employing the principles of classical liberal thought. While those orthodox thinkers in the high liberal and libertarian traditions may indeed not consider Tomasi’s market democracy as a serious alternative to their embedded philosophies, the “ideologically uncommitted” and “intellectual adventurers” (to use Tomasi’s descriptors) may want to give market democracy a serious second look. Tomasi has provided the intellectual and justificatory framework for classical liberal adherents to robustly explore opportunities in a market-democracy research program.

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The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion
Jonathan Haidt
New York: Pantheon Books, 2012 (419 pages)

As a social psychologist, Jonathan Haidt’s research focuses on how moral reason functions in social systems. In The Righteous Mind, Haidt is concerned that political and religious opponents wrongly demonize each other because they do not understand what the other side values and why. The book seeks to present the moral foundations of liberals (modern-day progressives) and conservatives in an attempt to show why it is that both sides talk past each other and why this impasse throws a wrench into policy making. In the end, Haidt notes that conservatives have an advantage in making a case for their positions in public discourse because they are more balanced in their moral foundations.

For those unfamiliar with the discipline of moral psychology, Haidt provides good background in the first few chapters. In chapter 1, we learn that moral psychology began as a subdivision of developmental psychology. Building on the work of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, researchers were pursuing two questions: How do children come to know right from wrong and where does morality come from? Haidt observes that rationalists, overvaluing reason in a Kantian sense, dominated early research, causing them to miss other important aspects of human nature. Early pioneers were beholden to Kantian frameworks, believing that moral actions followed cognitive moral reasoning. Haidt believes this approach to be inaccurate. As an alternative explanation, Haidt maintains that moral reasoning is what we do to justify our moral intuitions post hoc. For Haidt, our moral reasoning apparatus includes innate intuitions given to us by way of evolution as well as those learned from particular cultural norms and practices.

The next several chapters introduce readers to the basic principles of moral psychology and Haidt’s “intuitionist model.” Chapters 2 and 3 explain the first principle of moral psychology, namely that intuitions come first and strategic reasoning second. Using the illustration of a rider on an elephant, Haidt observes that the mind is divided into controlled processes (the rider) interfacing with automatic processes (the elephant). Because we use moral reasoning to make sense of our intuitions, if you want to change someone’s
mind about a moral or political issue, you need to address a person’s intuitions first (50). Intuitions are not static and can be shaped by reasoning, especially when reasons are embedded in relationships and story (77).

Chapter 4 explains that reason was designed to seek justification, not truth (74). To make this case, Haidt goes to great lengths to demonstrate that people work harder to look virtuous than to actually be virtuous (76). We are obsessed with personal polls, argues Haidt. We care so much about how people think of us that we will use our “in-house press secretary” to automatically justify our actions (78). Here we encounter a great weakness in using reason to make sense of morality. Because we use strategic reasoning to justify any of our preferences it opens us up to confirmation bias—“the tendency seek out and interpret new evidence in ways that confirm what you already think” (80). Confirmation bias makes discourse about public policy nearly impossible.

Chapters 5 through 8 frame the core of the application of moral psychology to politics. Haidt builds on discussions about the limited perceptions of political society used by those who are Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD). The WEIRDer you are, the more you see the world full of separate, independent, autonomous selves rather than as a place of relationships (96). In what could be a new challenge to John Rawls’s *Theory of Justice* from the discipline of psychology, Haidt maintains that there is more to morality than conceptions of harm and fairness, which is the second principle of moral psychology (98). Moral monism—the attempt to ground morality on a single principle—“leaves societies at high risk of becoming inhuman because they ignore so many other moral principles” (133).

Challenging the ethical validity of deontological concepts of morality (especially Kant and J. S. Mill), Haidt developed what his team calls “Moral Foundation Theory.” This theory initially laid out five moral foundations that cultures use to define morality, including care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity. A few years later, liberty, a sixth moral foundation, was added. Using empirical data, Haidt demonstrates that liberals and conservatives differ greatly in their appropriation of these foundations.

After processing data from over 132,000 subjects, Haidt concludes that conservatives have a moral advantage when speaking to the intuitions of most Americans because conservatives value the six moral foundations equally whereas liberals narrowly value care (compassion), liberty, and fairness while ignoring the others. Therefore, in public policy discourse conservatives are more effective at reaching broadly whereas liberals inadvertently limit themselves to people who do not value the US Constitution (loyalty), the proper role of government (authority), or personal morality (sanctity) (161).

It is our propensity to “groupishness” and tribalism propelled by confirmation bias that frustrates progress in helping those in need. This brings us to the third principle of moral psychology—that our group loyalties bind us and blind us. The remainder of the book, chapters 9 through 12, explores how forming group coalitions can be a double-edged sword. From evolutionary psychology, Haidt suggests that we initially organized in groups to form societies but we also organize groups in order to compete against others. We cooperate in order to compete. This aspect of groupishness is an asset. However, problems arise
because our groupishness in compromised by self-deception and confirmation bias. We find this in the debates between Christians and New Atheists as well as debates between liberals and conservatives. For example, no amount of evidence provided by Christians is going to dismantle the confirmation bias of New Atheists. In the same manner, no amount of data regarding the economic impact of rent control is going to dismantle the groupish confirmation bias of liberals who embrace Keynesian economics. In the end, Haidt suggests that the only way forward is to have robust discussions about the moral foundations that bind us and blind us in relational contexts of trust because the polarization and demonization are getting us nowhere.

For readers trained in Christian ethics and natural law the temptation may be to dismiss Haidt because the book is written presupposing evolutionary biology and psychology. Those readers will need to temporarily suspend their own confirmation bias as well as definitions of words such as moral and reason as they function within their respective disciplines in order to fully appreciate Haidt’s project. There may be alternative explanations for our moral intuitions that religious ethicist may be able to offer in this discussion. Haidt’s point that different concepts of human nature matter in public policy will not be new to many scholars. However, what Haidt does for ethicists is bring evidence from social psychology to make the case that moral foundations and beliefs about human nature drive public policy prescriptions, thus making this book invaluable. Religion scholars will simply have to eat the conceptual meat and spit out the evolutionary and relativistic bones. At best, this book demonstrates that moral and social psychology can be an enormous asset to Christian ethics and should encourage more cross-disciplinary approaches to conceptualizing the intersection of religion and liberty.

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Human Development in Business: Values and Humanistic Management in the Encyclical Caritas in Veritate
Domènec Melé and Claus Dierksmeier (Editors)
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012 (260 pages)

Collections of papers are difficult to review and often do not merit detailed discussion. This book is an exception. It contains a selection of papers that may be understood as cross-sectional evidence of the pulse of the debate on a common and rather narrowly defined topic: What is humanistic management, and which role does it or should it play in business? Most essays were presented at the 17th International Symposium on Ethics, Business and Society held by IESE Business School of Universidad de Navarra in Barcelona in May 2011. This symposium has emerged as one of the foremost venues for the discussion of the role of business in society, and the coeditors of this volume count among the most prominent advocates of humanistic management.