seems at hand. Centesimus Annus states, for instance, with equal clarity as the right of private ownership that the “use” of goods, while marked by freedom, is subordinated to their common destination as created goods. And when, in relation to creativity and enterprise, Pope John Paul II affirms in his encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis the great significance of the right of economic initiative as the creative subjectivity of every citizen. He hastens to add that also a nation, especially a less-advanced country, may be deprived of its own subjectivity if it is not allowed to maintain its own cultural and economic significance (n. 15). And where the principle of justice is mentioned, the pope says in full correspondence with Populorum Progressio: “In fact, if the social question has now acquired a worldwide dimension, this is because the demand for justice can only be satisfied at that level … how can one justify the fact that huge sums of money, which could and should be used for increasing the development of peoples, are [now] instead utilized for the enrichment of individuals and groups” (n. 10)? And where in Centesimus Annus the pope acknowledges clearly “the legitimate role of profit,” he also, therefore, adds immediately that the purpose of a business firm is not simply to make a profit. Its purpose, so he states, is to be found in its very existence as a community of persons, who in various ways form a particular group at the service of the whole of society” (n. 35).

It is, therefore, not strange at all that both in the Catholic and neo-Calvinist traditions we find not only warnings against socialism but also against classical liberalism. Both socialism and classical liberalism are seen as fruits of the same “Tree of Enlightenment,” which is characterized by the effort to reconstruct society in an individualistic way. For in that project of societal reconstruction all persons are primarily seen as atoms or individuals, to be fitted together in either the construct of mechanical and anonymous markets, or in the collectivist artifact of an omnipotent State. Both do reject any form of contentment, maturity, or saturation— which are the metaphors of organic life—but strive after an infinite and restless expansion of what man can make and produce. The strongest formulation comes here from Abraham Kuyper:
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The root principle of the French Revolution is its God-provoking cry “neither God nor master”—the ideal of humanity emancipated from God and his established order. From this principle extend two lines, not just one. The first is the [liberal] line along which you move in making up your mind to break down the established order of things, leaving nothing but the individual with his own free will and imaginary supremacy. Alongside this runs another line, at the end of which you are tempted not only to push aside God and his order, but also, now defying yourself, to sit on God’s throne, as the prophet said, and to create a new order of things out of your own brain. The last is what social democracy wants to create. [And Kuyper adds:] There is [also] in this [last] aim no letting go of the individualistic starting point. In fact, social democracy wants to erect a social structure ... on the foundation of the sovereignty of the people, and thus on individual will.  

In his Stone Lectures, he adds:

We in Europe at least, have arrived at what is called modern life, involving a radical breach with the Christian traditions of the Europe of the past. The spirit of this modern life is most clearly marked by the fact that it seeks the origin of man not in creation as the image of God, but in evolution from the animal. Two fundamental ideas are clearly implied in this: (1) that the point of departure is no longer the ideal or the divine, but the material and the low, and (2) that the sovereignty of God, which ought to be supreme, is denied, and man yields himself to the mystical current of an endless process, and regresses and progresses ad infinitum.

Especially the spirit of progress of Enlightenment liberalism led to a hard process of dissolution of the many existing organic ties and institutions of the premodern European society. Both Kuyper and Leo XIII lay, therefore, much emphasis on the need for a reorganization of the society of their times. But they meant with words such as organization and reorganization something different, as we usually understand it, for in their view every society, premodern or modern, needs living socioeconomic communal organs to remain in good shape. Therefore, if and when older organs, such as the guilds, died or were abolished, the growth and construction of new organs (reorganization) is requested by distributive or public justice. Neither Leo XIII nor Abraham Kuyper asks for a restoration of the old guilds; that would, indeed, have meant a kind of nostalgia. But both insist on the erection and foundation of those new organs in society that can fulfill again in economic life the need for communal ties between common people. So we see that both Kuyper and Leo XIII make a plea for the founding and growth of labor unions to attack the social question in its roots and to heal again modern society from the wounds in its social fabric.

Is that insight, so I would like to ask you, not also of direct significance for our time and our circumstances? The present style of globalization is inspired by faith in the merits of the survival of the fittest in a context of growth, risk, and competition, which, however, implies running roughshod over the weaker nations and cultures of the South and of the vulnerable natural environment by the prevailing mechanisms. Honoring the common legacy of Leo XIII and Abraham Kuyper implies, therefore, strengthening our public duties to protect weaker societies and natural endowments against all forms of misuse and overuse on a global scale, and supporting legally the poor in their efforts to come to a kind of self-organization against global capital. From a Kuyperian point of view, I add to this statement, that in terms of the principle of sphere sovereignty, the greatest danger of our time is no longer the risk of a too-dominant State, threatening the spheres of business and family. Now the greatest threat comes from a far-too-dominant economic sphere and the corresponding business activities, which tend to commercialize almost all elements of human culture. The economic sphere infringes deeply (think of so many aggressive advertisement campaigns) into the family—making it very difficult to educate young children against materialism, and now also tends to violate the sphere sovereignty of the State, transforming the government into an instrument of private economic interests.

With the help of this perspective it is easier for me to comment on Novak’s view of recent changes in economics, and I prefer to do that in a somewhat personal way. I was trained as an economist in the fifties at the Rotterdam School of Economics by teachers such as Jan Tinbergen, the first Nobel prize winner of economics; Henk Lambers, my promoter and a brilliant institutional economist; and Johan Witteveen, the former director of the International Monetary Fund. Due to their wisdom and insights I learned to love economics as a social science, a science called to contribute solutions to the most severe economic problems of our time, such as unemployment, the poverty of the South, and environmental destruction. I was also deeply influenced by my Christian Calvinist roots, and these lead me in some other aspects to deep feelings of disappointment vis-à-vis modern economic science. The Dutch Calvinist philosopher, J. P. A. Mekkes, made me especially aware of the closed, autonomous world and life view that was and is still present in the positivistic, so-called value-free mainstream of economics, which, especially
The root principle of the French Revolution is its God-provoking cry “neither God nor master”—the ideal of humanity emancipated from God and his established order. From this principle extend two lines, not just one. The first is the [liberal] line along which you move in making up your mind to break down the established order of things, leaving nothing but the individual with his own free will and imaginary supremacy. Alongside this runs another line, at the end of which you are tempted not only to push aside God and his order, but also, now defying yourself, to sit on God’s throne, as the prophet said, and to create a new order of things out of your own brain. The last is what social democracy wants to create. [And Kuyper adds:] There is [also] in this [last] aim no letting go of the individualistic starting point. In fact, social democracy wants to erect a social structure... on the foundation of the sovereignty of the people, and thus on individual will.25

In his Stone Lectures, he adds:

We in Europe at least, have arrived at what is called modern life, involving a radical breach with the Christian traditions of the Europe of the past. The spirit of this modern life is most clearly marked by the fact that it seeks the origin of man not in creation as the image of God, but in evolution from the animal. Two fundamental ideas are clearly implied in this: (1) that the point of departure is no longer the ideal or the divine, but the material and the low; and (2) that the sovereignty of God, which ought to be supreme, is denied, and man yields himself to the mystical current of an endless process, and regresses and progresses ad infinitum.26

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under the weight of the mainly neo-Kantian dichotomy between facts and values, fails to appreciate the unpriced parts of economic reality, such as the social fabric in which people choose and act and the natural environment in which they live. Mekkes, by the way, did so entirely in the line of Kuyper and Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd made in his *Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea*, for instance, the following remark about the Austrian school of economics:28

Under the guise of an abstract purely functional viewpoint the so-called Austrian School in its “pure economics” absolutized free-market relations at the expense of the other typical structures of society, which manifest themselves within the economic aspect of reality.

I tell all this, because the same feelings of ambivalence, vis-à-vis my discipline, are coming back as I hear and read Novak’s contribution. Of course, there is something good in the turn toward subjectivity within the Austrian school of economics, but it comes so late, so very late. Even now I miss in the publications of the representatives of that school a real appreciation for the significance of social relations for the empirical ways in which economic subjects act. “The calculus remains an internal construct that is egocentric in form,” so states Alan Storkey quite correctly.29 Becker has indeed introduced the valuable concept of human capital, but he is also the economist who expanded the utilitarian logic of choice to issues such as fertility, crime, and marriage. Becker’s views that children as consumer durables can be assumed to provide “utility,” and that we therefore can speak of “higher quality” infants when they are more expensive, leads Etzioni in his well-known study on the moral dimension in economics30 to the deserved remark: “One wonders, what is the effect of potential parents to children, if they are systematically taught to think about their offspring as a trade-off to other goods, such as cars.”

Friedrich von Hayek is also quoted by Novak. He indeed opened the eyes of many economists to the significance of evolution in economic life and to competition seen as a dynamic process, but Hayek was also the person who, in his attack on scientism, rejected the notion of “society” as such, because the only genuine material at our disposal, so he said, is to be found in the set of relationships between individuals.31 An idea such as the subjectivity of society, as expressed by John Paul II, would have been seen by him, I think, as pure nonsense. Hayek held also the strong conviction, fully in the line of Enlightenment philosophy, that the growth of reason and the progress of civilization emerge concurrently. “Civilization is progress, and progress is civilization,”32 he once wrote. The infiniteness and restlessness of man’s actions and desires, not his finitude or possible saturation, is Hayek’s leading societal image.

Let me conclude by saying, as far as the Austrian School is concerned, we should be happy with some changes in its most recent development; I agree on that point with Novak. However, because of its neo-Kantian background, it is simply not able to open itself to a more normative type of analysis of economic facts. A type of analysis that is now so deeply needed to come to a better economic understanding of phenomena, such as the increase of poverty and the erosion of environmental quality—phenomena, which, by the way, are also near to the heart of all recent papal encyclicals. The leading economist Amartya Sen wrote: “If one examines the balance of emphasis in the publications in modern economics, it is hard not to notice the eschewal of deep normative analysis, and the neglect of the influence of ethical considerations in the characterization of actual human behavior.”33 I could not agree more.

Notes

1. The word *Christian* does not appear in the official name of the meeting (*Het sociaal Congress*), and is therefore an addition of later times. The official title of Kuyper’s speech was “Het sociale vraagstuk en de Christelijke Religie” (*The Social Question and the Christian Religion*).


4. Most important in this respect are: (1) *Souvereiniteit in eigen kring* (Rede ter inwijding van de vrije Universiteit, 1880); (2) “Een wetboek van de arbeid,” in *Eenige kameradviezen* (Amsterdam: Wormser, 1890) (both also published in W. F. de Gaay Fortman, *Architectonische critiek: fragmenten uit de sociaal-politieke geschreven van dr A. Kuyper* (Amsterdam: Paris, 1956); and (3) the brochure *Handenarbeid* (Amsterdam: Wormser, 1889). Both the address on *Sphere Sovereignty* (1) and on *Manual Labor* (3) are also fortunately published in English.
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Ibid., 333.

23. Freedom with Justice, 209.

24. Kuyper, The Problem of Poverty, 65: “If asked whether our human society is an aggregate of individuals or an organic body, all those who are Christians must place themselves on the side of the social movement and against Liberalism.”

25. Ibid., 60.


27. How strong this idea of necessary reorganization was in the thought of Kuyper becomes clear especially in his 1891 lecture, where he speaks about Jesus as the One who organized (“Heeft Jezus ook niet georganiseerd?”) Ibid., 40.

28. Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1953), I, 555. Kuyper did not comment (as far as I know) on the Austrian School, but ... school can be characterized as the school of the individualistic principle, which takes self-interest as its lever (hefboom), and has chosen for the striving after utility as its highest aim. Now I do not wish in any way to deny the merits of that school of thought, but I ask: Is her principle really sustainable (houdbaar) in the long run? Is the time not coming to look for another, more honorable and higher principle than that for the building up of the State: not the self-interest that divides but the love that binds together?” Abraham Kuyper, Een wetboek van den arbeid, 33, my translation.


31. Also mentioned by Ben B. Seligman, Main Currents in Modern Economics (New York: Macmillan, 1962).


5. See Freedom with Justice, 61–68.

6. I give here my own translation of the relevant text because it is not available in English: “But especially I make here an appeal to (receive the support of) my Roman Catholic members (of Parliament). For under the greatest figures of whom the Roman Catholic Church of our days may boast, in my opinion, a first place is taken by the mighty personality of the bishop of Mainz, Von Ketteler. And now, has this bishop not made a plea, in even stronger language than I dared to choose, for the same interests?” “Een wetboek van de arbeid,” in Fortman, Architectonische, 35.

7. Fortman, Architectonische, 32, my translation.


12. Ibid., 29.

13. Ibid., 48.

14. Ibid., 333.

15. Ibid., 21.


18. “The very structure of democratic capitalism—even its impersonal economic system, is aimed at community, the community of free persons in voluntary association” (129). In Freedom with Justice he states that “markets are impersonal. The goals served by markets are social not personal” (178).


20. Ibid., 18.

21. Ibid., 82ff.

22. Ibid., 333.

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