Second Thoughts: Newman on Political and Economic Liberty

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While John Henry Newman clearly balked at liberalism in his early days, that is not the entire story. To reach an accurate judgment of Newman on political and economic liberty, one must not be too quick to follow the common first impression. A second look reveals Newman’s own second thoughts. This article argues that as his thought developed Newman warmed toward liberty while maintaining his criticism of the idea of automatic social progress. Through this lens, Newman’s mature position becomes clearer, revealing his own contribution regarding the value of a free society.

It is often said that second thoughts are best; so they are in matters of judgment, but not in matters of conscience. In matters of duty first thoughts are commonly best—they have more in them of the voice of God.¹

Introduction

The sermons of John Henry Newman are replete with warnings to heed the direct calls of God with quickness—neither lagging behind God nor trying to get ahead of him. Yet, for matters of larger consequence and thought, the voice of conscience is not always exactly clear at first. First thoughts must be sifted and examined to see how far they were indubitably correct. With respect to his decision to enter the Roman Catholic Church, Newman spent nearly six years attempting to ascertain whether his duty was to leave the Anglican Church or not and whether it was also to join the Roman Catholic Church.
In the *Essay on Development*, written during this long examination, Newman had analyzed how the myriad changes in Catholic theology and life could possibly fit with a notion of a deposit of faith delivered completely during the age of the apostles. If Christianity’s original idea had remained the same, how was it that Christian judgments on so many topics seemed to have changed? Newman’s explanation was that any great idea, whether theological or philosophical, will appear to be small at first, much like the beginning of a stream or a young creature. The progress of a great idea cannot even be described without using multiple metaphors, and it cannot be evaluated until after a long process. According to Newman,

it necessarily rises out of an existing state of things, and for a time savours of the soil. Its vital element needs disengaging from what is foreign and temporary, and is employed in efforts after freedom which become more vigorous and hopeful as its years increase. Its beginnings are no measure of its capabilities, nor of its scope. At first no one knows what it is, or what it is worth. It remains perhaps for a time quiescent; it tries, as it were, its limbs, and proves the ground under it, and feels its way. From time to time it makes essays which fail, and are in consequence abandoned. It seems in suspense which way to go; it wavers, and at length strikes out in one definite direction. In time it enters upon strange territory; points of controversy alter their bearing; parties rise and fall around it; dangers and hopes appear in new relations; and old principles reappear under new forms. It changes with them in order to remain the same.²

As it is with a great idea, so it is with anyone who wishes to truly follow great ideas. The famous ending of the above paragraph, too often separated from the last clause about the necessity of change in order to continue in sameness, needs to be emphasized: “In a higher world it is otherwise, but here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often.”³

I do not think we need to claim that Newman himself reached perfection on any particular topic in order to see the wisdom in such a quotation. Second thoughts are often best; ideas and those who wield them often need time. Newman’s examples of such ideas in the text included not only Christianity itself but also “the doctrine of the divine right of kings, or of the rights of man, or of the anti-social bearings of a priesthood, or utilitarianism, or free trade, or the duty of benevolent enterprises, or the philosophy of Zeno or Epicurus.”⁴ Second thoughts are often reversals of positions, but for Newman they are largely not reversals of first principles. The *Essay on Development* was dedicated to figuring out whether various second thoughts in Christian doctrine and practice were consistent with its original “idea.” In other words, second thoughts are often reversals of ap-
lication due to a growing understanding of the principles themselves and how those principles should be applied in changing circumstances.

As a social, economic, and political thinker, Newman has often gone unrecognized—an occasion for second thoughts among readers. This is partly due to his own reticence to publish his thoughts on the concrete state of ideas such as free trade or other aspects of political and economic theory. First, unlike the public intellectuals and scribblers of his day and ours, his goal was not to publish, willy-nilly, his own first thoughts. Newman understood what A. D. Sertillanges would later write in *The Intellectual Life*, that even mediocre minds can come upon a great idea as one can find uncut gems in the forest; it is the “cutting and setting” of the idea “in a jewel of truth” that matters. Newman’s lone pure essay in political philosophy was a series of letters to the *Catholic Standard* in 1858, examining the British Constitution and national genius, eventually published under the title of the first letter, “Who’s to Blame?” in his book *Discussions and Arguments*. “It has never been my line,” he wrote late in life, “to take up political or social questions unless they came close to me as a matter of duty.”

Second, Newman tended to give the impression to others that he was himself ignorant of political and economic goings-on. Writing to the Anglo-Irish poet Aubrey DeVere in 1885 he confessed, “I am a very bad person to ask for an opinion on a political question … but the truth is that since 1832 I have no political views at all.” Insofar as Newman was, except for a brief period as a young man, never a member of either the Tory Party or the Whigs, it is true that he had no political views. Crane Brinton wrote that even as an Anglican,

He did not adopt a high Tory sentimental nationalism and wish the Stuarts back; nor did he embrace the cause of the poor as the cause of God and the Virgin, and surround the Red flag with incense and candles. He continued, humbly and proudly, to be John Henry Newman, of no party but God’s.

This same unwillingness to put his trust in princes of any political persuasion was continued in his Catholic life. In an 1859 article in *The Rambler* on the “Policy of English Catholics toward Political Parties,” Newman wrote against the notions of attempting to get Catholics to rally behind one political party or another and attempting to start a Catholic party itself. Newman was insistent on the fact that Catholics came from high and low, Whig and Tory, and elsewhere. No, Newman disdained the idea of attempting to unite Catholics around what was not doctrine but philosophy. Insofar as Newman was a man who took political questions seriously and thought about them, he was a political thinker of a profound sort. Despite the disclaimers on Newman’s part, those who spoke to him
about politics knew this. His politician friend Sir Rowland Blennerhasset wrote to his German wife about Newman’s political judgment even on German matters:

His wonderful instincts kept him strangely right in German politics. It was instinct for he knew no German, or nothing to speak of. Yet I always consider I owe him as much as regards the little I know about Germany. It was not the facts he told one or the information he imparted. It was as well as I can express myself the method or habit of mind one got from him on looking at German affairs.¹⁰

Third, Newman’s own evaluation of the nature of this-worldly questions was that they were, though important, ultimately not to be labeled among first things for a Christian. As Edward Norman characterized Newman’s priorities, “the institutional arrangements for the world received a fairly lowly position, for he was addressing matters of antecedent gravity.”¹¹ That Newman took such matters seriously did not mean that he overvalued questions of politics or economy. True, such arrangements might have involved ideas, but for Newman too often such ideas were themselves often shunted aside in political discussions that were reduced to questions of expedience and of power. In such cases, religion was regarded only as an obstacle to political schemes. Newman knew too well that the main political issues in many cases related to an “idea” of securing the power of politicians and the well-off in society. On the flip side of political expedience and power seeking, Newman was equally distrustful of the sincere beliefs in this-worldly solutions to the human condition, which is a fragmented heart and not merely a technical glitch. Ideas all too often become idols and religion is again reduced to an obstacle, this time to progress. “Human nature wants recasting,” he said in The Tamworth Reading Room, “but Lord Brougham is all for tinkering it.”¹²

Newman’s Liberalism

Newman has been undervalued in part because he has been so often misunderstood. Part of that terminological confusion is bound up with terms such as liberalism, which even today can be the slipperiest of words, indicating a whole variety of points of view political, philosophical, and theological—many of them polar opposites. Pope Leo XIII said that he was determined to honor the Church in Newman though “they said he was too liberal.”¹³ Newman was forever accused of being a liberal, but he himself declared in his biglieto speech upon receiving the cardinal’s red hat that a summary of his work could be said to be a fight against liberalism.
The answer to the conundrum is that when Newman spoke of liberalism, he was referring to a set of principles rather than a course of action—philosophical liberalism rather than a political order. “You might call me a liberal,” he answered one correspondent, “I should call myself anti-liberal.” While Russell Kirk called Newman “a consistent Tory, devoted to the principle of aristocracy and the concept of loyalty to persons,” and Avery Dulles wrote that Newman “detested liberalism” in politics, Newman was neither politically nor temperamentally a consistent Tory. Neither was he absolutely and utterly opposed to all forms of political liberalism, nor even opposed to every bit of the liberal theory. In the biglieto speech, Newman observed of the religious liberalism that backs liberalism as a political theory that

it must be borne in mind, that there is much in the liberalistic theory which is good and true; for example, … the precepts of justice, truthfulness, sobriety, self-command, [and] benevolence, which, as I have already noted, are among its avowed principles, and the natural laws of society. It is not till we find that this array of principles is intended to supersed, to block out, religion, that we pronounce it to be evil.

Liberalism, as a political theory, has something going for it, but it is incomplete and therefore “evil” in Newman’s eyes when it purports to tell the whole story about the human being. Its falseness is as a closed account of reality that excludes God from the premises. “Religion is in no sense the bond of society” is the cry of the philosophical liberal. Newman consistently denied that the bond that unites a society could be anything other than religious. Lord Brougham’s tinkering with society was the pledge of doctrinaire English Liberals of the 1840s to build a new bond for society based not on faith but on a kind of technocratic scientism that claimed to exhaust knowledge. Both knowledge and technique must be directed to some theoretical end, and the end of the liberalism of the mid-nineteenth century was simply a utilitarian scheme of pain and pleasure. Such a center cannot hold much together for any length of time. “Let Benthamism reign, if men have no aspirations; but do not tell them to be romantic, and then solace them with glory; do not attempt by philosophy what once was done by religion.” Although a principle of expediency could keep the liberal state going for some time, Newman “shows no confidence that ‘broad ethical truths’ will stand unassailed without religion, and in any case, although a State may endure for some time without true morality, yet without it, its ultimate corruption is ensured.” For Newman, the politically liberal state had its roots in Christianity, and it needed Christianity for any long-term survival.
Yet, apart from philosophical or religious liberalism, Newman came to embrace a number of aspects of the Liberal order, as a number of scholars from Harold Laski and Terence Kenny down to Stephen Kelly, in his 2012 survey of Newman’s political and social thought, have shown. Newman’s position was not made on the basis of philosophical liberalism itself, but for reasons relating to his own Christian and, if you will, conservative beliefs. Crane Brinton put it in provocative terms that Newman ended up being a “romantic ally of the liberal spirit he distrusted.”

Terence Kenny wrote that an accurate title of his own study of Newman’s political thought could have been The Liberalism of Cardinal Newman.

**Newman’s First Thoughts**

It was not always so. The reason why second thoughts must occur about Newman is that his political and economic thinking underwent their own second thoughts. Newman’s original positions indeed lay heavily on what was considered traditional in Christendom. Stephen Kelly writes that Newman’s “sense of ‘Loyalism’ made him celebrate the traditional union between the Established Church, the monarchy, and the aristocracy.” Indeed, in 1836 in the *British Magazine*, Newman explained: “The (so called) union of church and state has been a wonderful and most gracious phenomenon in Christian history. It is a realization of the gospel in its highest perfection, when both Caesar and St. Peter know and fulfill their office.” It was the efforts of the Whig governments of the 1820s and 1830s to emancipate Catholics and lessen bars to participation in English political life for Protestant dissenters that began the Oxford Movement itself. In 1832, writes Kelly, Newman “disliked Liberals’ demands for constitutional liberty and could not understand their resentment towards royal autocracy.” The idea of any large-scale change to the British Constitution was seen as anathema. That year, Newman opposed the Reform Act, which increased the size of the electorate by some 50-80 percent, meaning that one out of six adult males were now voting. In 1838, he even drew a link between democracy and the Anti-Christ in his tract, “The Patristical Idea of the Anti-Christ.”

In a similar way, Newman’s views on economic and market life were heavily antagonistic, decidedly Tory, and aristocratic in the way that Russell Kirk had characterized. The changes in British life that were occurring as the Industrial Revolution changed economic life were greeted by Newman with grave distress. Newman was inspired, according to Stephen Kelly, at least in part by anticapitalist articles in the *British Critic* by Samuel Bosanquet. Bosanquet was, like Newman, a fierce opponent of liberal reforms and an advocate of a paternalist approach to
poverty. In his sermon, “The Danger of Riches,” Newman observed that it was “a very fearful consideration that we belong to a nation which in good measure subsists by making money.” It was in the context of a report on the American Episcopal Church that Newman wrote of the situation of America in which, long before Calvin Coolidge said it, the business of America, even more so than in England, was business. He did not like what he saw of the man of trade.

He has rank without tangible responsibilities; he has made himself what he is, and becomes self-dependent; he has laboured hard or gone through anxieties, and indulgence is his reward. In many cases he has had little leisure for cultivation of mind, accordingly luxury and splendour will be his beau ideal of refinement. If he thinks of religion at all, he will not like from being a great man to become a little one; he bargains for some or other compensation to his self-importance, some little power of judging or managing, some small permission to have his own way. Commerce is free as air; it knows no distinctions; mutual intercourse is its medium of operation. Exclusiveness, separations, rules of life, observance of days, nice scruples of conscience, are odious to it. We are speaking of the general character of a trading community, not of individuals; and, so speaking, we shall hardly be contradicted.

Newman contrasted the effect of wealth, drawing a distinction between the landlord for whom duties correct the faults associated with the pursuit of wealth and the trader, or financier, who has no such paternalistic duties. In another sermon, Newman wrote, “I do not know any thing more dreadful than a state of mind which is, perhaps, the characteristic of this country, and which the prosperity of this country so miserably fosters.” This worldly ambition is contrasted with any sort of reverence. One who has it becomes

a partizan in extensive measures for the supposed temporal benefit of the community, to indulge the vision of great things which are to come, great improvements, great wonders: all things vast, all things new,—this most fearfully earthly and grovelling spirit is likely, alas! to extend itself more and more among our countrymen.

Second Thoughts

Given Newman’s own love of authority and the role it played in his conversion, one might have expected the mature Newman to appear very much as did many other Continental conservatives: as a version of his Anglican self with Catholic additions. However, Newman had had second thoughts.
Concerning Church and state issues, Newman thought the Temporal Power (that is the pope’s rule over the large portions of Italy) was something that should be abandoned. Hugh MacDougall, in his book on Acton and Newman, observes that Newman actually beat Acton to this position by a year and helped convince Acton of it.\textsuperscript{30} Newman saw that political rule, though not against the teaching of the Church, was not working for the Church’s independence and ecclesial freedom but against it. How could one say the Church is made more independent when the pope depended on protection by a French army against the Italian nationalists? In addition, Newman was, as Terence Kenny put it, “a positive enthusiast for the secular state.”\textsuperscript{31} In his sole exclusively political treatise, “Who’s to Blame?” written during the crisis of the Crimean War, he wrote, “Indeed, I have a decided view that Catholicism is safer and more free under a constitutional regime, such as our own, than under any other.”\textsuperscript{32}

In this same treatise, we find Newman’s thought to be in favor of a small, limited government. Newman explains his rather Lockeian understanding that a state is what happens when a given group of people organizes itself or makes a “settlement.” “It is,” he writes, “the production and outcome of a people, it is necessarily for the good of the people, and it has two main elements, power and liberty,—for without power there is no protection, and without liberty there is nothing to protect. The seat of power is the Government; the seat of liberty is the Constitution.”\textsuperscript{33} The Constitution is the seat of liberty because it is essentially a series of checks on political power. Power always tends toward “centralization,” while liberty has an end in “self-government.” Power and liberty are “in antagonism from their very nature; so far forth as you have rule, you have not liberty; so far forth as you have liberty, you have not rule.” While a people that gives up no power to a leader cannot be a state, a people that “gives up everything … could not be worse off, though [it] gave up nothing.”\textsuperscript{34} Newman acknowledges that different peoples have different gifts, and that some peoples are more suited to foreign action than to domestic activity, drawing up a parallel between the English who are more like the peaceful, but economically and culturally entrepreneurial Athenians, and the Russians or French who are more like the militarily powerful Spartans.\textsuperscript{35} England is great as a nation but weak as a state. While he allows for these differences, it is clear that for Newman the state that governs best governs least. “You cannot eat your cake and have it;” he writes, “you cannot be at once a self-governing nation and have a strong government.”\textsuperscript{36}

Similarly, Newman’s tune has changed when he comes to the “miserable state” of his nation of men with an “ambitious spirit.” Newman celebrates the Victorian business culture in as hearty a voice as he had denounced it twenty
years before. Edward Norman says he sounds like any “Manchester Radical” as he speaks of these matters.37

This, then, is the people for private enterprise; and of private enterprise alone have I been speaking all along. What a place is London in its extent, its complexity, its myriads of dwellings, its subterraneous works! It is the production, for the most part, of individual enterprise. Waterloo Bridge was the greatest architectural achievement of the generation before this; it was built by shares. New regions, with streets of palaces and shops innumerable, each shop a sort of shrine or temple of this or that trade, and each a treasure-house of its own merchandise, grow silently into existence, the creation of private spirit and speculation. The gigantic system of railroads rises and asks for its legal status: prudent statesmen decide that it must be left to private companies, to the exclusion of Government. Trade is to be encouraged: the best encouragement is, that it should be free. A famine threatens; one thing must be avoided,—any meddling on the part of Government with the export and import of provisions.38

One might observe from the inclusion of “speculation” that Newman has changed his mind somewhat about the place of the financier.

While Newman worried about democracy, he was worried about it for the reason that John Stuart Mill was—it had a tendency to destroy liberty itself. Newman’s cheerleading for the British system is not without its ironic bits in this regard, noting, for instance, “England, surely, is the paradise of little men, and the purgatory of great ones.”39 Newman thought that what was great about the system of England was precisely its happy mediocrity between absolutism and democracy.40 He was not an unalloyed opponent of democracy, particularly after his time in Ireland as rector of the new Catholic University there. He wrote to the young convert Gerard Manley Hopkins in defense of the Irish cause of home rule that the Irish did not consider themselves rebels since they had never yielded to British control in the first place. “If I were an Irishman,” he observed, “I should be (in heart) a rebel.”41

Newman’s Political and Social Development

What were the causes of Newman’s changes of position? Why did he come to think that liberty was so important in religious as well as economic matters? Why did he forsake the glorious union of Church and state? Why so many second thoughts?

On matters of Church and state, the first answer is that even as the young Newman protested the Liberal government’s enfranchisement of others who were not Anglican, he began to realize that the relation of government to the Church
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was an asymmetrical one, and he was beginning to see that sovereignty was the issue. Even as he was defending the “glorious union” he was beginning to see that such traditional arrangements were not going to last. In 1829, he could already foresee the separation of the Anglican Church from the state and dread it for three reasons: (1) because revolutions are “awful things,” (2) because of the lack of “security for sound doctrine without change which is given by an Act of Parliament,” and (3) because the clergy would be “dependent on their own congregations.” As he was recalling the “glorious union” in 1836, he was also aware that the times were looking as they had in the patristic age “when men prayed for their rulers, and suffered from them, neither giving nor receiving temporal benefits.”

Newman’s determination that the Anglican Church could not be Catholic was due in part to his perception that it had not the power to determine its own teaching. He realized that the security for doctrine provided by an Act of Parliament was a false security. The Established Church was part of the establishment; it was a department of state. Newman was not surprised at the Gorham Decision in 1850, in which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of Parliament, a secular court, overruled an Anglican bishop who refused to ordain George Gorham on the basis of Gorham’s belief that baptism does not confer regeneration. To Newman, the Anglican Church had been proven incapable of deciding its own doctrine or deciding who could be ordained.

Newman was no less clear on his dislike of unions of Church and state when they were Catholic. Newman’s understanding of the state after he became a Catholic was, as we have pointed out, Lockean, and distinctly nonmetaphysical. He was also more Augustinian in his perception of the reality of original sin. Part of Newman’s distinctly pessimistic outlook on political affairs was that original sin did not exempt either people or rulers. While Newman worried about absolute democracy, he also rejected the sort of Tory paternalism that he had initially embraced during his Oxford years, and he rejected the notion that a “Catholic Civilization” or a “Catholic state” was of any intrinsic advantage to human souls or to government. To attempt to withdraw into a Catholic state was a fool’s pursuit because sin was not bounded by political barriers. In a series of letters to the convert historian Thomas Allies, Newman argued against Allies’ assertion that the goal of Christian society is to have the Church-state arrangements of the Middle Ages. While Newman was reticent to make absolute judgments about the political arrangements of different times, he denied that the Christian theocracy of the Middle Ages was either in principle or empirically more beneficial to the salvation of souls or the health of societies. If it was better in any sense, he argued, this was only an accidental advantage because antecedent probability lies the other way. In a letter to another correspondent, the Anglo-Irish convert
Newman had seen in his several trips to the Mediterranean that, though the fullness of Catholic faith was the law of the land, this did not guarantee either more serious Christianity or temporal success.

Thus we are led to Newman’s hymn to free enterprise and limited government in “Who’s to Blame?” The question one might immediately ask of all this is how Newman can extol such liberalism of government and enterprise, especially if religion can be the only thick bond of society? I think we can again point to Newman’s experience of Mediterranean Catholic states as a counter-example of authoritarian government’s producing fewer results than the modest and neutral secular state of England. We might also observe that Newman had also discerned a difference in theology’s relationship to politics. Terence Kenny observes that Newman had already begun to think about this in *The Idea of a University* when he claimed that politics, like chemistry and pure mathematics, will suffer less from a disconnection to theology than will other subjects such as ethics and metaphysics. Much like Michael Novak’s long-held belief that the economic, legal, and cultural/religious elements of a society are semi-independent, Newman’s thought, too, was predicated on a complex relationship among the elements of a civilization. Although Newman (like Novak) did indeed believe that a religious bond was ultimately necessary for a long-term survival of a state, he was too intelligent and too observant to think that society’s rejection of a religious bond would mean the immediate downfall of a nation’s morality or of a nation. An unpublished fragment from Newman’s middle-aged years records some thoughts on the “influence upon morality of a decline in religious belief.” He says that “the decline of religious belief might never affect the morality even of a whole class of men or of a generation; long habit, conservatism, law, respect for each other’s opinion, or personal convenience.” Furthermore, like Adam Smith, Newman understood that there is still a great deal of ruin left in a nation even when its religious bond is broken.

For Newman, ruin was not to be understood only negatively. Newman never really believed in such a thing as political theology. He believed that the ideas in politics were determined largely, as Edward Norman put it, “from the order of natural truth.” Being the good Catholic that he was, Newman understood that...
this order was accessible to nonbelievers as well as to Protestants and Catholics. However, they needed freedom in order to work with natural truth.

As Alvan Ryan observed and as Stephen Kelly has elaborated on, it was Newman’s experience of general Catholic intellectual culture operating under a lack of freedom that led Newman to emphasize freedom of action in both the Church and the state. Newman’s disputes with the Catholic bishops led him to conclude, in sympathy with “young Irishers” on his faculty and with the laity in general that “nothing great or living can be done except when men are self-governed and independent.”

Newman’s appreciation of English independence, self-government, and free enterprise could only be enhanced by his counter-experiences. In his defense of free trade, Terence Kenny observed, Newman was “consciously making a political and moral, and not an economic choice.”

Newman was appealing to liberalism in the sense of liberty of action. Newman understood that the tolerant, neutral state could become authoritarian just as easily as religious states could.

While Kenny rooted this appeal to liberty in Newman’s own individualistic strain of thought, I think it is equally true to say that Newman’s defense was rooted in his social view of the world and of ideas. If we go back to Newman’s understanding of the way in which ideas travel through history and are treated by different thinkers until they achieve clarity and breadth, until applications fit original ideas to the concrete circumstances of a society, we can see that Newman’s individualism is not atomized but is a sense of that which large numbers of individuals working in independence and self-government can bring to a society with their disparate understandings, experiences, and knowledge. When Newman appeals to the wonders of an England that are produced out of private enterprise, he is only demonstrating what he had talked about in the *Essay*—namely, the significance of individuals’ working together without central direction to bring ideas to life. While Kenny can say that Newman’s defense of free enterprise is not an economic choice, it certainly had economic effects—just as his defense of political freedom had effects. Meriol Trevor wrote of Newman that his acceptance of political liberalism was not only based on “principles derived from natural virtues and the sense of justice common to all mankind,” but also because it produced “benefits that were real and desirable.”

He was under no illusions that such freedom was permanent for he understood that everything here on earth is transient. Furthermore he understood that the political and economic freedom that had arisen and that he had begun to support were goods that were worthy of supporting for the sake of the Church, for the sake of his nation, and for the sake of individuals. Such goods as well as the goods they were producing were not automatic—visions of automatic progress were no more a part of his maturity than
they had been of his youth. Instead, they were goods that had to be rediscovered in every generation. That is why he liked freedom better.

Notes


   Now it is very observable, that one of the two early Fathers whom I have already cited, Hippolytus, expressly says that the ten states which will at length appear, though kingdoms, shall also be democracies. I say this is observable, considering the present state of the world, the tendency of things in this day towards democracy, and the instance which has been presented to us of democracy within the last fifty years, in those occurrences in France to which I have already referred.


