Mouw also gives attention to philosophical dimensions that stem from this line of Kuyper, such as the work of Herman Dooyeweerd. Mouw’s essay, “Modal Diversity in Dooyeweerd’s Thought,” will provide a helpful view of this philosopher’s approach to patterns of social interaction (modes) while presenting a good example of critical engagement and contemporary application.

Readers of this journal will be particularly interested in Mouw’s engagement with the work of Stephen J. Grabill in “Law, Covenant and Moral Commonalities.” The chapter expresses appreciation for the retrieval of natural law while also pointing to other ways that Reformed theologians have articulated the “commonness” that exists among all humans, regenerate or otherwise. Doctrines such as common grace and the idea of covenant are highlighted as ways in which humans can identify commonality though not in primarily cognitive ways. Mouw concludes that the natural-law tradition needs greater consideration but not exclusive attention as we consider human life together.

Following a very interesting chapter (“Creational Politics”) that sympathetically engages the Anabaptist tradition and specifically John Howard Yoder, there are several chapters in the latter half of the book that attend to the heirs of the Dutch Calvinist legacy. Klaas Schilder’s important contribution to faith and culture, splits in Calvinist denominations, the identity of genuine Christians, reflection on seminary education, the unique legacy of Dutch-American philosophical reflection, and the salvific status of infants in relation to baptism are covered; the ethnic emphasis should not dissuade any from entering these conversations and considering how the legacy of these Christians can illuminate the larger concerns of Christians everywhere. The book also contains a very helpful appendix that explains important terms and denominational identities.

While this reviewer wishes “the line of Kuyper” were familiar to most Protestants, such is not yet the case. This volume, along with Mouw’s recent introductory work to Abraham Kuyper, helpfully contributes to the aim of making this important theological legacy more prominent.

—Vincent Bacote

Wheaton College, Illinois

God and Moral Law:
On the Theistic Explanation of Morality
Mark C. Murphy
New York: Oxford University Press (192 pages)

*God and Moral Law* is the latest work by the prominent Catholic philosopher, Mark Murphy, who holds a professorship of religious philosophy at Georgetown University. Murphy works at the intersection of analytical moral and legal philosophy and contemporary natural-law theory, and his work, including the present volume, is predominately philosophical in content. He therefore tends not to reflect extensively on revealed theology in the way that, say, the American natural-law theorist Jean Porter does.
Some of Murphy’s broad arguments in *God and Moral Law* will be familiar from some of his previous works, such as his monograph *Natural Law and Practical Rationality* (Cambridge University Press, 2001) and *An Essay on Divine Authority* (Cornell University Press, 2002). This latest work is a relatively slim volume and can be seen as a development of themes from both of those books (particularly the latter) written in an even denser analytical prose style. The fact that this reviewer had read a significant proportion of the material presented in *God and Moral Law* in previously published articles does not give the book a fragmented or dated feel.

The work purports to put forward an original understanding of the lawful character of normative moral theory and its relationship to God, whose existence is assumed for the sake of argument in the book. In chapter 1, Murphy makes the case that the category of “moral law” is a defensible and helpful category for a range of normative moral outlooks, not only theistic ones. In doing so he takes a position at variance to the late Elizabeth Anscombe in her landmark 1958 essay, “Modern Moral Philosophy.” In the second chapter he outlines the position that moral facts can be explained by the presence of moral law and that the moral law in turn can be explained by facts about God who is best thought of as playing an immediate explanatory role in the existence of moral law.

Chapter 3 is particularly helpful in outlining some of the core aspects of natural-law theory. In particular, this chapter sheds light on the controversial question of whether natural-law theory is essentially deontological or teleological—or a sophisticated combination of both. This chapter could be used, on a self-standing basis, as a teaching resource for undergraduate philosophy majors. Murphy pays particular attention in this chapter to how “detachable” (in John Finnis’s terms) natural-law theory is from an explicitly theistic ethic, altering Murphy’s previously held position in *Natural Law and Practical Rationality* that there is no necessary and immediate theistic explanation of the natural moral law. This is a somewhat novel position for a contemporary natural-law theorist—though (ironically) it has similarities with the stance of the traditionalist Thomist Steven A. Long—and is contrary to the position taken not only by Finnis but also by notable scholars such as Anthony Lisska and Martin Rhonheimer.

Chapter 4 critiques the “theological voluntarism” outlined by such theorists as Philip Quinn and Robert Adams on the basis that such concepts do not properly explain moral necessities and how God can be the immediate explanation of those necessities. Murphy’s key thesis is contained in chapters 5 and 6 of the book and is the notion of “moral concurrentism,” in which “an account of the good in which facts about God and facts about creaturely nature cooperate in fixing the character of creaturely goodness” (149). Murphy justifies his position with vigor and persistence, but this reviewer would have welcomed reference by the author to solutions that other Catholic philosophers have offered to the interface between God’s role as a moral governor and human autonomy. A comparison with, or at least reference to, Martin Rhonheimer’s important theory of “participated theonomy” (taken up in John Paul II’s 1993 encyclical *Veritatis Splendor*) or the more traditional First Vatican Council doctrine of the *Duplex ordo cognitionis* might have helped
those Catholic philosophers less immersed in the literature of analytical philosophy to locate Murphy’s notion within a wider intellectual framework.

*God and Moral Law* will be valued by those engaged in debates within analytic philosophy and possibly those participating in the emerging school of analytical theology. General readers or those unfamiliar with the form of argumentation employed in the analytical idiom may find Murphy’s style somewhat testing. At times this style even appears to include sending himself up, such as an extended passage in which he speculates about the ethical consequences of acquiring an illness that makes him taste like “a good chicken fried steak” (155). *God and Moral Law* is probably best directed at graduate students or advanced undergraduates focusing specifically on analytical philosophy of religion. Scholars in the field of moral or religious philosophy will also value Murphy’s insights if they can conquer the analytical idiom employed.

—Greg Walker (e-mail: walkergh@cf.ac.uk)
Cardiff University, Wales, United Kingdom

---

The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Pope Benedict XVI’s Social Encyclical and the Future of Political Economy

Adrian Pabst (Editor)

Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2011 (289 pages)

Imagine the following scene:

Before us on the table lies a text that we all agree will inform how we approach our lives as faithful Christians in the modern world. Around us are several people clamoring to have us accept their interpretation of the text. Most of them agree that the text speaks with one voice, but they cannot agree on what the voice says. Some say it calls us to affirm European-style socialism. Some would go farther and say that it affirms the “true communism” of the Victorian writers John Ruskin, George Bernard Shaw, and Frederick D. Maurice. Some say it reaffirms the message of social justice that has become a familiar refrain of contemporary Christians from the political left. Others say that it wraps that message in a cloak of love and charity, pointing us in a new direction. Some say the key to the new direction is fraternity and generosity; others that it is gift and reciprocity—the social justice activists tell us that both those options are encapsulated in the renewed call to justice.

Many of the voices around us remind us that a Christian anthropology is the starting point for all Christian inquiry into politics and the civil economy. Just as soon as they start talking about politics and economics, though, they once again fall into a cacophony of differing voices. Must there be a distinctly Christian approach to politics, economics, and sociology? Are there secular concepts of the social sciences that can inform us as we approach our modern world as faithful Christians? Were not there some approaches to the social sciences that, although we often think of them as secular, were actually informed